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Chapter 1. Introduction 
In 2017, the world was swept by a wave of sexual assault and sexual harassment accusations 
against many of Hollywood’s powerful men. These were the first big impact of the #metoo movement, 
which allowed women to use social media to share their experiences and call their abusers out (Davey, 
2019). Even while facing some pushback, the movement continued spreading to many countries in 
different forms and intensities. In Japan, it took a while to be acknowledged, because of the 
traditional media’s reluctance in reporting on the topic, based on society itself treating rape and abuse 
as taboo. However, the efforts of internationalized and less conventional digital media outlets and 
the courage of some women to come out and name high profile abusers, such as journalist Shiori Ito1, 
allowed the movement to slowly show its face within Japanese society (Ito, 2018).  
This was the biggest achievement of the movement: it clearly showed to the whole world 
that the power imbalance existent everywhere in our male-dominated society was as alive as ever, 
especially in the workplace. Not only when it came to sexual harassment and abuse, this gender 
inequality also could be seen translated into the gender-pay gap, lack of women in positions of power, 
discrimination related to pregnancy and maternity leave and other discriminatory attitudes. It broke 
through the general illusion that the decades of apparent advances in international human rights law, 
particularly in the protection of women’s rights, had solved this kind of problem. While it is true that 
some states have managed to reach better gender equality, others have been stuck in time and so-
called traditional gender roles.  
Japan is a prime example of this situation. It is a highly economically developed country, 
with the necessary material resources to fully implement women’s rights protection provisions. It 
also is one of the leading nations in international society, being part of groups like the G7, having 
ratified all the most relevant UN human rights treaties (such as the International Bill of Human Rights 
and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women – CEDAW), 
and even creating domestic law to nationalize the provisions of such documents. Proving how close 
                                                 
1 For uniformity, in this thesis the names of Japanese people will be written in “first name/ last name” order. 
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is the relationship between the state and the treaty bodies, a Japanese woman has even been the 
chairperson of the CEDAW Committee before. Lastly, the Japanese government has been for a long 
time extremely vocal about its plans of creating a gender equal society “where all women can shine”. 
Regardless, Japan remains low in international gender equality indexes when it comes to female 
economic and political empowerment. There is a clear gap between Japan’s legal commitments and 
its compliance with these legal provisions, which has impeded Japanese women from fully enjoying 
their rights.  
This commitment/compliance gap in the implementation of women’s rights is the focus of 
my work. Thus, in this thesis I aim to understand the reasons for such a lack of implementation of 
internationally sanctioned women’s rights in the case of Japan. The core research question is as 
follows: 
 What are the causes for Japan’s commitment/compliance gap when it comes to the women’s 
right to work?  
Supplementing this core question, I identify a list of sub-questions that will help answer the core 
question and shape the chapter structure of the thesis. They are as follows: 
 What is the spiral model of norm diffusion? What are its strengths, weaknesses and relevance 
to this thesis? 
 How has the UN human rights system been dealing with the protection of women’s rights? 
 How has Japan domestically applied international human rights treaties, with special 
attention to the CEDAW, the ILO documents and NGOs? 
 What are the major issues that arise from a commitment/compliance gap in the 
implementation of women's rights in Japan? How can case studies illustrate these issues?  
 Making use of interviews, how can I apply the “spiral model” to the Japanese case? 
 Based on this analysis, can I suggest ways of bridging the commitment/compliance gap?   
Such sub-questions are not only useful to help visualize the formal organization of the thesis, but 
also to identify the research’s starting point when it comes to its material contents. Therefore, before 
reaching a conclusion concerning these questions, I can use them to proceed to the development of 
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tentative answers on what has been causing this lack of implementation when it comes to the 
women’s right to work, in the form of propositions. 
 First, I see that the influence of cultural and social conditions in this lack of implementation 
is highly relevant, even more when looking at women’s work-related situation. Problems such as the 
M-shaped curve of women’s employment, the gender-pay gap of 24.5% (Yamaguchi, 2019), the 
existence of a discriminatory system of dual career paths that locks women into clerical work without 
growing perspectives, the fact that most working women get shunned into part-time positions, the 
continuous and normalized subjection of workers to cases of sexual and power harassment, and the 
lack of women in both public and private positions of power show that indeed society plays a huge 
part in the persistence of this issue. There is still this strong idea, (sadly externalized and internalized 
by people of both genders) of how women should behave, and this influences their life choices and 
opportunities. 
Second, Japan has been criticized by domestic and international actors for its tendency of 
downplaying the importance of international law, which influences how both decision makers and 
the general population tend to not have working knowledge concerning the content of such laws, and 
consequently of their own rights. Despite being a part of all the main human rights related 
international treaties, Japan has also been harshly criticized by the CEDAW Committee for 
continuously not implementing the Committee’s previous recommendations and for refusing to ratify 
the CEDAW Optional Protocol, thus not recognizing the competence of the Committee to receive 
and consider complaints from individuals or groups in its jurisdiction. The ILO (International Labour 
Organization) has made declarations in the same sense, specially because in this case Japan refuses 
to even ratify or follow some of the most basic equality-related conventions and recommendations. 
Lastly, as the third proposition, I have the fact that discrimination persists because Japanese 
domestic laws and policies created to implement treaties or to put in practice national policies are 
inadequate, poorly constructed and lack any real sanction for the actors who do not follow them. In 
the same sense, Japanese courts are basically an illustration of gender inequality, with very few 
female judges and law operators. Plus, they tend to not apply international law or human rights 
 
 8 
concepts in their judgements, taking a backseat when it comes to creating chances for any significant 
societal change to be achieved. 
Following the setting of research questions and propositions, I must think of how can I 
demonstrate the validity of such ideas. Thus, there is the need to decide on the best possible research 
design. In the present thesis, the main question deals with what causes the implementation gap in the 
Japanese context, and thus I must work with the always inextricably linked causal and descriptive 
types of analysis (Gerring, 2001). Furthermore, using the teachings of Christopher Lamont in the 
field of research tailored specifically for international relations, I may situate the research design 
epistemologically within the empiric/interpretive spectrum as pending to the side of interpretivism, 
but with important influences of empiricism (Lamont, 2015). The reason for that is the approach 
taken to the research question, since even though the research question asks about a causal 
relationship, it tends to focus more in leading us to better understand identities, norms, ideas and 
culture, criticizing the status quo. Thus, the best research design in this case was to mainly utilize 
qualitative methods, with a focus on two main points: Collecting data through preexistent literature, 
both from primary and secondary textual sources; and carrying out semi-structured interviews 
(Lamont, 2015, p. 84) with actors actively involved in the issue of women’s right to work.  
All this data collection and interviews will be carried out taking into consideration 
positionality theory and how it affects my research. According to Kezar and Lester, it is a concept 
that originated in postmodern feminist theory (late 80s and early 90s), as an addendum to Sandra 
Harding’s standpoint theory, and suggests that identity is fluid, dynamic and affected by historical 
and social changes. Composed by three main components, which are intersecting identities, power 
relations and context, positionality allows researchers to focus on the intersection of various aspects 
of a person’s identity, and how they are incredibly relevant to form the position every researcher has, 
and how this position builds and reinforces individual perspectives that affect the research itself 
(Kezar & Lester, 2010, pp. 165-166). 
As a foreign researcher studying the inner workings of another society, I must be aware of my 
own positionality and how I may be perceived by the people I interview. Although I have lived in 
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Japan for 7 years, speak Japanese fluently and have included myself in the spaces Japanese women 
use to discuss their labour rights, that does not change the fact that I am still a Brazilian woman that 
had her main educational formation in Brazil, under a legal and cultural approach to women’s rights 
that is highly different than the Japanese one. The study of human rights and of the role of 
supranational legal organizations in Latin America (and in other areas of the world), who play a key 
part in the enforcement and interpretation of human rights provisions, was unavoidable and essential 
in my undergraduate years, and it definitely gave me a unique view of the issue. 
That said, this awareness of positionalities and contexts which differ for me and for my 
interviewees does not change my approach that there are universal human rights, guaranteed by 
international treaties and which must be successfully implemented. Plus, at the same time I respect 
and take into account the impact positionality can have in my research, especially considering how I 
am the primary decision maker and the dominant figure in the research process (Vanner, 2015, p. 2), 
I use the “spiral model” of norm diffusion in an attempt to anticipate and screen out these concerns.  
A similar point can be made in regards to the question of tradition and culture being used by 
key actors as defense mechanisms against norm diffusion, since these ideas overlap with the 
understanding of positionality to some degree. I emphasize that this research is based on the “spiral 
model”, which is a social scientific model, and that it aims to analyze the extent to which an 
internationally agreed upon model of women’s rights is or is not being successfully implemented. In 
the case of Japan, although the situation of implementation is undeniably “messy” and the cultural 
defense mechanism may be found in the statements of a variety of actors, it is a fact that the state has 
signed up to the majority of the most relevant international documents on women’s rights, and has 
also actively worked on introducing a many of those into its domestic legislation. Thus, it can be said 
that, regardless of the discussion concerning their actual implementation, Japan has accepted the 
validity, the relevance and the legitimacy of these rights, in the form of a universal human rights 
paradigm, both in softer and harder legal mechanisms. That considered, I approach both positionality 
and the argument of culture and tradition carefully, when I analyze the content the interviewees 
provided me, and letting them use this platform to raise their voices.  
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Then, concerning the collection of data through the compilation and examination of literature 
itself, to analyze the commitment/compliance issue I will use a theoretical approach based on Risse, 
Ropp and Sikkink’s “spiral model” of norm diffusion, with some complementary aspects taken both 
from other models of norm diffusion and from different theories altogether. I chose this model of 
describing the socialization processes through which international norms are internalized for the 
following reasons: its organized framework, created in 1999 but updated in 2013, has had good 
explanatory power for different individual cases; it made possible to generalize the different phases 
of human rights change across different types of political regimes, socio-economic systems, and 
cultural regions; it has a high number of citations in other studies, which shows that academia has 
been fruitfully engaging with it; and it provides a rich conceptual framework within which to analyse 
the commitment/compliance gap.   
It is also important to point out that the “spiral model” offers an ideal-typical conceptualization, 
a framework indicating what happens when the human right in question is being successfully diffused. 
Making use of that essential characteristic of the model, it becomes easier to identify in the situation 
of specific states what is not going according to plan. In other words, the model is extremely helpful 
in identifying the “messy” points existent in the workings towards the domestic implementation of 
human rights, and in guiding us towards possible ways of overcoming such “messiness”. In that sense, 
if it is found that what is happening in a state when it comes to human rights implementation does 
not match the model’s framework, this is in no way detrimental to the use of the model itself, but it 
is instead valuable, as the model is helping us to identify the specific situation of the state. It is not a 
question of the model not working correctly, or being wrong about such situation, but that it is 
showing us what is happening in the process of diffusing human rights norms in a particular state.      
In Chapter 2, I will present this “hybrid” approach to the “spiral model”, dividing the 
processes of human rights implementation in five distinct phases, based on the interaction between 
domestic and transnational actors and states. Put simply, in the first phase of repression the state tries 
to actively stop any opposition group from bringing human rights norms to the light. In phase two, 
denial, the state continues refusing to recognize the validity of human rights norms, but the process 
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of international socialization has started. Phase three of tactical concessions sees the state using 
concessions to get the international human rights community to stop pressuring it, which empowers 
domestic advocacy groups. During phase four of prescriptive status, the state discourse shifts and 
the state ratifies human rights treaties and conventions. Lastly, in phase five, rule-consistent behavior, 
the state changes its behavior and complies constantly with international human rights, which leads 
to implementation both domestically and internationally. 
I also include references to three theories that can make the model even more well adapted 
to be applied to the Japanese case. First, I introduce Checkel’s theory of different types of 
socialization. Checkel divides socialization processes in three types: Strategic calculation, in which 
a state focuses on incentives and rewards to reach the best situation for itself; Role playing or Type 
I socialization, which sees actors adopting certain roles because they are appropriate in a particular 
setting and because it is the easier thing to do; Normative suasion, persuasion or Type II socialization, 
where agents present arguments in order to convince each other, through active and reflective 
internalization, being guided by a logic of appropriateness.  
Second, I read the “spiral model” together with theories of norm localization, particularly 
Acharya’s work. This theory highlights the importance of the domestic legal structure as the one that 
will transpose international law into practice within national borders. Thus, there is the need to 
develop a respectful dialogue between local beliefs and foreign norms, so as to find congruence 
between both sides and make it easier for states to accept external influence when necessary. There 
is no forceful domestic implantation of international principles understood as universal, but an 
adaptation based in the active construction of foreign ideas by local actors, which results in 
congruence between international norms and local beliefs and practices. This approach can be related 
to positionality theory, in the sense that it takes into account the intersectional background and 
context that shape a state and its citizens. It is also particularly important for the Japanese case in 
relation to the women’s right to work, because it is an Asian state which highly values many 
traditional gender role aspects, such as women being responsible for taking care of the home and 
children, (even having to abandon their careers completely to do so), while men are only responsible 
 
 12 
or working, being unrelated to domestic or child-rearing responsibilities. To avoid Japan raising 
culture-based objections before international pressure to comply, it might be necessary to apply 
concepts of norm localization to this case.  
 Third, I need to include a feminist approach to the topic, since it deals with women’s rights. 
Two related points will be brought up in this sense: the need to address the conflict existent between 
protection of women’s rights according to feminism and multiculturalism, and the productive 
engagements feminist scholars have had with constructivist ideas and norm contestation. Concerning 
the first point, as mentioned in relation to norm localization, it is common for violations to women’s 
rights to be hidden behind the excuse of protecting a group’s cultural rights. I can also avoid such 
claims of neocolonialism by arguing that not only minority cultures, but even powerful nations are 
full of power imbalances between women and men. Thus, it is not a matter of right or wrong cultural 
practices, but of cultural practices that go against internationally guaranteed rights, and therefore 
must be overcome. It cannot be forgotten that there is also a legal impediment to such neocolonialism 
allegations, since reservations that go against the objective and purpose of the treaty are not allowed 
and openly criticized (United Nations, 1969). 
 Concerning the second point, feminist researchers have given much focus to ways that power 
and gender impact on the context of international norms. They have brought up that the diffusion of 
norms is not dependent only on states, in the same vein in which the “spiral model” also looks at 
domestic and transnational organizations. They also emphasize and the fact that the social 
construction of power, which clearly favors men over women, must be criticized and rethought, 
because it directly affects the creation and the implementation of norms, particularly the ones 
guaranteeing women’s rights. Jacqui True is a representative author that clarifies the fact that norms 
are dynamic and not power-neutral, with complex processes at work, which affects the way they are 
internalized and their consequences felt in different states. This fluidity and the recognition of these 
power relations could be useful to help fully persuade norm implementing actors. 
 After presenting the theoretical framework, I will introduce the background information 
needed to understand how has the protection of the women’s right to work evolved in international 
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legal documents. Chapter 3 will be used for this purpose, and there I will present the origins of human 
rights protection with a historical recapping of the relationship between sovereignty and human rights 
within international law, and a general explanation of the contemporary protection of women’s rights 
based on the analysis of provisions included in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). I will focus on referencing the specific 
articles that deal with this topic, and, since my research is based on the importance of norm 
implementation, I will also analyze the implementation methods used by the Human Rights 
Committee. 
 Since the previous chapter deals with women’s rights in a comprehensive manner, without 
specifying the women’s right to work, I will use Chapter 4 for such detailed analysis. This part 
presents and explains the contents of the most relevant provisions concerning gender equality and 
the women’s right to work included in the International Covenant on Economic, Civil and Social 
Rights (ICECSR), the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women (CEDAW) and from the ILO. With this exposition, I will provide a robust knowledge of the 
contents of the international law treaties, which serve as base to diffuse international norms on the 
women’s right to work within Japan. 
  After looking towards international law, I can finally turn my focus to gender equality inside 
of Japanese society. I focus my efforts on the CEDAW because of its status as the most relevant 
international treaty for the protection of women’s rights, and because of the long history it has of 
interacting with Japan and Japanese civil society actors. Thus, in Chapter 5 I will look at how the 
CEDAW Committee has been trying to convince Japan to improve the implementation of its 
provisions and how the Japanese government and judicial courts have reacted to that, based on the 
periodic report system and the Concluding Observations that it originates. Continuing in that context, 
in Chapter 6 I focus on laws and policies Japan has introduced in an attempt to overcome this situation 
of intrinsic and continuous and gender inequality, pointing out their pros and cons. I will also present 
some recent and relevant judicial cases involving complaints about the gender pay gap, 
discrimination due to the dual career track system and maternity harassment, which represent the 
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lack of efficient attitude from Japanese courts towards the protection of women’s rights 
implementation. Lastly, I apply the “spiral model” and analyze the extent to which Japanese and 
international actors interact in the case study, particularly looking at how Japanese women’s rights 
NGOs have interacted with the CEDAW when attemping to bridge the gap between commitment 
and compliance. 
Aiming to enrich the document-based data with direct insight from people and organizations 
involved in the realization of the women’s right to work, I decided to carry out semi-structured 
interviews with NGO representatives and other Japanese actors familiar with the domestic human 
rights situation, be it because of their academic background, their field of work or real life experience. 
In Chapter 7, I detail the interview process, explain the aspects related to the selection of the final 12 
interviewees and the creation of an initial and a follow-up question list, analyze the answers 
according to a norm diffusion perspective and present conclusions focused on making connections 
to the “spiral model” and other complementary theoretical approaches.  
 Lastly, in the conclusion, I will first recapitulate the main points stated in each chapter, and 
compare my separate findings with the propositions concerning the lack of implementation of the 
women’s right to work I made in this introduction. With that, I can see how similar or different these 
tentative answers were to the more robust reasons I hope to become aware of after a deep and 
comprehensive analysis of the collected data, using the hybrid “spiral model” as the guiding 
framework. I intend to look at the issue mainly from a legal and social point of view, but also include 
political and economic aspects, since they are inseparable from labor rights issues. Then, after this 
investigation, I will try to suggest some feasible and clear ways of helping Japan overcome the 
obstacles that have kept it stuck in a situation of minimum commitment and improve the 
implementation of the women’s right to work, consequently enhancing Japanese women’s 




Chapter 2. The “Spiral Model” of Human Rights Change: Merits, Demerits and 
Possibility of Application to the Protection of Women’s Rights 
 
 Within the study of international human rights norms, understanding how they are brought 
to life in the international community through the processes of elaborating international instruments 
is not enough to guarantee that they will be followed by signatory states’ domestic governments. 
Thus, knowing about how these norms are accepted, adapted and internalized by countries that are 
so essentially different of each other is one of the most basic points when researching about norm 
implementation. In this context, theories of norm diffusion, in other words, theories that attempt to 
explain how the diffusion of human rights norms works and who has the normative power to perform 
such diffusion, are in the core of the constructivist view concerning international relations.  
 Within these theories, the highly influential “spiral model” is the work that represents the 
state of the art in the research field that aims to understand the socializing effects of international 
society, specially focusing in the interactions of international and domestic institutions. It is 
undeniably a very well-known and vastly cited theory,2 which shows its relevance in the context of 
the study of norm implementation. Furthermore, it has been applied successfully by scholars in many 
diverse case studies that have analyzed the situation concerning the adoption and the implementation 
of human rights in a wide range of countries from all around the globe. Thus, the spiral model will 
be used as the base of this analytical framework, albeit coupled with some improvements taken from 
other relevant approaches to norm diffusion. Specifically, this hybrid theory incorporates scope 
conditions, mechanisms of diffusion and modes of action from Ian Manners’ Normative Power 
Europe and Borzel and Risse’s Europeanization/diffusion paradigm. 
                                                 
2 According to Google Scholar, both books presenting and discussing the model, "The Power of Human 




Considering this, and that the objective of this work is to understand and suggest ways of 
improving the processes that move Japan from a situation of relative disregard towards women’s 
rights to one of compliance, with special attention to the difficulties faced by the country when trying 
to move beyond a status of simple commitment to international norms, it is easy to conclude that this 
hybrid model must receive special attention. Therefore, it will be the main subject dealt with in this 
chapter.   
 In regards to its structure, this part will first introduce the basic characteristics of the model 
and how they have changed through the years. The focus is on introducing how the “spiral model” 
works in describing the socialization processes through which international norms are internalized 
until the point of a state reaching behavioral compliance. The initial point that will be brought up is 
an introduction of the different types of socialization it identifies, the scope conditions under which 
this socialization happens, and the directs and indirect mechanisms of diffusion and modes of action 
used to make states reach a status of norm internalization. 
In addition to that, I will present and explain in detail the five phases of human rights 
implementation suggested by the model, which are named as: 
 Repression; 
 Denial; 
 Tactical concessions; 
 Prescriptive status; 
 Rule-consistent behavior 
 Next, the chapter will point out and clarify some shortcomings and omissions of the theory, 
in a critical way that allows for the future improvement of the model as a whole. One of the criticisms 
that is fundamental for this research is the fact that the phases of prescriptive status and rule-
consistent behavior, in other words, the phases consisting respectively of creating laws and policies 
and adhering to them, are still underspecified by the “spiral model”. In addition to that, within the 
theory there is still room for a better development of the processes necessary to move from the former 
phase to the latter. In fact, Japan’s approach to women’s rights is a good example of this, and could 
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also be used to help pinpoint parts of the model that would benefit from more clarification. The 
country actively dialogues with international women’s rights organizations and has a domestic 
environment that has allowed laws and policies that deal with women’s rights to be made, but these 
developments have not been satisfactorily translated into effectively improving the situation of 
Japanese women. In other words, Japan remains stuck in a prescriptive status, failing to reach rule-
consistent behavior even though it has favorable scope conditions. In relation to that, this chapter 
will tackle the distinction between persuasion and socialization, which is another under specification 
of the model that might be playing a role in the fact that a great number of countries do not reach the 
phase of compliance. Taking these and other topics into consideration, this thesis aims to be of help 
in understanding and improving the application of this model, as the analysis carried out in the next 
chapters allows for process tracing of norm implementation and consequently for theorizing what 
may be the causes of this gap between both phases.       
 The last part of the chapter will bring up complementary ideas on how to improve the mainly 
constructivist view present in the model. It will do that not only by showing the benefits of using 
specific positive points existent in other traditional theories of norm diffusion, but also by trying to 
connect the application of the “spiral model” with a feminist approach to international relations and 
international law, focusing on the ideas of gender mainstreaming and transnational dialogue 
including women, nongovernmental organizations and governmental institutions. Based on that, it 
will be generally suggested how should the model be adapted so it can be more effectively applied 
to understanding the process of human rights’ norm diffusion in each different case. The rest of the 
research in the following chapters will be guided by these findings, aiming to reach a conclusion 
where it will be possible to suggest ways of specifically improving the promotion and the protection 
by Japan of women’s rights and its implementation of international treaties’ provisions that deal with 
gender-related discrimination and gender equality, all in the context of the right to work. In other 
words, this chapter’s final objective is to be the base for developing process that might help in 
shrinking the gap between commitment and compliance in the context of the women’s right to work 
in Japan.       
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2.1 Introducing the basics of the “spiral model” of human rights change 
 
 I will start this chapter with the definition of the “spiral model” of human rights change and 
its main characteristics, which are the central pillars that support the contents of and the analysis 
included in the books “The Power of Human Rights” (1999), and in its follow up “The Persistent 
Power of Human Rights”, edited by authors Risse, Ropp and Sikkink (2013).3 At first, the model was 
mainly used for describing the socialization processes through which international norms were 
internalized into the domestic practices of various authoritarian states during the Cold War years. 
Then, in their second edited volume, the authors took into consideration the economic, political and 
historical developments that happened in the decade separating both books, bringing up the concept 
again and expanding it. This improved and relatively recent study renews the information on the 
various causal mechanisms and conditions which produce behavioral compliance, broadens the range 
of rights-violating actors, and it also dialogues with many of the other criticisms made to the first 
work. This shows that its analysis is a relevant and contemporary need when researching about norm 
diffusion, and justifies it being the focus of this chapter and the basis of this work. 
However, the spiral model would benefit from using a mixed approach, including topics 
brought out in other theoretical lines. This hybrid theory incorporates elements from all the three 
major theories in this field: the already mentioned Risse, Ropp and Sikkink’s spiral model of norm 
diffusion (Risse, Ropp and Sikkink, 1999; Risse, Ropp and Sikkink, 2013); Ian Manners’ Normative 
Power Europe (Manners, 2002); and Borzel and Risse’s Europeanization/diffusion paradigm (Borzel 
and Risse, 2012). Since my focus will be on the spiral model and on its framework, I will not dive 
deep into every content of the theories of Normative Power Europe or Europeanization. Regardless, 
it is necessary, for clarification concerning the parts of those last two theories I will used in this thesis, 
to at least mention their theoretical bases. 
                                                 
3 The main contents of this chapter are a critical compilation of the ideas developed in these two books 
and in other related published research.  
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 The Normative Power Europe focuses its explanatory efforts in the European Union (as shown 
by its name), and this specificity is why I will not be able to apply some of its characteristics in this 
work. According to the theory, the normative basis the EU is built on makes it inclined to also act in 
a normative way in world politics. This normativity, combined with the EU’s historical strength, 
would give the organization the power to outline and spread the values and actions considered 
“normal” in the stage of world politics.  
 The limitations of the theory, exemplified by its emphasis in explaining the EU’s identity 
instead of its actions, ended up making other authors distance themselves from the idea of normative 
power and move towards the notion of civilian power in the following theories. This is present not 
only in the spiral model’ focus on the relationship between transnational networks and domestic 
civilian action, but also in Borzel and Risse’s Europeanization/diffusion paradigm. The biggest 
limitation of this latter is its application, since it is used to look only at developments within the EU, 
concerning acceding states, in the neighborhood areas, or in relation to other regional organizations. 
However, it is still a complete and powerful theory when it comes to its framework, which warrants 
the use of some of its points, especially when it comes to mechanisms of diffusion and modes of 
action. 
Considering the pros and cons present in all these norm diffusion theories, I can understand 
why a hybrid theory focusing in more than just norm diffusion in the EU and its neighboring foreign 
area and context would be welcome. Thus, basing myself in the more robust spiral model and 
including pertinent additional points present in the other two theories, next I will proceed to 
introducing a hybrid norm diffusion framework. However, since the model is still substantially based 
on the spiral model, in this thesis I will keep using this nomenclature to refer to the hybrid theory 
here applied.  
 It is important to note that the “spiral model” is originally built upon the theory of the 
“boomerang effect”, previously proposed by Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink in their important 
work Activists Beyond Borders (see Keck & Sikkink, 1998, 1999). This theory, in its turn, relies 
heavily on the concept of transnational advocacy networks, which are diverse groups (including 
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research and advocacy groups, intergovernmental organizations, local social movements, 
foundations, the media and others) that communicate, share information and services, circulate 
personnel, and exchange funds, working in tandem to influence policies (Keck & Sikkink, 1999, pp. 
91-92). Through these networks, groups in one country appeal to citizens of another and these 
citizens pressure their own government to pressure the offending regime. As a consequence of that, 
states that at first try to resist international and national pressures risk becoming the aim of greater 
future pressure, since domestic activists can attempt to enter into powerful transnational alliances. 
Thus, by initially avoiding compliance or contributing to impunity, states might actually be setting 
themselves up for a situation where they receive even heavier criticism later on. In the next part, I 
will proceed to the exposition of the main points of this “spiral model”, starting with the way it deals 
with the processes behind states’ actions and relationships.  
2.1.1 The “spiral model’s” approach to the logics of action and socialization processes 
 
 The “spiral model” made use of views concerning the causal relationships and processes 
between various state and non-state actors in order to come up with a more specified 
conceptualization of them. Concerning the contents of such concepts, the theory brings up the 
different logics of action towards the implementation and enforcement of human rights law, namely 
the logic of consequences and the logics of appropriateness and persuasion, which are actually a 
concept that originates from the types of socialization processes explained in the first part, i.e. 
instrumental adaptation, argumentation and habitualization.  
 According to the work of March and Olsen, the logic of consequences sees political action 
and outcomes as the product of rational calculating behavior designed to maximize a specific set of 
preferences. The logic of appropriateness, on the other hand, understands political action as a product 
of rules, roles and identities that stipulate appropriate behavior in given situations. In other words, 
while one logic works by asking the question “how can I maximize my interests?”, the other works 
by asking “who am I and how should I act based on that?” (Krasner, 1999, p. 5). These two logics, 
which characterize all political and social environments, are not mutually incompatible, but their 
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importance does tend to vary depending on the situation the state and its representatives find 
themselves in. According to the present approach of the “spiral model”, in an ideal situation the logic 
of consequences is thought to be often embedded in and overlapping with the logic of appropriateness, 
and thus, instead of being pitted against each other, all those mechanisms and sequences by which 
the various modes of social action interact could be systematically examined. However, a look at the 
present reality shows that these logics have often been treated separately by the states, and used 
depending on what which situation calls for, balancing each other (Risse & Ropp, 2013, pp. 13-16). 
 Moreover, especially because states are still the main subjects of norm diffusion, it is relevant 
to notice that the way these logics of action are applied by them have a huge influence in how 
sovereignty is perceived and dealt with. More specifically, this refers to international legal 
sovereignty and Westphalian sovereignty, which are two of the four distinctive but non-exhaustive 
attributes of sovereignty introduced by Krasner in his “Sovereignty: organized hypocrisy” book 
(1999). He explains domestic sovereignty as the state’s capacity to maintain the monopoly of the use 
of violence within its territory and interdependence sovereignty as the ability of a government to 
control the intra-borders movements of any kind, but in the context of logics of action his focus is 
maintained only in international legal sovereignty and Westphalian sovereignty, as they are the ones 
that represent the pivotal expressions of the principle of sovereignty. He defines the former as 
international recognition from states, and the latter as the principle of non-interference in a given 
territory. In other words, both of them are defined by clear rules that say that they should, respectively, 
recognize juridically independent territorial entities and exclude external authority structures from 
the territory of the state. Based on these rules and principles, state governments know what is the 
“appropriate” action to take. 
 However, as already mentioned, the logic of appropriateness does not work alone, and thus 
the rules based on it have been often mitigated by the compelling logics of consequences. In their 
attempts to obtain their maximized interests and protect their own sovereignty, states’ rulers have 
realized that sometimes it is worth breaking the rules, be it through mutual agreement between 
nations or through the use of coercion (Krasner, 1999, pp. 3-8). Examples of the basic rule of 
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international legal sovereignty being dishonored are nonrecognition, which has been used as an 
instrument of policy like in the case of the Chinese Communist regime until the 1970s, and 
recognition of entities that lack specific necessary characteristics, like the case of Ukraine and 
Byelorussia being members of the United Nations even when they did not have formal juridical 
autonomy. Westphalian sovereignty, on its turn, has had its logic of appropriateness largely mitigated 
in actual practice too. Rulers often say one thing, but exercise another when needed. For example, 
they might ensure nonintervention to nationalist groups that aim to the end of external influence at 
the same time that they give the International Monetary Fund (or other international organization) a 
role in domestic policy formation (Krasner, 1999, pp. 8-9). 
 On the other hand, the contrary is also true, in the sense that sometimes the logic of 
consequences and cost-benefit calculations that maximize utility end up being transformed into a 
logic of appropriateness. For example, private companies or public governments might initially 
comply to human rights norms just for instrumental reasons, like consumer boycotts or international 
society pressure, but these pressures might lead to these entities finally incorporating norms of 
appropriate human rights behavior (Risse & Ropp, 2013, p. 13). Therefore, it is better to look at the 
analysis of the logic of consequences, manifested through rational choice informed egoism, and the 
logic of appropriateness, manifested through norm-guided behaviour, in a sequential manner, 
observing the ways in which the various modes of action of the “spiral model” interact in its different 
stages (Risse & Ropp, 2013, pp. 7).  
 The incorporation of these ideas related to the different logics is also especially relevant in 
the context of Japan, as it fits well as an example of a state that has clearly been abiding to a logic of 
appropriateness that is still very much limited by an underlying logic of consequences. 
Internationally, the government has been ratifying treaties and participating in discussions aiming 
for the protection of women’s rights, and domestically it has created legislation and maintained a 
proactive discourse towards women empowerment, with Prime Minister Abe’s “womenomics” being 
the material manifestation of that. Thus, in a sense Japan seems to be aware of what it needs to do to 
improve the rights of its female citizens, even if this awareness might come from the fact that the 
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state does not want to be the aim of foreign criticism, or that it has been strengthening its discourse 
on women’s rights so that it can help solve other domestic issues such as the declining birthrate. In 
other words, the most likely primary reason for Japan’s policies is not an internalized belief that 
protecting women’s rights is the right thing to do, but instead it is the positive consequences 
originating from that action that it can enjoy as a country. However, this kind of attitude towards 
rights shows its negative side when looking at reality and realizing that there is still much less 
progress when it comes to the actual implementation of all these governmental laws, programs and 
ideals. Japan has been progressively “talking the talk” and that it understands very clearly that there 
is a logic of appropriateness, which is shown by the laws it has approved and the treaties it has signed. 
However, it cannot seem to satisfactorily “walk the walk”, in other words, it is not implementing 
these laws satisfactorily, which suggests that Japan may not be completely sincere in its commitments, 
prioritizing a logic of consequences. This lack of sincerity will be investigated later in this thesis. 
  Then, based on these logics, the model has identified three distinct, but interconnected types 
of socialization processes, named instrumental adaptation, argumentation and habitualization. In 
other words, no matter how much their underlying logic or mode of social action and interaction may 
differ, they are all considered necessary for enduring change in the human rights area to happen.  
 The first process of instrumental adaptation concerns the adaptation of governments to 
domestic and international pressure, and how they make use of strategic bargaining, as its name 
indicates. Under this kind of socialization, states accused of not complying to human rights norms 
usually try to avoid criticisms and pressure by making concessions, bargaining their way out of the 
spotlight, or even by starting to “talk the talk” of human rights in the international scene, led by 
United Nations (Risse & Sikkink, 1999, p. 12). 
 The second process, named argumentation, concerns argumentative discourses in the 
Habermasian sense, emphasizing processes of communication, argumentation and persuasion, all 
based on moral discourse. This kind of discourse is different than simple daily communicative 
practices, surpassing being just an exchange of information and focusing instead in raising questions 
about this exchanged information. Because of that, it is usually raised by governments when they 
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attempt to challenge the validity claims inherent in the definition and the contents of a material 
situation, or even the validity claims of the definition of the human rights norms themselves (Risse 
& Sikkink, 1999, pp. 13-14).  
 Lastly, as the “spiral model” admits that these two processes are not enough to make norms 
be fully internalized, it sees the need to bring in a third kind, called habitualization, to the table. It 
means that the internalization of domestic practices can only be accomplished by the gradual 
institutionalization of norms, when actors comply with them irrespective of considerations of 
instrumental character or of individual beliefs about their validity. In this last stage of socialization 
process, these norms are simply taken for granted (Risse & Sikkink, 1999, pp. 16-17). 
 This original formulation has been targeted with enough criticism that it warranted updates by 
the spiral model’s own authors and other scholars researching the topic. The best reorganization of 
such socialization processes comes from Borzel and Risse in their work on Europeanization theory 
of norm diffusion. They divide the processes again into three different categories. The first is named 
instrumental rationality (logic of consequences), and explains that actors can be understood as mostly 
self-interested utility maximizers who select their actions based on cost–benefit calculations. On the 
other hand, the second one, called normative rationality (logic of appropriateness), sees actors as rule 
followers who “do the right thing” because they want to be part of a particular community and 
because they have been socialized into doing so. Lastly, the third kind of process, named 
communicative rationality (logic of arguing), sees actors arguing (by giving and discussing reasons 
and challenging the legitimacy of norms) and trying to persuade each other about the validity claims 
intrinsic to causal or normative statements. (Borzel & Risse, 2012, p. 5). 
 There was an inversion in the order of the logics of action, with persuasion and moral 
argumentation moving to the last item while socialization remained on the second one. In this sense, 
communicative rationality would be a stronger manifestation of the logic of appropriateness, going 
beyond just the socialization of actors into following rules and actions just because there is a 
dominant idea telling them what is the right thing to do. They instead would need to believe that a 
norm is substantively true or correct, being deeply persuaded.  
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In order to better understand this difference between the concepts of socialization and 
persuasion, as well as the importance of deep socialization processes for the successful diffusion and 
implementation of human rights, I must explain and apply Checkel’s theory of different types of 
socialization to the “spiral model”. This additional analysis will be included in part 2.4, which deals 
with the improvements that could be made to the present model of norm diffusion concerning its 
application to women’s rights in general, and specifically to women’s right to work. 
2.1.2 The scope conditions identified by the “spiral model”  
 
The “spiral model’s” scope conditions serve as the contextual background on which 
socialization processes and logics of action work in each different case. These conditions are different 
characteristics identified in states and non-state actors, under which mechanisms of diffusion and 
their associated modes of social action would be expected to encourage compliance with human 
rights. This theoretical point was already present in the original “spiral model” framework, but could 
be improved with features present in the theories applied in the hybrid model.  
 The scope conditions can be listed as follows: 
 Analysis of the amount of domestic incentives existent, in the sense of how much power do 
domestic actors in politics and society have to call for institutional change (Borzel & Risse, 
2012, p. 11); 
 The kind of statehood (consolidated of limited) the state has in that moment. This is relevant 
because limited statehood states might have to deal with lack of state capacity when 
implementing human rights norms, in addition to just a governmental refusal of doing so 
(Borzel & Risse, 2012, pp. 11-12);  
 Considering if states are under democratic or authoritarian regimes. This condition is 
important because democratic countries are considered more likely to implement human rights 
norms than authoritarian regimes (Borzel & Risse, 2012, p. 12); 
 The centralization or decentralization of rule implementation within the states. The degree 
of centralization makes a difference because greater compliance tends to be connected with 
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norms being administered by central authorities, who are more easily monitored and held 
accountable. (Risse & Ropp, 2013, pp. 18-19); 
  The state’s material vulnerability, because this is directly connected to which states will be 
strongest against external economic pressure (Risse & Ropp, 2013, p. 20); 
 The state’s social vulnerability, since states that care about their international standing and 
reputation are more susceptible to “shaming” techniques than authoritarian states (Risse & 
Ropp, 2013, pp. 20-21); 
 The presence of overt-diffusion, which happens when the physical presence of the EU through 
its local delegations (overt diplomacy) affects the process of norm diffusion (Manners, 2002, 
p. 245). 
From this explanation, knowing which conditions I am working under is essential, because they 
affect not only the propensity to move from commitment to compliance, but also which would be the 
most efficient diffusion mechanisms to be applied in that specific case. In the next part and following 
this line of thought, I will introduce these mechanisms of diffusion and their modes of action. 
2.1.3 The “spiral model’s” mechanisms of diffusion and their modes of action 
 
The hybrid theory based on the “spiral model” identifies different types of mechanisms and 
their respective modes of action, dividing them in direct or indirect depending on if the mechanism 
comes from transnational actors or from domestic actors, respectively.  
For the direct mechanisms, according to Risse and Ropp (2013, pp. 13-16), they are: 
 Conditionality manifested as sanctions (negative incentives) and rewards (positive 
incentives);  
 Capacity building, meaning the education, the training and the building up of administrative 
capacities necessary to enforce human rights, specially in those areas of limited statehood 
where there is a lack of state capacity to enforce human rights norms;  
 Socialization, in the sense that actors would try to act by meeting social expectations in each 
situation, through complex learning and habitualisation;  
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 Persuasion and discourse, usually combined with the aforementioned negative and positive 
incentives. 
I must be noted that the mechanism of coercion, meaning the use of force and legal enforcement, 
in not included in this hybrid model, since it would not be relevant in the case of women’s rights in 
Japan.  
There are also the indirect mechanisms, in the form of competition, lesson drawing and mimicry, 
which are the emulation of institutional models in different regional contexts (Borzel & Risse, 2012, 
pp. 5-10). They are defined as follows: 
 Competition, which involves speedy change in behavior by the actors as they compete over 
meeting certain performance criteria, in this case set by the EU. Here, states passively receive 
ideas or solutions from abroad. 
 Lesson-drawing is very alike to competition in the sense that in both actors look to others for 
effective policies and rules. However, lesson-drawing is said to be set off when actors are 
faced with a political or economic problem which needs institutional change be solved, and 
they then look around for suitable institutional solutions.  
 Normative emulation or mimicry happens when actors emulate others for normative reasons, 
for example to increase their legitimacy, or because the appropriateness of doing so is taken 
for granted.  
These additional scope conditions and mechanisms of action are worthy of being integrated as 
theoretical arguments into the larger literature on diffusion, bringing to the forefront an agency-
centered approach over a structure-based one (Borzel & Risse, 2012, pp. 7-11). 
 Through the analysis of material cases, it is possible to identify which would be the most 
efficient social mechanisms to be applied in each specific situation, and maybe suggest which should 
be used to improve compliance in other instances. In other words, they can be used to think about 
how international human rights norms can be diffused to the domestic context more effectively. For 
that analysis to be complete, however, there is also need to understand the following five diffusion 
stages of the “spiral model”, which will be introduced in the next part.  
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2.1.4 The five phases of the “spiral model” 
 
According to the “spiral model”, all the aforementioned processes, conditions and 
mechanisms work together during of a set of five different phases of accepting and implementing 
international human rights norms. This is the most characteristic and revolutionary part of the “spiral 
model”, and will be the basis for my analysis of the Japanese case. 
 The initial phase is called repression (phase 1) and consists of authoritarian regimes’ 
attempts of stopping any opposition groups of bringing human rights norms to the light. The next 
phase, denial (phase 2), starts if transnational groups manage to start the advocacy process with the 
information they have on the rights violations. While these domestic groups might still be hindered 
from fighting for themselves, the lobbying from international human rights organizations and from 
other nations is already strong enough to evoke denying claims from the abusing government. And 
although the state continues refusing to recognize the validity of such norms, this phase is relevant 
as it is the one that kick starts discursive engagement and the process of international socialization. 
In the third phase, tactical concessions (phase 3), the violating state starts using concessions to get 
the international human rights community to stop pressuring it. Even though these actions are 
motivated by an instrumental logic, in the end they empower domestic advocacy groups and cause 
them to rapidly increase in mobilization. However, this is also rather risky, as the state could react to 
this empowerment either in a complying way, or in a repressive way. Moving on to the next phase, 
it happens when the state discourse shifts and it starts granting human rights norms prescriptive status 
(phase 4) through a defined set of state actions and associated practices. Lastly, in the final phase of 
rule-consistent behavior (phase 5), the state shows clear behavioral change and sustained compliance 
with international human rights. It means that at both domestic and international levels, there is now 
actual implementation of prescriptively validated norms. A better look at these phases, their 
characteristics and their position within written research can be seen in Figure 1 and Table 1 





Figure 1. Phases of the “spiral model” 
 
Table 1. The spiral model explained 
Characteristics Phases Books 
The State try to stop any opposition group of 
bringing human rights norms to the light. 
Repression 
Bigger focus in “The 
Power of Human 
Rights” 
The State continues refusing to recognize the validity 
of human rights norms, but the process of 
international socialization has started. 
Denial 
The State uses concessions to get the international 
human rights community to stop pressuring it. This 
empowers domestic advocacy groups. 
Tactical 
Concessions 
The State discourse shifts and it starts granting 
human rights norms prescriptive status through set of 
state actions and associated practices. 
Prescriptive 
Status 
Bigger focus in “The 
Persistent Power of 
Human Rights” 
The State changes its behavior and complies 
constantly with international human rights. There is 





 These core contents of the model have remained relatively constant during the almost two 
decades since the theory was formally first publicized. Thus, it is necessary to keep them in mind in 
 
 30 
order to understand how this theoretical construction has adapted itself to the changes in the 
international society and in human rights law, how it has interacted with other theories, and how it 
has developed itself from being applied in diverse case studies. In the following part, I will take a 
deeper look into the more recent improvements made to the model.    
2.2 The “spiral model” then and now: innovations of the Persistent Power of Human Rights  
 Almost twenty years have passed since the first formulation of the “spiral model” until now, 
making it obvious that human rights policies have changed remarkably during this long time. There 
was the emergence of a new model of criminal accountability to hold individuals responsible for 
human rights violations, by making use of the International Criminal Court; the advent of the 
Responsibility to Protect (R2P), as a new international norm; the recognition in the human rights 
field that weak or limited statehood has become a major obstacle when it comes to domestic 
implementation and compliance (Borzel & Risse, 2012, pp. 11-12);4 the increasing commitment of 
private actors to complying in a direct way with international human rights standards; and the 
evolving of human rights scholarship, with the use of quantitative methods and the blending of social 
and political science with law (Risse & Ropp, 2013, pp. 3-4). These developments, together with the 
fact that the “spiral model” has been constantly researched, reviewed and applied to real scenarios in 
case studies, need to be considered when looking at the evolution of the theory and when applying it 
to present material situations.  
 Still, the core of the theory remains the same, and the spiral-shaped mutual interaction 
between states, international society and domestic society, as it evolves through the model’s phases, 
has helped identify a pattern of human rights progress within an apparently asymmetric and 
                                                 
4 According to the authors, even though it is not clear how limited statehood affects the various diffusion 
mechanisms, the fact is that institutional and administrative capacity of states and degrees of statehood in 
general do have an influence in the transformative power of the EU when it comes to domestic change. Plus, 
considering that areas of limited statehood are not a rare thing, this characteristic can be understood as 
something even more hindering when making state actors adopt and adapt to EU demands.  
 
 31 
asynchronous phenomenon. This interaction between the different phases can be seen in the 
following figure 2 (reproduced from Risse & Ropp, 2013, p. 8). 
Figure 2. Representation of the “spiral model” 
 
 
 What has undoubtedly changed, however, is the focus of the theory. In the approach taken 
in the first book, considering the way international society had still been dealing with human rights 
related issues until the end of the nineties, the theory’s main objective was how to change from the 
moment of repression (phase 1) to the one of tactical concessions (phase 3), highlighting the first 
three phases of the model and explaining state commitment to international human rights.  
 However, after it became clear that most countries were capable of reaching that third phase, 
specially with the increase in human rights treaties encompassing the most diverse topics and the 
raise in the number of nations ratifying these international documents, there came the need to 
understand why states seemed to have so much difficulty in reaching the other following stages. In 
this sense, the Persistent Power of Human Rights focuses its efforts in understanding how subjects 
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may move from tactical concessions (phase 3) to rule-consistent behavior (phase 5), including in 
this analysis the difficulties of surpassing a simple prescriptive status (phase 4). The authors then 
suggest that more attention must be paid to the importance of actors other than states in actions 
towards commitment and that the different ways these non-state actors can be used to help countries 
move on from that commitment-only status that characterizes tactical concessions and prescriptive 
status, and reach the full compliance of rule-consistent behavior, should be analyzed.  
 In other words, many researchers started to focus their studies in the question of what can be 
done in order to improve the application of the mechanisms of these final phases of the model so that 
states can evolve from an already accomplished situation where “actors accept international human 
rights as valid and binding for themselves” to one where “sustained behavior and domestic practices 
that conform to the international human rights norms” are a reality (Risse & Ropp, 2013, pp. 9-10). 
The present thesis is another example of this academic tendency, as it will focus on the issues Japan 
has been facing when it comes to moving from commitment (phases 3 and 4) to compliance (phase 
5) when it comes to the women’s empowerment and to their right to work. Based on the previous 
suggestion that giving special attention to the efforts of non-state actors might be helpful in 
understanding this implementation gap, this study will also work on bringing to the forefront the 
work of the civil society, domestically and transnationally, and of adding a new feminist lens through 
which I contemplate the implementation of women’s rights. 
2.3 Accolades and criticisms towards the “spiral model” 
 
 As it can be perceived from its characteristics and application, the “spiral model” is a highly 
relevant way of understanding the processes involved in the adoption and in the implementation of 
human rights norms. Consequently, the model is also helpful for improving such processes and 
bringing change. It has been established in many material cases that the socialization mechanisms 
for turning international law into domestic practices found in the model hold up well in empirical 
tests, having been put to test by quantitative and qualitative studies and still survived the scrutiny. 
The case of Indonesia, which showed that public shaming by the UN Human Rights Commission 
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had positive effect in the attitudes of a norm-violating government towards compliance, is a pertinent 
example (Clarke, 2013, pp. 125-144). Risse and Ropp argue that they managed to prove the model’s 
success through a “comparative case study method”, in which they selected paired country cases of 
human rights “success” and “failure” from various world regions and were able to find out the various 
factors that made a difference when related to the phases of the model. As examples of “success 
stories” during the 1980s, they raise Chile, South Africa, the Philippines, Poland, and the former 
Czechoslovakia, and as more difficult cases, they cite Guatemala, Kenya, Uganda and others. They 
also mention as a positive aspect of the model that scholars have been able to extend their analysis 
to other relevant states such as China, Egypt, Turkey and Israel (Risse & Ropp, 2013, p. 7). With the 
present study, I hope to be able to better understand Japan’s attitude towards the women’s right to 
work, and suggest mechanisms that in the future might allow it to be included in the roster of states 
that successfully reached the phase of rule-consistent behavior. 
 The authors are rightfully very proud of their accomplishments, concluding that the 
socializing mechanisms of change that were built into the “spiral model” in “The Persistent Power 
of Human Rights” had “a good deal of explanatory power for most of the individual cases” and that 
apparently it was possible to generalize the different phases of human rights change “across different 
types of political regimes, socio-economic systems, and cultural regions” (Risse & Ropp, 2013, p. 
7). The usefulness of the theory is proven even further through the fact that some of the processes 
between commitment and compliance that are consistent with the “spiral model” have also been 
brought up in other relevant studies, such as judicial action enabled by human rights treaties and 
popular mobilization being analyzed within the work of Beth Simmons in “Mobilizing for Human 
Rights: International Law in Domestic Politics” (2009).  
 It can be said that these positive points of the model lack some measure of constructive self-
criticism, though. Some authors recognize demerits, taking note that the model seems to “smuggle 
in” a hidden ideological agenda and that there was an associated teleological twist to the analysis. 
Problems with the measurement and operationalization of key variables, cases of clashes between 
the empirical evidence and the application of the model, and inadequate treatment of human rights 
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situations where competing norms were involved have been cited too (Risse & Sikkink, 1999, p. 8; 
Jetschke & Liese, 2013, p. 26-42). Other than these sins of commission, sins of omission have also 
been pointed out, such as the initial assumption that only fully functioning states would be under 
analysis, which prompted the suggestion that compliance with human rights norms was a matter of 
state commitment and willingness more than of institutional capacity. However, this was not proven 
to be true when compared to reality, and thus the need to consider limited statehood cases was 
acknowledged. 
As mentioned in part 2.1.2, the original model omitted some complementary scope 
conditions and diffusion mechanisms, which is remedied by using the present hybrid theory.  In 
addition to that, Jetschke and Liese also bring to the table pertinent criticism towards the model. They 
sum up that some studies have concluded that the “spiral model” has been vigorously criticised for 
being “teleological”, “deterministic”, “overly optimistic”, and “linear, even tautological” (Jetschke 
& Liese, 2013, p. 33). This criticism is a valuable acknowledgement that the theory is an ideal-typical 
conceptualization, a framework that help researchers identify what is not going to plan in the 
processes of norm diffusion and domestic implementation. As such, and according to Thomas Risse 
himself,5 the model should be understood in some senses as a product of its time, particularly when 
it comes to its formulation in the “Power of Human Rights”. Regardless of this understanding, the 
value of the model is certainly not undermined. If an exercise of reflexivity is done, with awareness 
and recognition of these matters being dutifully shown, the “spiral model” is still a theoretical 
approach as useful and valuable today as it was during its formation years. In that sense, Jetschke 
and Liese affirm that the model assumed the existence of a core group of developed democracies that 
respected human rights and thus could make norm-violating ones respect them the same way, but 
ignored the fact that these developed states could also be the actors violating these norms (Risse & 
                                                 
5 In his oral comments at the JSPS Core-to-Core Seminar “The European Union and Japan in a Fluid Global 




Sikkink, 1999, p. 9). Also, the “spiral model” did not anticipate that norm-violating governments 
would be able to provide largely accepted good reasons and counter-strategies to minimize the 
external pressure of the international society and of human rights networks when it comes to the 
criticism towards their own human rights violations (Jetschke & Liese, 2013, p. 28).  
The main object of this research, Japan, is a pertinent example of both situations explained 
above, and it proves that the model is as relevant as ever. As a developed democratic country, it has 
succeeded in providing women of a range of rights wider than other countries that are commonly 
criticized for being rights’ violators. For example, in theory it does provide women of freedom and 
equal political, economic and social rights, and it is undeniable that the majority of Japanese women 
have access to good education and health care. Making use of these good points, Japan presents itself 
as a defender of women’s rights in the international arena, but this position crumbles under stronger 
scrutiny of the implementation of its domestic policies. When one takes a deeper look into Japanese 
society, it is easy to identify many situations where discrimination against women is still rampant, 
both in the private and the public realms. In fact, as will be better explained in the following chapters, 
openly discriminatory provisions remain even in Japanese law. Based on that, when it comes to 
women’s right to work in general, it is possible to put Japan mainly in the phase of prescriptive status 
(phase four), as a state that has created protective domestic law to an extent, but still uses excuses to 
explain the lack of material efficiency of its policies. In addition, the fact that some characteristics of 
the phase of tactical concessions (phase 3) can be found in different areas of rights’ protection, such 
as the lack of a legal definition for discrimination must be considered. Based on these remaining 
aspects of phase three, the country can be represented in a mixed position that has slightly surpassed 
prescriptive status in some cases, but is in general much closer to tactical concession than to rule-
consistent behavior. On the other hand, in the specific case of the CEDAW Optional Protocol and 
other relevant international instruments the country still refuses to ratify, it can be said that it remains 
stuck in the phase of denial, but very close to tactical concessions, considering that Japan has 
acknowledged the existence and value of these treaties. This explanation is illustrated in Figure 3.  
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Furthermore, the model also failed to recognize divisions within civil society, specially 
between NGOs themselves, and between NGOs and other civil groups (like religious ones), and it 
did not explain the failure within democratic states of mobilizing comprehensively against human 
rights violations. In the end, its weak point is that it gave too much credit to democracies, assuming 
they would be good examples of human rights protection just because of their system of government, 
when in reality states can come up with excuses for their passive inefficiencies or active violations 
regardless of them being democratic or not.  
Figure 3. The suggested position of Japan 
 
This overlooking leads into the biggest so-called “problem” of the “spiral model”, which is 
the under specification of the processes that span from phases three to five. In other words, it has 
been said that the model has a lot of difficulty in explaining the move of states from commitment to 
compliance, and the processes that happen in that gap. This is because the same causal mechanisms 
used in the first three phases of the model ended up not being at work in its last two phases, and thus 
there would be the need to rethink the commitment to compliance background processes in the most 
recent approaches to the theory, especially when it comes to explaining the behavior of democracies 
(Jetschke & Liese, 2013, pp. 30-32). Here I bring up again that within the model there was a lack of 
interest in considering the issues that might arise concerning the lack of compliance by powerful 
democratic states, of which the USA, Israel and also Japan are examples.  However, while the model 
could possibly benefit from a clearer division between the phases, specially in relation to phases three 
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to five, and from better guidelines on how to classify countries amongst them, this is not a fatal issue 
that undermines the theory. Instead, this “problem” could also be understood as a strength of the 
theory, as it helps in the identification of commitment/compliance gaps and in pointing out what is 
wrong with the implementation processes being used by different countries.  
In the same sense, and subjected to the same counter-arguments as the “problem” 
aforementioned, it is said that there was a lack of attention paid to and an under-theorization of 
instances where states could not get past the phase of prescriptive status and reach all the way to the 
level of sustained rule-consistent behavior, which culminated in an under-specification of the 
processes and scope conditions by which and under which states as well as private actors could be 
moved from commitment to human rights to actual compliance to them (Risse & Sikkink, 1999, p. 
11). While it might seem that treaty ratification at phase four would lead naturally into norm 
internalization and compliance at phase five, the application of the model has proven that to be untrue, 
and it also lacked in specifying how much pressure is actually needed and what would be the best 
conditions for a state to reach the final phase (Jetschke & Liese, 2013, p. 32). In fact, one must keep 
in mind that to reach rule-consistent behavior, to have fully institutionalized international human 
rights norms and norm compliance as a habitual practice enforced by the rule of law, there must be 
continuous pressure and mobilization both from below (domestically) and from above 
(internationally) (Risse & Sikkink, 1999, p. 33). This point is crucial for the case study of the 
Japanese government in the context of the women’s right to work, since the state has been actively 
creating norms and policies to improve a situation of gender inequality, with a lack of satisfactory 
results. Using Japan as a case study, this research aims to make use of this aspect of the theory to 
better understand the problems plaguing women’s rights implementation in Japanese society, and 
then attempt to apply these useful findings by suggesting ways of improving the level of Japan’s 
domestic compliance to international human rights norms.  
Additionally, Jetschke and Liese point out an overestimation of the domestic effects of 
transnational advocacy in theory, since when looking at material examples it can be seen that there 
are a number of nuances, such as lack of political, societal and monetary support for certain local 
 
 38 
human rights organizations, which influence on how domestic mobilization might be effective or not. 
Also, while domestic mobilization and the influence of international actors is a key variable 
explaining progress towards the phase of prescriptive status, this mobilization “can be hard to come 
by and sustain” after that (Jetschke & Liese, 2013, p. 29). This can be because of changes in the 
government (regardless if it is a democratic or authoritarian one), because the state has learned how 
to develop counter-strategies to minimize the pressure of human rights networks, or because these 
international actors themselves make mistakes when interacting with domestic organizations. Maybe, 
in order to improve the real understanding of the process that goes from commitment to compliance 
and to overcome the difficulties concerning the under-specification of the transition between phases 
four and five of the model, it will be necessary to bring down the idealistic and perhaps apolitical 
perspective of both of them. Also, considering how relevant this key point concerning the domestic 
mobilization is for the theory, there is a need to ask about this question to my interviewees from 
NGOs, since they are exactly the center of this national bottom-up pressure for women’s rights 
change. The findings related to how this issue has been playing out in society will be presented in 
Chapter 7.  
In this sense, a shift in the way scholars have been paying attention to the model has already 
been happening. Instead of focusing only in compliance mechanisms and in the role of foreign 
organizations, they have been also raising questions related to legal plurality, local customs and 
norms and to the importance of domestic courts (Jetschke & Liese, 2013, p. 29). Cultural expressions, 
combined with the allegation of sovereignty, have given origin to many normative conflicts and they 
have been consistently used as excuses for not complying to human rights, so they need to be faced 
directly. The model’s focus on the attitudes of norm senders over understanding the reasoning of 
norm takers, which underestimates the importance of the elements of dialogue, interaction and 
adaptation that exist in the process of norm diffusion, has clearly been contributing to these issues 
and hindering the full extent of the model’s application. Thus, there is the need to think about the 
process of localization in the context of norm implementation. Acharya’s work is a reference in this 
context, explaining how universal values may be successfully adapted to domestic realities and how 
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local beliefs may need to be seriously considered in order to fulfil the objective of raising a state’s 
acceptance of foreign norms (Acharya, 2004, pp. 239-275). 
This different approach, together with other helpful theories, is incredibly important for the 
improvement of the “spiral model” and for it to be applied more efficiently to a wider range of case 
studies. In the next part, I will delve deeper into them and suggest which parts could be useful to 
overcome the cited shortcomings of the model.  
2.4 Going beyond using only the “spiral model”: interaction with theories concerning types of 
socialization, norm localization and feminism  
 
 When looking just at the amount of the aforementioned shortcomings, they might seem 
overwhelming and capable of undermining the “spiral model”. However, they are in fact very useful 
in the sense that they demonstrate problems that happen within domestic societies, and it is by 
correctly identifying these problems that they can begin to be solved. Thus, even with such criticism, 
the workings of the “spiral model”, and the “boomerang effect”, together with some helpful 
developments from its interactions with other theories, do have much to contribute when it comes to 
the understanding of conditions and mechanisms that contribute to the realization of human rights. 
In the next three parts, I will present additional theories that are necessary in order to make the hybrid 
“spiral model” more adapted and useful not only to the Japan situation concerning the women’s right 
to work, but to other difficult case studies involving actors culturally and physically distant from 
western powerful nations. 
2.4.1 Checkel’s theory of different types of socialization 
 
 One point that is intrinsically connected with the “spiral model’s” underdevelopment of the 
processes that move states from phase three to five is its take on the different types of socialization. 
In the “Power of Human Rights”, the authors are interested specially in looking into the connection 
between the instrumental adaptation and argumentative rationality. Because of that, they end up 
leaving the phase of habitualization, and consequently the one of complete internalization of norms 
 
 40 
somewhat underspecified. On the other hand, in the “Persistent Power of Human Rights”, there is an 
attempt of solving this issue by citing Jeffrey Checkel’s theory of different types of socialization 
(Checkel, 2005, pp. 801-826), which is extremely relevant for this study and thus will be explained 
in detail in the forthcoming paragraphs. However, the authors’ approach to the topic in the book and 
in their following research (in the form of the aforementioned division between normative rationality 
and communicative rationality) is also not without criticism. Their conclusion is that it is irrelevant 
whether target actors comply to human rights because they are completely and truthfully persuaded 
or because they just believe they must do so for other reasons, including instrumental ones. This, 
however, is an oversimplification that might hurt the explanatory power of the model, specially 
concerning phases four and five and the processes of compliance.    
 At this point, to fully understand why the conclusion made in “The Persistent Power of 
Human Rights” is problematic, it is necessary to also understand how and why Checkel divides 
socialization into different types, according to their different mechanisms of socialization. These are 
viewed as “a set of hypotheses that could be the explanation for some social phenomenon”, based on 
the interaction between different individual or plural actors. Furthermore, the reason for this approach 
is to bridge the delay between the socialization done by international institutions and the result of 
this socializing process at the individual or state level (Checkel, 2005, p. 808). Three different 
mechanisms are then presented: strategic calculation, role playing and normative suasion. 
 Strategic calculation has roots in rationalist social theory, which means that it deals with how 
incentives and rewards (material or social) are relevant to the socialization process. The most 
important point is that strategic calculation by itself is not considered to bring socialization and 
internalization, because here there is no change from a logic of consequences to a logic of 
appropriateness. Here, the actors just calculate what kind of attitude would be more profitable for 
themselves only in each situation. Thus, this mechanism is more of a first step that can lead to 
sustained compliance, if it is combined with other processes that go beyond instrumental rationality 
(Checkel, 2005, pp. 808-810). 
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 Role playing is a mechanism based in organization theory and cognitive social psychology, 
which understands actors as rational beings that are not able to calculate the costs and rewards of 
every and each action, and thus end up relying in certain cues and shortcuts given to them by 
organizational environments. They adopt certain roles because they are appropriate in a particular 
setting and because it is the easier thing to do, not because there was a calculation of the benefits 
they would get or because they internalized the correctness of this action. This is the beginning of 
the shift from a logic of consequences to one of appropriateness, and the outcome of this socialization 
mechanism is called Type I internalization (Checkel, 2005, pp. 810-812). 
 However, conscious acts of persuasion are only present in the third mechanism, normative 
suasion. Being based on Habermasian social theory with influence of social psychology, it adds a 
communicative understanding to the other mechanisms, claiming that agents present arguments in 
order to convince each other. In other words, this mechanism has agents actively and reflectively 
internalizing what is considered to be appropriate, being completely guided by a logic of 
appropriateness. This is true persuasion at play, resulting in what is called Type II internalization 
(Checkel, 2005, pp. 812-813).  
 Although Checkel argues that there is a tendency to think of changes in the implementation 
of human rights brought by persuasion are deeper and more stable than the other mechanisms, he 
also points out that this progressive linear hierarchy is not unquestionable and does not flow in only 
one way. Research has showed that internalization can occur from a process that started with 
incentive-based arguments, specially in cases that have target actors cooperating within international 
institutions. Sometimes, cognitive dissonance and self-persuasion are the keys for this change, 
without any proactive attitude from other agents. Thus, it is better to think of the mechanisms as 
nominal categories whose application can be more effective depending on each situation (Checkel, 
2005, pp. 813-815).  
 Regardless, the final objective of socialization could be said to be to reach a more enduring 
status of Type II internalization, since if states do not fully internalize the importance of human rights’ 
protection they tend to get stuck in the gap between commitment and compliance. This culminates 
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in the fact that there must be persuasion at some extent, be it from internal or external influences 
towards the agent. Based on this, Checkel openly criticized the initial take of the “spiral model” on 
socialization, saying that it focused too much in the necessity of social mobilization to jumpstart 
strategic and rational reactions from target actors (Checkel, 2005, p. 807).  
As already mentioned, Risse and Sikkink address this criticism in the “Persistent Power of 
Human Rights”, where they still affirm that actors reaching Type I socialization is enough for 
compliance (Risse & Sikkink, 2013, pp. 284-285). Their approach to socialization can be seen 
represented in Table 2 (Souza, 2019). While this idea might be true in some specific cases, it does 
not solve the general problem of under specification of the socialization processes leading to 
persuasion. Especially since the biggest obstacle of the “spiral model” now is to characterize the 
processes that influence in changing a state’s situation from commitment to compliance, it can be 
said that persuasion mechanisms that culminate in Type II socialization need instead to be brought 
to the forefront, together with the other mechanisms.    
That considered, I suggest a framework that includes Checkel’s idea of how to socialization 
or persuasion could affect how actors move between the “spiral model” phases, so the movement (or 
lack of thereof) between phases three to five may be understood. 
First, based on the way actors have acted before the international community when it comes 
to commitment and compliance, a differentiation could be made in phases three and four. In phase 
three, there are two kinds of instrumental concessions made by actors: one based on calculations of 
benefit and/or just so they can end or stall criticism from others, and other legitimacy-based, with 
actors actually basing their opposition speech in somewhat valid reasoning, for example by bringing 
up specific cultural and traditional justifications or prioritizing the implementation of some human 
rights over others. 
This initial division branches out to phase four, where it creates situations in which states act 
because they were truly persuaded, or because they are just following a social script without 
internalizing it. These branches, which I divide respectively in “sincere” ratification and “tactical” 
ratification, could help explain situations where phase four is more of an extension of phase three, 
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and states who find themselves there would consequently have more difficulty to proceed to phase 
five. 
Second, I suggest that phase five could be divided in three separate stages of norm 
implementation: partial implementation, substantial implementation and comprehensive 
implementation. With this division, it would become easier to analyze case studies, identifying 
specific issues and suggesting the most efficient modes of action and mechanisms of diffusion for 
each specific situation.  
 Even though this framework is still under development, I believe it can become a helpful 
way to dissect the last three phases of the model and the processes happening there, maybe allowing 
us to shed some light on the issue concerning the commitment/compliance gap.  
Table 2. Some Approaches Concerning Socialization 
The Persistent 
Power of Human 
Rights 
Checkel’s theory of 
different types of 
socialization 
Definition 
Socialization Type I internalization 
Actors know what is socially expected of 
them and behave accordingly (role-playing). 
There is no need for deeply believing in the 
validity of the rule. 
Persuasion Type II internalization 
Needs normative persuasion and deep 
attitudinal change. Actors believe that a norm 
is true, and thus are convinced that complying 
is the right thing to do.  
 
2.4.2 Acharya’s theory of norm localization 
 
 In this same context of trying to reach the phase of rule-consistent behavior, another point is 
that the “spiral model” should be read together with theories of norm localization. While it is 
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undeniable that international norms play a huge role in influencing actors to abide by human rights 
protection, the domestic legal structure is the one that will effectively put these norms into practice 
within national borders. Thus, there is the need to be more focused on how principles and norms 
understood as universal should be adapted according to different cultures and customs, taking into 
consideration the different positionalities of groups and individuals instead of counterproductively 
just forcing states to accept such principles and norms at face value.  
Acharya’s remarkable work on the topic raises exactly this question, prioritizing respectful 
dialogue between local beliefs and foreign norms. He argues that the first wave of norm diffusion 
scholars was excessively fond of the moral cosmopolitanism perspective, prioritizing the “good” 
global norms over the “bad” local ones. For them, the transnational agents had the responsibility of 
teaching the right way of acting, which in turn diminished the role of local actors. On the other hand, 
he cites a second perspective, which in turn stresses extremely the importance of domestic actors and 
the congruence between foreign and national norms. However, he makes it clear that both these 
perspectives are overly static and centered in finding “differences” or “matches” between principles, 
and argues that localization goes further than that (Acharya, 2014, pp. 242-244). Defined as “the 
active construction (through discourse, framing, grafting, and cultural selection) of foreign ideas by 
local actors, which results in the former developing significant congruence with local beliefs and 
practices” (Acharya, 2014, p. 245), localization brings all adaptive processes together in a framework 
that respects the role of local actors without disregarding the importance of foreign actors in this 
dialogue. Here, Acharya could also be understood as talking about the point concerning tradition as 
a defense mechanism, since there is a clear link between his take on localization as a method of 
bridging universally accepted human rights’ paradigms and local traditional positions concerning 
such rights. 
 That considered, the relevance of considering aspects of norm localization when making use 
of the tools of the “spiral model” is clear when looking at the Japanese case in the context of the 
protection of women’s labor rights. Japan’s society still keeps many traditional aspects, such as 
women being the main or even sole responsible for taking care of the home and children, many times 
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having to abandon their careers completely to do so. The persistence of an M-shaped curve in the 
statistics that show female labor force participation rate by age group (Government of Japan, 2017), 
which indicates that women usually leave their jobs after marriage or childbirth and then rejoin the 
labor force years later, usually in part-time positions (Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development, 2017), is the proof of that phenomenon. Other exemplificative data related to that is 
that while married Japanese men spend only 44 minutes daily in housework related activities, women 
spend 3 hours and 28 minutes doing so (Government of Japan, 2016a). To make matters worse, even 
if men wanted to help more, that would be difficult, considering Japan’s draining work culture 
maintained by long and inflexible working hours. In other words, Japanese society must deal with 
two ingrained issues: strictly assigned gender roles and a work culture, which combined stop women 
from advancing in the workplace and taking leading positions in society, hinders the possibility of 
introducing concepts of work-life balance. 
 Considering that Japan, at least for the past three decades since the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Law (EEOL), has consistently tried to implement new norms to solve this gender 
inequality in labor and society, all without considerable success, it can be said that the problem goes 
beyond the law. The aforementioned legitimate group of domestic social norms, which is part of 
Japanese values and stems from cultural and corporate tradition, cannot be disregarded only as an 
instrumental obstacle for not complying with women’s rights. Instead, it might be necessary to apply 
concepts of norm localization to this case, and not to try to force feed the state with universal 
principles. It might be helpful to the understanding of the processes towards achieving compliance if 
the “spiral model” paid more attention to localization as a dynamic social process that takes into 
account domestic principles while aiming to redefine an actor’s values and priorities.  
2.4.3 Approaching norm diffusion through feminist and norm contestation theories 
 
Given some possible improvements, one can say that the “spiral model” is very pertinent for 
understanding the workings and processes related to change in the realization of human rights 
generally, and specifically of women’s rights too. Contesting sexual politics across national borders 
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is an inherently complex process, that involves a balance between protecting women when needed, 
and empowering them through gender equality. It implicates a change in the whole internalized 
construction of gender roles, in how men (and women, to an extent) think, in male-dominated 
institutions and patriarchal logics (Brysk, 2013, p. 262).  
Moreover, women’s rights protection is usually done in a decentralized manner and within 
the private sphere. This is true especially in the context of labor rights, whose norms are generally 
created by a centralized government but have their compliance in a decentralized level, because the 
ones who apply it are private actors at large. States are responsible only for standard-setting, resource 
provision and some symbolic enforcement. Considering that, according to the model, compliance is 
said to be more easily assured in a centralized environment, this decentralization of the application 
of labor rights norms causes not only difficulties in the implementation of norms, but also in the 
assessment of such implementation.  
Plus, it also affects the application of the “boomerang” model. Since gender related rights 
violations are a blend of state-sponsored, state-delegated and private wrongs, the model’s traditional 
concept, which moves from local to global to local again, may not be seen in all cases. For example, 
in the case for ending female genital mutilation, a multi-level frame contest and a dialectical 
reconstruction, which makes the interactions between advocacy networks remain relevant instead in 
a global - local - global development (Brysk, 2013, p. 263), can be observed. However, if this 
criticism is thought through the lens of localization, it can be said that in the process of achieving its 
objective of mapping the changes in the behavior of states, the model still ends up giving women 
protection and implementing their rights. Through the work of transnational and domestic advocacy 
networks that carry out a dialogue between national and international norms, the “boomerang” effect 
may generate much needed support for women’s causes. 
 In that sense, the “spiral model” is a fruitful way to understand and improve the process of 
women’s rights’ implementation. It arguments that victims of repression reach out for international 
support based on legal and rational grounds, but that only is not enough. As mentioned beforehand, 
in the context of the difference between types of socialization and of the need for persuasion, there 
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needs to be a deep change in society itself, and thus significant framing efforts by experts, advocates, 
the media and cultural figures also prove to be incredibly relevant and necessary (Brysk, 2013, p. 
263).  
 Lastly, when thinking about the implementation of women’s rights, paying attention to the 
feminist view on the topic is a must. Although not commonly recognized, there is undoubtedly a 
conflict between the protection of women’s rights according to feminism and multiculturalism. In 
other words, the beliefs that women should not be disadvantaged by their sex, that they should be 
recognized as having human dignity equally with men, and that they should have the opportunity to 
live their lives as fulfilling and as freely as men can often clash against the idea that minority groups 
may claim for group rights beyond the individual rights of its members (Okin, 1998b, pp. 661-663). 
This tension between both sides tends to end with the sacrifice of norms that protect women in favor 
of the protection of “societal cultures”, because the leading nations do want to avoid the criticism 
towards the “Western powers” trying to impose their views and the loud cries of “neocolonialism” 
coming from the minority groups. The application of norm localization in these cases might be 
helpful to avoid this kind of complete rejection by states that are not leading the movement for 
women’s rights.  
 In addition to that, even considering the limited and apparently more balanced view that the 
defense of group rights should be only granted to groups that are internally liberal, this does not 
automatically mean that there will be no violation of women’s rights behind the veil of sovereignty. 
Most cultures (even the so called “culture of the internationally powerful majority”) are full of 
practices and ideologies concerning gender, which endorse and facilitate the control of men over 
women and thrive in disparities in power between the sexes. And this is even more exacerbated 
because of the tendency to focus on cultural groups as uniform entities, and for the lack of attention 
to the private sphere, where violations of women’s rights tend to concentrate. Still, even though 
virtually all the world’s cultures have this patriarchal past, it is a fact that Western liberal cultures 
have tended to separate themselves from these ideas more than others, thus becoming the frontline 
of the movements for women’s rights change (Okin, 1999, pp. 7-24). This all needs to be brought to 
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light in the discussion, so as states may improve their true compliance to international human rights 
in general, and in specific to women’s rights.  
The feminists’ work has been the pillar that helped begin the questioning of the traditional, 
male-dominated international and domestic law, thus also being necessary for solving the issue of 
bridging the gap between law and reality. Feminists have had, in fact, very productive engagements 
with constructivist ideas, which the spiral theory is a part of.  Both fields draw on concepts of social 
construction to inform their theorizing, and both favor the idea that identities and interests can be 
constructed through social interaction. However, constructivist ideas are not without some well-
intentioned criticism from feminists, as they diverge from feminist ideas in the way they treat power 
and gender. Constructivists have under-theorized the social construction of power, and when they 
paid attention to it, they have described it separately from social construction. Furthermore, they tend 
to focus on the state as the most relevant actor to the diffusion of norms. Because of these factors, 
feminist scholars raise issues such as that constructivists lack the tools to explain how gender and 
power are interconnected, and that they gloss over the fact that societal change and the persuasion of 
individual perpetrators are also a must to change practices that harm women’s rights (Pearce, 2015, 
pp. 423-426).  
Building on this concept, an important point of intersection is the relation between 
international norms, constructivism and feminism. Jacqui True is one of the authors that tries to go 
further than simple constructivism, focusing on norms being more than just ideas materialized and 
understood as major influences on international relations like other material factors. According to 
her (True, 2013, p. 76):  
From a feminist perspective there are three main problems with 
constructivist approaches to international norms: (1) norms are not fixed rules, 
but are plural and dynamic in their content and in the degree to which they are 
internalized; (2) norms are not power-neutral – implementing them might create 
new patterns of domination and marginalization and feminists are skeptical that 
the process of internalizing norms will effectively bring about normative change 
 
 49 
and; (3) norms do not stand above power but result from global power relations 
and thus can reproduce them. 
By understanding norms as something disconnected, that remains fairly stable in terms of 
their content, constructivists tend to simplify them too much, ignoring that they can be distinguished 
in different types and are “often plural in their constitution and implementation” (True, 2013, p. 77). 
Even though they are the same as the feminists in the sense that both are “concerned with 
understanding normative change”, the latter are at the same time additionally concerned with 
bringing about normative change. Thus, the main point of a feminist analysis would be to instead of 
following the status quo and just applying the traditional theoretical basis of constructivism, using 
critical methods to trouble old and new norms, breaking with the process of normalization that makes 
certain ideas and relations to be taken for granted and used to force conformity of subjects (True, 
2013, pp. 73-77). Feminists do not want simply the implementation of international norms, with their 
fixed boundaries and lack of internal contradictions, they actually wish for norms to be acknowledged 
as dynamic, with complex processes at work when they are adopted and translated into practice 
(Krook & True, 2012, p. 104). 
Considering my aim of looking into the implementation gap issue and of suggesting ways to 
allow states to reach the phase of rule-consistent behavior, it is interesting to consider incorporating 
these feminist challenging ideas to my study of norm diffusion and of the “spiral model”, since it has 
a tendency to spread normalized, static, male-centered and discriminatory ideas concerning gender 
equality and to harm both males and females. While it might seem that including this somewhat fluid 
and evasive nature of norms would complicate even more this task, it actually would be useful for 
explaining why norms emerge and appear to diffuse fast up to a certain point, at the same time that 
they rarely achieve their final goals in terms of effectiveness. True was right in her contention that 
“norms diffuse precisely because — rather than despite the fact that — they may encompass different 
meanings, fit in with a variety of contexts, and be subject to framing by diverse actors” (Krook & 
True, 2012, p. 105). However, to the extent that this diffusion is done without aiming for full 
persuasion of the actors, it will remain stuck without ever reaching a level of full norm compliance. 
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The approach to norm diffusion, if combined with characteristics of norm localization and feminist 
critique, could be a way of understanding how to reach that level. In this sense, her suggestion of 
applying a more discursive approach to the constructivist framework, and of trying to perceive norms 
less as a commitment written into international treaties or instruments and more as something 
anchored in language and revealed by repeated speech acts, with an ongoing constitution that evolves 
internally and externally over time (Krook & True, 2012, p. 105), are very much welcome, but still 
not enough. In other words, citing again Checkel’s different types of socialization, it can be said that 
True’s ideas are close to Type I socialization, as they bring up discourse but lack in the aspect mutual 
convincing by the actors. This work suggests that more than just repeated discourse, in order to reach 
full compliance, there is a need for using conscious acts of persuasion, which then culminate in true 
norm internalization. In addition to that, the focus given by Krook and True to the work of non-state 
actors and to how actors as a whole may not all have the same capacity of defining problems and 
solutions due to structures of social, economic and political inequality, is also pertinent to my original 
statement in regards to how much influence civil society, national and transnational organizations 
have on the protection of women’s rights (Krook & True, 2012, p. 105).  
 In conclusion, the “spiral model” as a theory of norm diffusion, with its due criticisms, has 
great potential of explaining and possibly helping find ways of bridging the gap between the legal 
protection of women’s rights and their implementation in reality. Investigating the extent to which a 
particular set of norms – in this case, women’s rights as human rights - have been successfully 
diffused in a specific country – in this case, Japan - by institutions like the European Union (EU), the 
United Nations (UN) and its specific organs, is the first step for improving their implementation. For 
that, there is the need to understand the progress achieved through international treaties and other 
legal documents, which will be the focus of the next chapter. 
However, this model will not be able to move forward without the complement of other ideas. 
The fact that gender bias and gender roles remain deeply embedded the most different domestic 
societies, as well as even in the international system, and that many groups resist any kind of change 
to this situation needs to be addressed. Examples of the international society attempting to change 
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this internalized bias do exist. Aiming to guarantee gender equality and the empowerment of women 
around the world, the UN has created the UN Women, which in its turn has created initiatives like 
He For She, a “solidarity movement for gender equality (which) provides a systematic approach and 
targeted platform on which men and boys can engage and become change agents towards the 
achievement of gender equality” (UN Women, 2016). This latter is specially relevant in the context 
of breaking gender roles and stereotypes, as it takes a proactive approach to breach into the male-
centered international society, including men as partners of women in the fight for equality and 
making them understand that it is an issue that also affects them.  
In the end, gender, global politics and power are intrinsically connected, and they clearly 
influence how norms are formed, their content and how they are locally implemented. Thus, in order 
to accomplish the goal of suggesting mechanisms for overcoming the compliance gap, one must first 
understand how gender works as a social process through looking at different case studies, and then 
based on these findings attempt to adapt norms (cultural and legal) built on masculinity and 
femininity. This revolution of concepts can become the start point of a mutual influence, based on 
constructivism mitigated by dialogue and localization, between domestic and international 
institutions, culminating in pressure over the actors going against norm compliance so that they will 




Chapter 3. Understanding Women’s Rights in the UN Human Rights System: From 
the Origins of Human Rights Protection to the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights 
 
 Even though human rights in general, and specifically women’s rights and gender equality, 
have been in theory subject of international protection since the advent of the United Nations in the 
1940s, gender-based discrimination and crimes against women remain rampant in the present society. 
The many treaty provisions and other international legal instruments concerning women’s rights have 
undoubtedly evolved through time, but they remain unable to be satisfactorily reflected in today’s 
reality. Women are the primary victims of gender based violence, their participation in positions of 
power and in decision making is still much smaller than men, the gender pay gap remains, sexual 
and maternity harassment in the working environment persist, stereotyped gender roles keep being 
pushed by society. The issues are varied and worrying, but they all lead to the fact that women do 
suffer discrimination just for being born female. 
 As a researcher, witnessing, and to a certain extent living with these issues daily made 
defining the objective of this work easy. The aim is to understand better the processes that lead actors 
to complying with international women’s rights, and as a result to improve the implementation of 
these rights in Japan, with special attention to the right to work, to female empowerment and to their 
social, political and economic participation.  
The women’s right to equal employment and to be able to effectively work itself is broadly 
protected by Article 11 of the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women, which included varied aspects of the concept of “work”. There are 
many ways to approach the topic, but this research will limit itself to focusing on the issues that are 
more apparent in the case of Japanese women, which includes: a) the lack of equal employment 
opportunities; b) inequality in promotion opportunities, job security and all benefits and conditions 
of service; c) the persistence of the gender pay gap and of unequal treatment despite of work of equal 
value; d) the many cases of dismissal, discrimination or harassment on the grounds of any gender-
related characteristic, such as pregnancy, maternity or marital status; e) the deficiency of the system 
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of parental leave and the lack of child-care facilities, together with insufficient promotion of the idea 
that family obligations and that work-life balance is a concept that matters for both genders.  
All this considered, I chose to focus on the right to work specifically not only because of its 
historical importance in the feminine struggle of breaking away from their traditional and 
stereotypical role of caretaker of the home, but also because of the characteristic of intersectionality 
the topic has. When talking about the women’s right to work, I realize it has to do not only with 
improving labor laws, but also with cultural issues like sexual and power harassment, how pregnancy 
is socially understood, male participation in child rearing and housework, amongst others. Other than 
these cultural aspects, it also obviously has a huge influence in the economic situation of the state 
and of its nationals, which makes it a relevant both in a macro and micro perspectives.  
Moreover, my selection of the Japanese society as a study case is based in the fact that there 
is a clear contrast between the Japanese legal and political rhetoric and the effective introduction of 
these norms and principles in society. As already mentioned in Chapter 2, in the context of the “spiral 
model” and socialization, Japan is found in a position that clearly shows a huge gap between 
commitment and compliance to international law, proving that the state has not been successfully 
persuaded to implement such norms. The data collected during the three decades between Japan 
becoming a member state of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
against Women (CEDAW) and now show that, when facing external pressures, the country attempts 
to show a proactive image, but this does not fully translate in its domestic advances.  
Thus, it may be said that the Japanese case is a clear example of the problem concerning the 
gap existent between international commitment and domestic compliance, and therefore there is a 
need to use an analysis model that makes it easier to recognize and understand this situation. 
Regarding this research, the most useful model is considered to be the aforementioned “spiral model” 
and it will be applied as the basis for understanding the persistence of the implementation gap issue, 
and how it can be overcome. To use the language of the model itself, Japan is stuck in a situation 
where it has somewhat reached a status of prescriptive status (phase four), with even some occasional 
characteristics of tactical concessions (phase three), but unable to move on to achieving rule-
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consistent behavior (phase five). In other words, it has created some protective laws and policies, but 
there are little significant results coming from their application. The “spiral model” identifies this 
issue, and offer tools for this research to analyze the processes and mechanisms that exist between 
these two phases. However, as explicated in Chapter 2, although the model is undeniably a highly 
valued theory of norm diffusion, and arguably the best one in the present academic context, it is not 
perfect. Because of that, in this work I also attempted to complement it with other theories, especially 
ones that take up norm localization, understandings about socialization and a feminist approach, so 
that I could find the necessary balance that would allow international women’s rights to be 
satisfactorily internalized by states. 
 That said, after using the previous chapter to present my findings concerning the “spiral 
model” and before using the following chapters to delve into the Japanese situation in specific, the 
legal and historical foundation for this work must be laid out, through the introduction of the history 
of international human rights, women’s rights and how they came to be protected by an organization 
such as the United Nations. In this chapter and in the next, I will cover these points, respectively 
bringing up civil and political rights and economic and social rights. In addition to that, I will make 
a brief but sufficient presentation of the main international treaties and of their provisions that protect 
the women’s right to work, gender equality and nondiscrimination in the field of employment, like 
the International Bill of Human Rights and the CEDAW. I will also mention the International Labour 
Organization (ILO) and its legal instruments (conventions and recommendations), as they too are 
very specific to the topic.  
3.1 The origins of human rights protection: balancing sovereignty and human rights within 
international law 
 
When one thinks of human rights protection, documents such as the Magna Carta (1215) and 
the French Revolution’s Declaration of Rights of Man (1789) come to mind as the first ones to give 
a kind of state-guaranteed protection to citizens, even if the subjects of these rights were limited to 
certain specific kinds of human beings. Also, because traditional international law prioritized the 
 
 55 
respect for state sovereignty, the idea that human rights protection was an issue of national law rather 
than international law prevailed at the time those instruments were drafted.  
This way of thinking about sovereignty is widely accepted to be rooted in the historical 
events of the Peace of Augsburg (1555), the Peace of Westphalia (1648) and the Westphalian System 
of International Law that derived from the latter. Augsburg was pivotal in settling religious conflicts 
between Protestant German Princes and the Catholic Emperor, and largely contributed to the increase 
in focus towards the separate polities existing within the Empire. Although this first attempt of 
resolution was very much flawed and was already crumbling by the end of the 16th century, it became 
the base for the treaties that originated from the Peace of Westphalia. The original principle that the 
monarch could determine the religion of their domain persisted in the new regime established on 
religious practice and denominational matters, albeit with some relevant limitations (Beaulac, 2004, 
p. 195). Despite being mostly remembered for bringing about a general territorial redistribution 
amongst the various sovereigns, the treaty also granted certain concessions to minorities. Even 
though these religious rights that were provided might not have been the same as the concept of 
minority rights used in the present, it is undeniable that they were an initial political formulation of 
the idea of freedom of religion. This is especially relevant considering that religion was the sharpest 
dividing characteristic between European communities of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, 
leading to the conclusion that the granting of these kinds of rights to political outsiders within a 
sovereign jurisdiction is a part of the contents of the Peace of Westphalia that should undeniably also 
be remembered as an important advancement (Preece, 1997, pp. 75-77). 
In fact, this system composed of a balance between sovereignty and legally based limitations 
is said to be the concrete expression of the international society propounded by Hugo Grotius, the 
intellectual father of this first general peace settlement of modern times (Bull, 1990, p. 75). At large, 
the Grotian view of the Westphalian model is said to have had a profound effect on the course of 
history, and even now just a reference to “Westphalia” will make any scholar automatically think of 
a legally-empowered image of the international system as an association of sovereign states (Beaulac, 
2004, p. 212). In other words, the idea of an authority or organization above sovereign states was to 
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be replaced by the notion that they all form a worldwide political system or that, at any rate, the ones 
from Western Europe form a single political system. Ironically, after this first phase of the creation 
of the modern state system, even though initially the European inventors of the principle of sovereign 
territorial rule denied the same principle to non-European subject territories, these latter ended up 
turning it against their masters to obtain their independence. This process contributed to the 
expansion of the Westphalian order through the globe (Inoguchi & Bacon, 2001, p. 290), with 
international law and the balance of power as the base of this new system, and with law and power 
operating between states, rather than above them (Gross, 1948, p. 29).  
Even though the aspect of state sovereignty tends to be exacerbated by most interpretations 
of Grotian works, there are critics that, based in historical and legal facts, question how much of a 
paradigm shift the Peace of Westphalia was (Beaulac, 2004). It is said that the landscape of Europe 
did not change dramatically before and after the Peace of Westphalia, and that it was actually only 
one important event in a process of change towards understanding sovereignty as a territoriality 
matter, which had already began five hundred years before (Inoguchi & Bacon, 2001, p. 289). 
Moreover, whether researchers concur that the Peace brought more or less change, it is clear that it 
gave form to an embryonic idea of human rights through religious rights, at the same time that it also 
influenced in the way state sovereignty was understood and prioritized, setting off the processes that 
culminated in the rise of state voluntarism over universality and the unity of humankind. These latter, 
which were originally relevant in Grotius’ work (together with the attention he gave to natural law 
and the role of reason), should not be forgotten in the context of contemporary international law 
(Trindade, 2013, pp. 9-15). The evolution suffered by the environment surrounding the original 
Westphalian idea of sovereignty should not be understated. From the destruction of medieval society 
to the advent of the nuclear age, international society, the relations of states and several norms have 
changed immensely. These norms specifically continue to change with the emergence of new 
supporting norms or proto-norms, such as ideas of peacekeeping and humanitarian interventions 
(which are also examples of legal mitigation of sovereignty) (Inoguchi & Bacon, 2001, pp. 293-294). 
Such ongoing processes of social construction relate closely to norm-focused constructivist theories.  
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Showing how resilient it is, the Westphalian model of society retained its significance, with 
many of its characteristics and resources still being used. However, it is undeniable that there has 
been an erosion of state sovereignty with the advent of globalization and the global civil society 
(Inoguchi & Bacon, 2001, pp. 294-295). Thus, while it cannot completely be suggested that 
Westphalian sovereignty is the working principle supporting international relations today, it also 
cannot be affirmed that this logic is being totally replaced by the emergence of institutional norms 
and global governance (Inoguchi & Bacon, 2001, p. 289). The fact is that, the more globalized 
international society gets, the more it depends on the states acting together with other non-
governmental actors (Inoguchi & Bacon, 2001, p. 301). Consequentially, the traditional concept of 
sovereignty has been mitigated by liberal influence on states, therefore making them focus more in 
the concept of popular sovereignty, create a complex interdependence with other states, and be less 
likely to take claims of sovereign statehood as seriously as states under Westphalian sovereignty 
principles (Inoguchi & Bacon, 2001, pp. 294-295).  
Through this liberal influence, I observe a constantly tense relation between the concepts of 
sovereignty and human rights. At the same time that they might be seemingly polar opposites, each 
hindering the full realization of the other, they are also complementary parts of the whole of 
contemporary international law. The existence of human rights is “the greatest modern challenge” to 
the states’ continued exercise of national sovereignty the way it was conceptualized in Westphalia, 
but these rights also legitimize the survival of the idea of sovereignty, to a certain extent. Even though 
it was faint, the guarantee of religious rights that was in the background of Westphalia must not be 
forgotten. Instead of annulling one or the other, sovereignty and human rights must meet in the 
middle, through a legitimate collective of state and non-state actors working to develop a less state-
centric system, which allows the pursuance of human rights (Albahary, 2009, pp.514-517). 
Sovereignty cannot afford aiming to protect just territories anymore, but peoples and human rights 
too. In the next sections, I will focus on how this concept evolved through time, specially after the 
end of the Second World War, and on how the modern view on human rights and women’s rights in 
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the context of the right to work and non-discrimination, based on the efforts of the United Nations 
and its agencies, came to be. 
3.2 The contemporary protection of the women’s right to work and of gender equality based 
on the United Nations and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights  
 
With the constant evolution of the international system and of the values of humankind, the 
long period when states and only one class of people - the male individuals with monetary and 
political power - were exalted began to change. International law that matched this new way of 
thinking also developed, going from having as its subjects only equal sovereign countries to aiming 
to unite the whole globe under universally accepted principles. Consequently, the protection of 
human rights on the international level also changed. From the 19th century, international law started 
spreading itself across national borders and having a say on what happened with citizens in their 
relations with their government. At the same time, the workings of international organizations were 
brought to the foreground and special importance was given to the conclusion of treaties with a wide 
range of objects, such as minorities and race discrimination, and that had effects not only in relations 
between states, but also between people. 
These ideas were reconstructed and, finally, completely embedded in international society 
in the middle of the 20th century, after the regret and reflection brought by the atrocities of the Second 
World War. Originating from this scenario, the United Nations (hereinafter UN) was established 
through its Charter in 1945. The document is the base for the establishment of the main international 
organization for the protection of the general peace, which was attained after much difficulty, and it 
was also the first instrument to bring up this concept of human rights protection in many of its articles. 
Remarkably, its Article 1, paragraph 3 establishes that one of the institution’s purposes is “to achieve 
international co-operation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, 
or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for 
fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion” (United 
Nations, 1945). At this point, a broad reference both to human rights and to a prohibition of 
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discrimination in the grounds of sex, not only in the context of civil and political rights, but also 
concerning economic, social and cultural rights. 
After that, the United Nations Human Rights System only expanded. The promulgation of 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, which included common principles that evolved 
to be treated as customary international law,6 was the starting point of this legal development, and 
served as basis for other instruments, such as the International Covenants on Human Rights. In 
addition to these treaties and their respective treaty-based bodies, the United Nations' principal 
political organs that originated from the UN Charter also introduced many subsidiary bodies, 
programmes, specialized agencies and other offices.  
Among the many varied protection topics that have been contemplated in this UN human 
rights expansion, gender equality, specially in the context of women’s empowerment and their right 
to work, has always been extremely relevant. The fact that the right to work is related to social and 
economic empowerment, as well as to the development of women within both the public and private 
spheres of society, justifies the focus that shall be given to it in this work. Accordingly, my efforts 
will be concentrated in introducing the main treaties, treaty bodies and agencies that work towards 
the realization of women’s labor rights, and in analyzing how have these instruments been applied. 
In this part, I will focus in the political and civil aspects of the International Bill of Human Rights, 
by analyzing the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and leaving for the next chapter 
the analysis of the Bill’s economic and social rights with my focus on the International Covenant on 
                                                 
6 It is important to note that this notion is not undisputed, with a number of authors disagreeing that human 
rights should be considered international customary law. “However, since the 1970s, a wide range of newer 
non-traditional scholarship has emerged arguing against a strict adherence to state practice and opinio juris in 
determining customary international law and advocating instead a more relaxed interpretive approach. Within 
this vein, other scholars have gone further, arguing that widely ratified multilateral conventions or treaties 
which have established human rights prohibitions against genocide, torture, and slavery actually form 
confirmation of customary international law binding upon all states, not just the signatories.” (from Baker, 
2010, p. 174). 
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Economic, Social and Cultural Rights can already be seen. In addition to that, I will also pay attention 
then specifically to presenting relevant points of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women and of the conventions related to gender equality from the 
International Labour Organization.  
3.2.1 Introducing the approach to the women’s right to work in the ICCPR 
 
The International Bill of Human Rights, composed of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), is the most basic group of 
international instruments guaranteeing the protection of women and their right to work. The 
Declaration has a general provision in its preamble reaffirming the people’s faith in the equal rights 
of men and women,7 and it also brings up everyone’s equal right to work in its Article 23 (United 
Nations, 1948):  
Article 23. 
(1) Everyone has the right to work, to free choice of employment, to just and 
favourable conditions of work and to protection against unemployment. 
(2) Everyone, without any discrimination, has the right to equal pay for equal 
work. 
(3) Everyone who works has the right to just and favourable remuneration 
ensuring for himself and his family an existence worthy of human dignity, and 
supplemented, if necessary, by other means of social protection. 
(4) Everyone has the right to form and to join trade unions for the protection of 
his interests. (emphasis added) 
                                                 
7 “Whereas the peoples of the United Nations have in the Charter reaffirmed their faith in fundamental human 
rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person and in the equal rights of men and women and have 
determined to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom, (…)” in the Preamble of 
the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948). 
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Reading both provisions together, the expression “everyone” that is repeatedly used in 
Article 23 gives margin to the understanding that it includes all people regardless of sex. This article 
and the preamble are, however, extremely general provisions, based on the formal concept of equality 
that dominated the first period of the construction of human rights norms. Thus, there was the need 
to adopt conventions which would define specific rights and their limitations, facilitating their 
implementation, and the advent of the ICCPR and the ICESCR was to be the first step in order to 
solve this problem. The former has, according to paragraph 7 of General Comment 24 (1994): 
The object and purpose…to create legally binding standards for Human Rights 
by defining certain civil and political rights and placing them in a framework of 
obligations which are legally binding for those States which ratify; and to provide 
an efficacious supervisory machinery for the obligations undertaken.  
Based on these guidelines, the ICCPR goes on to embrace the principle of equality and non-
discrimination generally in the following articles (United Nations General Assembly, 1966a):  
Article 2.  
(1) Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure 
to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights 
recognized in the present Covenant, without distinction of any kind, such as race, 
colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, 
property, birth or other status. (emphasis added) 
Article 3. 
The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to ensure the equal right of 
men and women to the enjoyment of all civil and political rights set forth in the 
present Covenant. (emphasis added) 
 Article 26. 
All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination 
to the equal protection of the law. In this respect, the law shall prohibit any 
discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection against 
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discrimination on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, 
political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status. 
(emphasis added) 
It is important to note that all three articles include sex as one of the characteristics that shall 
not be raised as reason for discrimination. Moreover, in this context, Article 3 is especially relevant, 
as it forbids sex discrimination specifically, and it seems to incorporate more positive obligations 
towards the affected individuals than the other parts of the text (Joseph & Castan, 2013, p. 761). This 
goes to show how much importance was given to gender equality by the international community at 
the time, at least in principle and on paper.  
Concerning the other relevant topic of this research, the protection of the right to work, 
although there is a small mention of forced or compulsory labor in its Article 8, paragraph 3 (a), the 
scope of the ICCPR does not go as far as encompassing it in full. However, that lack of reference is 
not farfetched, considering that the object of the treaty is civil and political rights and that it leaves 
the regulation of other basic rights, which include labor, to the ICESCR.  
3.2.2 Implementing treaty provisions: a look into the Human Rights Committee, its views and the 
reporting process  
 
Regarding the ways these treaty provisions have been implemented, the Human Rights 
Committee (HRC) is the body responsible for promoting state participation within the standards of 
the ICCPR. Through General Comments and Concluding Observations to state reports, the members 
of the Committee express their views and suggest ways of improving the application of the treaty. 
General Comments consist on the interpretation of the content of human rights treaty provisions, 
covering a wide range of subjects, including the interpretation of specific articles and general 
guidance of what kind of information should be submitted in State reports (United Nations Office of 
the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2018). They also deal with general issues such as the role 
of national human rights institutions and the rights of minorities.  
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Additionally, it is important to notice the status, relevance and utility assigned to General 
Comments, specially by domestic courts. Generally, they have agreed that treaty bodies’ findings are 
relevant and useful in some contexts, regardless of the fact that they do not originate from 
international courts. Still, states and their courts have been hesitant to conclude that they are obliged 
to follow treaty body interpretations, be it from more general expressions such as General Comments 
and Concluding Recommendations, or more specific ones, such as when a treaty body gives it direct 
opinion on a unique case or law from that state (International Human Rights Law and Practice 
Committee, 2004, p. 3). In other words, governments have given considerable importance to the 
views of treaty bodies, while at the same time they tend to not consider them to be formally binding 
interpretations of the respective treaties. They usually give them some attention, but not effect and 
implementation (International Human Rights Law and Practice Committee, 2004, p. 5). 
There are many states and domestic courts whose attitudes go against this rhetoric, however. 
Especially when it comes to the executive, but not excluding actions from the judiciary, there are 
many occasions in which states accept, contest, interact and dialogue with General Comments, 
considering them as questions of law. This is backed up by an extensive list of examples compiled 
by the International Human Rights Law and Practice Committee, in their 2004 Berlin Conference 
Report. It includes cases such as Residents of Bon Vista Mansions v Southern Metropolitan Local 
Council, a South African case, in which the High Court stated that “General Comments have 
authoritative status under international law” (International Human Rights Law and Practice 
Committee, 2004, p. 3). Also, a bill of rights adopted in the Australian Capital Territory in 2004 
defined international law as including “general comments and views of the United Nations human 
rights treaty monitoring bodies”, and provided that “international law, and the judgments of 
international and foreign courts and tribunals, relevant to a human rights may be considered in 
interpreting the human right” (International Human Rights Law and Practice Committee, 2004, p. 4).  
Still, the consensus is that, while national courts have generally not been prepared to accept 
that General Comments and committee interpretations of treaty provisions are formally binding, most 
agree that considerable weight must be given to them, especially when it comes to determining the 
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meaning of rights and the existence of a violation (International Human Rights Law and Practice 
Committee, 2004, p. 43). It is undeniable that these Comments are adopted and circulated to states 
parties, being subjected to their scrutiny and interpretation concerning their correctness. Thus, it is 
possible to argue that, because states parties discuss and accept those statements, because they tend 
to refer to general comments or recommendations together with case law in their submissions to 
treaty bodies and to other actors, and because they report on and reply to specific matters listed in 
these kinds of treaty bodies’ findings, states have been clearly giving General Comments and other 
views political and legal relevance (International Human Rights Law and Practice Committee, 2004, 
p. 6). The words of the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the Report No. 21 to the Storting 
(1999-2000) sum up this conclusion well: 
 “These comments are not legally binding but are of great significance when 
interpreting the conventions, and may contribute to the development of 
customary international law”. 
 Lastly, considering that this work focuses on the Japanese situation, it is interesting to not 
how the state has been considering treaty bodies’ views. In a judgement of June 1996, the Osaka 
High Court followed the general consensus explained above, by stating that the “general comments” 
and “views” should be relied upon as supplementary means of interpretation of the ICCPR. And it 
went even further, by saying that contents of an international convention of a similar kind such as 
the European Convention on Human Rights and jurisprudence under it can also be treated as such 
supplementary means of interpretation. However, since then Japanese courts have changed their tone, 
dismissing arguments based not only in General Comments and other views, but even barely 
mentioning the international treaties themselves. For example, in  judgements of 1999 and 2001, the 
Tokyo District Court dismissed any arguments based on General Comments 19 and 15, respectively, 
stating that “ “the General Comment (19) has no binding force in Japan” and “the General Comment 
(15) neither represents authoritative interpretation of the ICCPR nor binds the interpretation of the 
treaty in Japan” (International Human Rights Law and Practice Committee, 2004, pp. 21-22). This 
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is a worrying position, which I will give more attention to in the following chapter dealing 
specifically with the Japanese legal situation. 
This considered, and following the theme of this research, two of the ICCPR Comments that 
deal with the concept of equality must be brought up. General Comment No. 18 is relevant because 
it tackles directly the meaning given to “non-discrimination”, including there the principles of 
equality before the law and equal protection of the law without any discrimination. Basing itself on 
the definitions existent in the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination and in the CEDAW, it sets the term “discrimination” in the ICCPR as something that: 
…should be understood to imply any distinction, exclusion, restriction or 
preference which is based on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, 
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or 
other status, and which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the 
recognition, enjoyment or exercise by all persons, on an equal footing, of all 
rights and freedoms (United Nations Human Rights Committee, 1989, paragraph 
7).  
 It goes on to reinforce other general requirements and characteristics of the principle, such 
as the understanding that the enjoyment of rights and freedoms on an equal footing does not mean 
identical treatment in every instance (United Nations Human Rights Committee, 1989, paragraph 8) 
and the possibility of affirmative action by the States parties being required in order to promote non-
discrimination (United Nations Human Rights Committee, 1989, paragraph 10.  
On its turn, General Comment No. 28 deals with equality within the specific topic of gender, 
and brings to light what should be the updated interpretation of Article 3 of the ICCPR, in order to 
improve the situation of inequality. Replacing the 20 year old General Comment No. 4, it goes over 
all the articles of the covenant, highlighting the points that have to do with inequality between women 
and men, identifying some of the factors affecting the equal enjoyment by women of the rights under 
the Covenant and spelling out the related information that needs to be informed to the Human Rights 
Committee (United Nations Human Rights Committee, 2000, paragraph 6). Its text is very extensive 
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and comprehensive, but some of its paragraphs are worth of mention for their relation to this research. 
Paragraph 3 of the General Comment No. 28 (2000) is relevant in the sense that it emphasizes the 
need for states to take positive action towards empowering women, and their obligation to provide 
information about women’s situation and its progress: 
(…)The State party must not only adopt measures of protection, but also 
positive measures in all areas so as to achieve the effective and equal 
empowerment of women. States parties must provide information regarding the 
actual role of women in society so that the Committee may ascertain what 
measures, in addition to legislative provisions, have been or should be taken to 
give effect to these obligations, what progress has been made, what difficulties 
are encountered and what steps are being taken to overcome them.  
 This trend of demanding proactive actions from the states continues in paragraph 4, as it 
focuses on the needs for “all steps necessary” to be taken. Its reference to the existence of 
discrimination both in the public and the private sector (United Nations Human Rights Committee, 
2000, paragraph 4) is also important, especially because most violations against women occur in this 
latter, which makes it harder to identify and eliminate: 
Paragraph 4 
States parties are responsible for ensuring the equal enjoyment of rights without 
any discrimination. Articles 2 and 3 mandate States parties to take all steps 
necessary, including the prohibition of discrimination on the ground of sex, to put 
an end to discriminatory actions, both in the public and the private sector, which 
impair the equal enjoyment of rights.  
 Branching away from a strictly legal aspect, paragraph 5 (United Nations Human Rights 
Committee, 2000) considers the cases where culture and customs might be used as excuses for states 




Inequality in the enjoyment of rights by women throughout the world is deeply 
embedded in tradition, history and culture, including religious attitudes. The 
subordinate role of women in some countries is illustrated by the high incidence 
of prenatal sex selection and abortion of female fetuses. States parties should 
ensure that traditional, historical, religious or cultural attitudes are not used to 
justify violations of women’s right to equality before the law and to equal 
enjoyment of all Covenant rights. States parties should furnish appropriate 
information on those aspects of tradition, history, cultural practices and religious 
attitudes which jeopardize, or may jeopardize, compliance with article 3, and 
indicate what measures they have taken or intend to take to overcome such factors.  
Moving on to the Concluding Observations, according to the text of Article 40 of the ICCPR, 
they are the result of the examination done annually on the reports periodically submitted by states 
parties, indicating “the measures they have adopted which give effect to the rights recognized herein 
(in the Convention) and on the progress made in the enjoyment of those rights” (United Nations 
General Assembly, 1966a). They contain the concerns and recommendations of the Committee to 
that specific state party, becoming the guidelines for government representatives to act on areas 
where improvement in necessary, or to commend the state for any progress in the implementation of 
ICCPR principles.  
Concerning this procedure of state reporting under the ICCPR, it requires member states of 
the Covenant to submit an initial report detailing progress in the domestic treaty implementation, 
specifically addressing every Article in its Parts I, II and III, particularly the constitutional and 
domestic legal framework for the implementation of Covenant rights, and explaining with how is the 
situation of the access to remedies for any violations of them. Then, they must issue another updated 
report every three to five years (depending on the treaty body), focusing this time in discussing the 
problematic provisions identified in the previous Concluding Observations, the progress on 
enjoyment of ICCPR rights and areas in which there has been significant development since the last 
submission. The state is supposed to send a delegation to appear before the Human Rights Committee 
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to discuss the report in a process similar to a dialogue. Afterwards, based on the report, the dialogue, 
and any other relevant information submitted by groups like national human rights 
institutions or non-governmental organizations, the above-mentioned concluding observations on 
each state are created.  
The following image, provided by the OHCHR website (United Nations Office of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights, 2019a), illustrates this cycle. 
Figure 4. Diagram of the reporting cycle 
 
The aim of these reports is to be more than a simple procedure, and instead to provide “an 
opportunity for an individual State party to conduct a comprehensive review of the measures it has 
taken to bring its national law and policy into line with the provisions of the treaties to which it is a 
party” (United Nations Secretariat, 2006, paragraph 8). In other words, it is a system that works to 
promote state compliance with the treaty principles and provisions. This process of reporting and 
evaluating can actually be taken as an example of the diffusion of norms through the “spiral model”, 
since it is a framework that requires continuous interaction between domestic actors and international 
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organizations towards the goal of reaching a status of rule-consistent behavior. Therefore, it should 
consist of an “honest appraisal of their (state’s) conformity to the treaty obligations” (Smith, 2015, 
p. 154), and include information from sources other than the official governmental ones.  
In this sense, information provided by non-governmental organizations in their particular 
reports becomes vital for the functioning of human rights implementation, as they are usually 
disaggregated from the governmental pressure of showing material results of norm compliance, and 
because they allow for an assessment on the state of civil, social and political rights and considers 
such assessments from the point of view of subjects that are directly affected by ICCPR principles. 
This information must be thus valued accordingly, as an effective way of giving the public an 
opportunity to keep in check the government's implementation of the Covenant.  
Furthermore, some formal points concerning the participation of NGOs in the procedure 
process are worth mentioning. As seen in figure 4, NGOs and other organizations may present their 
reports after the state parties send in their original reports, and separately from them. This is relevant 
because it gives the NGOs the chance to interact with the state report, be it to criticize, correct, 
complement or agree with it. Considering that the majority of state party reports are known for 
prioritizing information about legislative advances and for overlooking the analysis of practical 
challenges and measures taken for implementation, independent NGO reports become especially 
important. They should then focus on presenting good practices and identifying gaps and challenges 
in the implementation of legislation, programmes and policies. Also, this time difference is positive 
because it ensures that the Committee has the most up-to-date information at the time of the state 
review. Needless to say, this information must also be specific, reliable and objective, and preferably 
sent in as a comprehensive report. If possible, it is preferred that NGOs send their observations as a 
joint report, by forming a representative coalition of organizations that deal with different topics 
within the treaty, since this allows for more effective monitoring at national level (Child Rights 
Connect, 2015).  
Concerning the structure and content of the alternative NGO reports, they should contain an 
introduction with the methodology used, a list of NGOs which contributed to the report, and can 
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include information about the general situation of the state. It then needs to have a substantive 
analysis of the state report, which goes section-by-section according to the clusters present in the 
official reporting guidelines. This part should include information about the extent to which 
legislation, policies and practice of the state complies with the treaty provisions. Finally, at the end 
of each section there needs to be conclusions and recommendations, which the Committee might use 
in its final recommendations (Child Rights Connect, 2015, pp. 9-16). Lastly, it is worth mentioning 
that the Committee may also answer to individual complaints against countries which have ratified 
the first Optional Protocol to the treaty, acting directly in implementing treaty provisions that are 
being violated.  
Although these mechanisms may sound fail proof in theory, they are far from being perfect. 
The whole system suffers with the failure of states parties to submit the reports before their deadline, 
with inaccurate or incomplete reports when they do get turned in, and with lack of staff and resources. 
Hard data exemplifies this, since as many as 59 out of 172 state parties (making up for 34.3% of the 
total) are overdue with their reports. Among these states with pending obligations, 15 countries have 
initial reports that are still overdue, and if broken down by time overdue, 28 countries have reports 
overdue less than five years, 11 have them overdue between five and ten years, and 20 have them 
overdue more than ten years (United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 
2019b). That shows a lack of commitment to the structure of the system, regardless of how it may be 
justified. Even more worrying is that these problems are not only contained to the HRC. In fact, all 
major Committees have their activities hindered by it to bigger or lesser extent. To mention the 
situation of the bodies that will be explained in this research, The Committee on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights has 76 overdue reports out of 169 state parties (44.9%), while the CEDAW 
Committee has 56 of them out of 189 state parties (29.6%). 
 Another issue is that the views of the Human Rights Committee (and of all the other 
Committees) do not have the formal quality of judgements, thus being seen as not legally binding 
and without the possibility of enforcement. In fact, this binding quality has been rejected by Spanish, 
Irish, Sri Lankan and many other national courts (European Commission for Democracy through 
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Law, 2014, paragraph 76). The object of this research, Japan, regardless of the fact that Article 98, 
paragraph 2 of its Constitution clearly states that “the treaties concluded by Japan and established 
laws of nations shall be faithfully observed”, also tends to follow this trend of not having the 
Committee’s views nor the Covenant’s rights actively considered by its courts. Paragraph 6 of the 
Concluding observations on the sixth periodic report of Japan, which talks about the applicability of 
the Covenant rights by national courts, exemplifies this issue: 
While noting that treaties ratified by the State party have the effect of domestic law, the 
Committee is concerned at the restricted number of cases in which the rights protected under the 
Covenant have been applied by courts (art. 2) (United Nations Human Rights Committee, 2014, 
paragraph 6). 
However, as mentioned in the excerpt above, the legal norms accepted by the state parties 
themselves when they become signatories of a human rights treaty are binding obligations, and thus 
it can be said that the views of treaty bodies should be seen as more than simple recommendations 
that can be readily disregarded without a valid cause. Member states not only of the ICCPR, but of 
all other human rights treaties are under the obligation the views of their respective treaty-based 
bodies into consideration in good faith (European Commission for Democracy through Law, 2014, 
paragraph 78). Also, the Human Rights Committee routinely asks states about the use of the 
Covenant before their national courts, which is an indicative that it believes they are required to use 
the treaty provisions as domestic law (Quigley, 1993, pp. 1293-1297).  
Nevertheless, analyzing what happens in reality, domestic implementation of the Covenant 
usually gets hindered by how internal institutions of the state interpret and submit to the obligations 
imposed to them. The case of the USA is very telling in this context. American courts may 
occasionally refer to the rules codified by the ICCPR, but they have repeatedly held it to be 
unenforceable domestically and unavailable to litigants as a legal basis for causes of action. This is 
mostly because the United States made it explicit in its reservations, at the time of ratification, that 
the Covenant is non-self-executing (Kaye, 2013, pp. 95-96), and thus it may only be enforced in the 
courts if there is prior domestic legislation implementing it (Vazquez, 1995, pp. 695-696). Regardless 
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of the considerable academic politically based criticism regarding the validity of that position, as 
well as of many other reservations, understandings and declarations made by the US and other state 
parties, the worrying fact is that nations keep mitigating their obligations through such instruments 
that are clearly incompatible with the object and purpose of its respective human rights treaties 
(Venetis, 2011, pp. 107-109). This bends the contents of Article 19 (c) of the Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties, which spells out that:  
Article 19  
A State may, when signing, ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to a treaty, 
formulate a reservation unless: 
(a) the reservation is prohibited by the treaty; (b) the treaty provides that only 
specified reservations, which do not include the reservation in question, may be 
made; or (c) in cases not falling under sub-paragraphs (a) and (b), the reservation 
is incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty. (emphasis added) 
Thus, reservations that do not match the “objective and purpose of the treaty” are one of the 
many obstacles to the implementation of its provisions. In the context of human rights treaties, the 
problem is that even though the meaning of such “objective and purpose” seems to clearly consist of 
giving legal protection to human rights, this point is actually the subject of different interpretations 
by state parties, according to their own political, economic and cultural characteristics and interests. 
These interpretations are usually hard to refute, and thus this clash between theory and reality persists, 
culminating in the misuse and devaluation of treaty provisions. 
 In conclusion, in this chapter I took a deeper look into the history of human rights protection 
and into one of the most basic documents that guarantees such rights, the ICCPR. Keeping my focus 
in the issues concerning gender equality and discrimination on the grounds of sex, I also attempted 
to link aspects of the treaty and of its corresponding treaty body to my main object of study, which 
is Japan. In the next chapter, I will continue this analysis, switching its object to economic and social 




Chapter 4. The Women’s Right to Work in the Context of the ICECSR, the CEDAW 
and the ILO: Analyzing Gender Equality with a Focus on Economic and Social Rights 
 
Building upon the previously introduced content concerning the history of human rights 
protection, the creation of the UN Human Rights system, and specially on the guarantee of gender 
equality in the context of the ICCPR, this chapter will continue paving the background needed for 
this thesis. This time, however, the focus will be given to the protection of women’s rights in regards 
to economic and social rights, bringing to the forefront specifically the women’s right to work, the 
main topic of this research. Starting with an analysis of the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) (United Nations General Assembly, 1966b), I will dedicate 
one part to understanding the singularities of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). Then, I will finish by presenting the focused efforts of 
the ILO to contribute to the end of discrimination in the grounds of sex existent in society as a whole. 
4.1 Gender equality and the women’s right to work in the ICESCR: Analyzing relevant treaty 
provisions and treaty bodies’ findings   
 
Keeping in mind that many of the considerations made in the last chapter about the ICCPR 
can be applied to the ICESCR, I move on to its analysis. The treaty aims to make possible the ideal 
of free human beings enjoying freedom from fear and want, and living enjoying their inherent dignity 
as human persons. As the focus here is people’s economic, social and cultural rights, attention was 
obviously paid to both the principle of equality and to the right to work. The former is included in 
Article 2 (2) and Article 3, through which it respectively sets to states parties the following duties: 
Article 2 
2. The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to guarantee that the rights 
enunciated in the present Covenant will be exercised without discrimination of 
any kind as to race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, 




The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to ensure the equal right of 
men and women to the enjoyment of all economic, social and cultural rights set 
forth in the present Covenant. (emphasis added) 
As it was in the ICCPR, the treaty openly guarantees the equal protection of rights and their 
realization regardless of the subject’s sex. It also has a separate article specifically focusing on this 
trait, reinforcing its importance. On its turn, the right to work is contained in the intertwined contents 
of Article 6 and Article 7. Article 6 presents the right to work itself, as it follows: 
Article 6. 
1. The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right to work, which 
includes the right of everyone to the opportunity to gain his living by work which 
he freely chooses or accepts, and will take appropriate steps to safeguard this right. 
(emphasis added) 
This is a general provision that is important to bring up because of its use of the expression 
“everyone”, which includes all sexes, and because it values the capacity of people to choose their 
own work. Building on this, Article 7 repeats the fact that everyone has the right to the enjoyment of 
just and favourable the conditions of their chosen work, while being way more specific in recognizing 
what kinds of characteristics deserve special focus: 
Article 7. 
The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to the 
enjoyment of just and favourable conditions of work which ensure, in particular: 
(a) Remuneration which provides all workers, as a minimum, with: 
(i) Fair wages and equal remuneration for work of equal value without distinction 
of any kind, in particular women being guaranteed conditions of work not inferior 
to those enjoyed by men, with equal pay for equal work; 
(ii) A decent living for themselves and their families in accordance with the 
provisions of the present Covenant; 
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(b) Safe and healthy working conditions; 
(c) Equal opportunity for everyone to be promoted in his employment to an 
appropriate higher level, subject to no considerations other than those of seniority 
and competence; 
(d) Rest, leisure and reasonable limitation of working hours and periodic holidays 
with pay, as well as remuneration for public holidays. (emphasis added) 
  Moreover, the fact that women are singled out in the article above shows that the member 
states, when drafting the text, were already aware of the prevalence of discrimination against females 
in the area of employment. This necessity of guaranteeing the rights of women, and even more 
specifically of women dealing with motherhood, is also brought up in paragraph 2 of Article 10: 
Article 10. 
The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize that: 
2. Special protection should be accorded to mothers during a reasonable period 
before and after childbirth. During such period working mothers should be 
accorded paid leave or leave with adequate social security benefits. 
To make sure these treaty provisions are being followed correctly, the ICESCR (similar to 
the ICCPR) also has a monitoring committee that makes General Comments, Concluding 
Observations to state reports, and answers to complaints of states that opted into its Optional Protocol. 
It is the already mentioned Committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights (hereinafter CESCR). 
Although its functions are equal to the ones of the Human Rights Committee, for a long time many 
commentators were keen on the idea that while civil and political rights were subject to immediate 
application, economic, social and cultural rights required progressive realization, and thus different 
implementation measures were needed. However, the CESCR has issued several General Comments 
aiming to crush that idea, and it has found that states do have a duty to ensure the immediate 
enjoyment of a minimum level of the rights to food, shelter, health, education and finally, 
employment (Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 1999a, 1999b, 2000, 2003, 2006). 
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I agree with this position, especially with the considerations that these rights are undoubtedly more 
concrete and easier to physically measure than civil and political rights. 
Other than these General Comments, some others must be mentioned for their connection 
with the topic of equality and the right to work. General Comment No. 16 (Committee on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights, 2005) starts by setting the definitions of “equality” and “non-
discrimination” that should be applied when reading the treaty. From paragraphs 6 to 9, it clarifies 
that equality between men and women needs to be understood comprehensively, both as de jure (or 
formal) equality and de facto (or substantive) equality. In other words, it shows awareness that only 
creating laws or policies that treat both genders in a neutral manner is not enough to stop inequality, 
and thus there is the need to pay attention to the effects of these creations, so that they effectively 
lessen the issues women are faced with. These paragraphs also note that states parties must respect 
both the principle of equality in the law and of equality before the law (Committee on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights, 2005, paragraphs 6-9). 
 Concerning the principle of non-discrimination, it is described as “the corollary of the 
principle of equality” (Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 2005, paragraph 10), 
and discrimination against women is singled out in paragraph 11 as: 
 “any distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex which has the 
effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or exercise 
by women, irrespective of their marital status, on a basis of equality of men and 
women, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, 
social, cultural, civil or any other field”. Discrimination on the basis of sex may 
be based on the differential treatment of women because of their biology, such as 
refusal to hire women because they could become pregnant; or stereotypical 
assumptions, such as tracking women into low-level jobs on the assumption that 




 It is interesting to observe that both examples given in this paragraph are of cases of 
discrimination in the workplace, which shows again how relevant the topic is in the context of 
women’s rights.  
 In addition to these basic definitions, the General Comment differentiates the states parties’ 
duties into general legal obligations and specific legal obligations, these latter which in turn were 
divided into obligation to protect, respect and to fulfill. Based in these categories, it goes on to detail 
the interpretation of Article 3 of the ICESCR in relation to each specific right guaranteed in its text, 
through different examples of its application. The right to work, as protected by Articles 6 and 7, is 
taken upon paragraphs 23 and 24. Paragraph 23 gives a general example of how the implementation 
of Article 3, in relation to article 6:  
(…) requires inter alia, that in law and in practice, men and women have equal 
access to jobs at all levels and all occupations and that vocational training and 
guidance programmes, in both the public and private sectors, provide men and 
women with the skills, information and knowledge necessary for them to benefit 
equally from the right to work. (emphasis added) 
 Paragraph 24, on the other hand, is way more specific in its exemplification, following the 
tone of the text of Article 7. It raises various important work-related issues that are born from gender 
discrimination, going as far as requiring that the state party’s government needs to be aware of the 
levels of compliance by the private sector.  
Paragraph 24 
Article 3, in relation to article 7 requires, inter alia, that the State party identify 
and eliminate the underlying causes of pay differentials, such as gender-biased 
job evaluation or the perception that productivity differences between men and 
women exist. Furthermore, the State party should monitor compliance by the 
private sector with national legislation on working conditions through an 
effectively functioning labour inspectorate. The State party should adopt 
legislation that prescribes equal consideration in promotion, non-wage 
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compensation and equal opportunity and support for vocational or professional 
development in the workplace. Finally, the State party should reduce the 
constraints faced by men and women in reconciling professional and family 
responsibilities by promoting adequate policies for childcare and care of 
dependent family members.  
Together with General Comment No. 16, General Comment No. 20 (Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 2009) also aims to explain the way non-discrimination, as 
included in Article 2, paragraph 2, should be understood and applied in conjunction to the rest of the 
ICESCR. It starts by defining, in paragraph 7, that:  
(…) non-discrimination is an immediate and cross-cutting obligation in the 
Covenant. (…) It is to be noted that discrimination constitutes any distinction, 
exclusion, restriction or preference or other differential treatment that is directly 
or indirectly based on the prohibited grounds of discrimination and which has the 
intention or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or 
exercise, on an equal footing, of Covenant rights. Discrimination also includes 
incitement to discriminate and harassment. (emphasis added) 
 This definition is interesting in the sense that it adds incitement to discriminate and 
harassment to the contents of discrimination, amplifying the concept. The Comment also does a good 
job in covering various relevant conceptual bases, by mentioning and describing important 
approaches towards discrimination, such as the differences between formal/substantive 
discrimination and direct/indirect discrimination, the existence of discrimination in the private sphere 
and of systemic discrimination (Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 2009, 
paragraphs 8, 10-12). Lastly, it then goes on to break down the different grounds on which this 
discrimination is forbidden, updating the interpretation of each of them. The prohibition of 





The Covenant guarantees the equal right of men and women to the enjoyment of 
economic, social and cultural rights. Since the adoption of the Covenant, the 
notion of the prohibited ground “sex” has evolved considerably to cover not only 
physiological characteristics but also the social construction of gender 
stereotypes, prejudices and expected roles, which have created obstacles to the 
equal fulfilment of economic, social and cultural rights. Thus, the refusal to hire 
a woman, on the ground that she might become pregnant, or the allocation of low-
level or part-time jobs to women based on the stereotypical assumption that, for 
example, they are unwilling to commit as much time to their work as men, 
constitutes discrimination. Refusal to grant paternity leave may also amount to 
discrimination against men. (emphasis added) 
The most important point of this interpretation is the fact that “sex” is also now understood 
as including the socially constructed concept of “gender”. This change is valuable for it includes 
situations that go beyond biological sex and helps build a better society not only for women that do 
not wish to conform themselves to stereotypical roles, but for all people. It is also under this kind of 
approach that this thesis uses “sex” and “gender” with the same general meaning, unless it is clearly 
specified that one or the other is meant specifically. Moreover, it is interesting to note that the 
examples give in this paragraph are also related to work, showing the impact gender has in these 
situations. 
Furthermore, specifically related to the right to work, the Committee on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights has adopted General Comments No. 18 and 23, which respectively focus on 
Articles 6 and 7 of the Covenant. General Comment No. 18 (Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, 2006) presents the interpretation of the article and sets how it should be applied. 
Since it is a document that delves comprehensively and deeply into the topic of work, including 
definitions, normative content, state obligations, violations and implementation, this research will 
limit itself to including mentions only to the main paragraphs that deal with non-discrimination and 
the right to work for women. Paragraph 12 is relevant, as it details the elements necessary for the full 
 
 80 
exercise of the right to work. Its text combines the application of Articles 2, 3 and 6 of the treaty 
emphasizing the accessibility of the labor market to everyone: 
Paragraph 12 
The exercise of work in all its forms and at all levels requires the existence of the 
following interdependent and essential elements, implementation of which will 
depend on the conditions present in each State party:  
(b) Accessibility. The labour market must be open to everyone under the 
jurisdiction of States parties. Accessibility comprises three dimensions: (…) 
(i) Under its article 2, paragraph 2, and article 3, the Covenant prohibits any 
discrimination in access to and maintenance of employment on the grounds of 
race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social 
origin, property, birth, physical or mental disability, health status (including 
HIV/AIDS), sexual orientation, or civil, political, social or other status, which has 
the intention or effect of impairing or nullifying exercise of the right to work on 
a basis of equality. (…)(emphasis added) 
 Here, the prohibition of discrimination on the grounds of sex is included in a broader context 
that includes and puts on the same level all the other characteristics that should not give origin to 
discriminatory acts. However, the General Comment also gives more specific attention to women 
and the right to work (Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 2006, paragraph 13): 
Paragraph 13 
Article 3 of the Covenant prescribes that States parties undertake to “ensure the 
equal right of men and women to the enjoyment of all economic, social and 
cultural rights”. The Committee underlines the need for a comprehensive system 
of protection to combat gender discrimination and to ensure equal opportunities 
and treatment between men and women in relation to their right to work by 
ensuring equal pay for work of equal value. In particular, pregnancies must not 
constitute an obstacle to employment and should not constitute justification for 
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loss of employment. Lastly, emphasis should be placed on the link between the 
fact that women often have less access to education than men and certain 
traditional cultures which compromise the opportunities for the employment and 
advancement of women.  
 Still, the approach of this General Comment had margin for improvement. This evolution is 
seen in General Comment No. 23 on the right to just and favorable conditions of work, a fairly recent 
document which follows the tendency set by its predecessors in giving detailed interpretations of an 
article’s normative content – in this case, Article 7 of the ICESCR – and thus contributing to its full 
implementation. It innovates in the context of the definition of non-discrimination and equality by 
explicitly saying that the expression “everyone” used in the treaty refers to workers in all settings, 
regardless of gender or any other characteristics, in addition to it reinforcing the references to these 
principles in the texts of Article 2, paragraph 2, Article 3 and Article 7 (Committee on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights, 2016, paragraph 5). 
 Concerning the specific struggles and rights of women in the labor market, it is present in 
every part of Article 7 and highlights many different issues: the disadvantaged position of women in 
the context of equal remuneration (Article 7 (a)); the necessity for special health protection for 
women in situations related to pregnancy (Article 7 (b)); the requirement that hiring, promotion and 
termination must not be discriminatory towards any workers, with special mention to women and 
others, such as workers with disabilities, workers from certain ethnic, national and other minorities, 
lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex workers, older workers and indigenous workers, so 
that equal opportunity for everyone is guaranteed (Article 7 (c)); and the need for a workplace that 
provides people of the tools to achieve work-life balance, with special mention to the fact that these 
measures should not reinforce stereotyped gender roles, such as that men are the ones responsible for 
the family income and that women should be responsible only for the household (Article 7 (d)). It 
also makes a point of singling out the right of workers to freedom from all forms of harassment, 
including sexual harassment, which tends to affect women more (Committee on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights, 2016, paragraph 48).  
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Lastly, the General Comment No. 23 summarizes perfectly the situation of working women 
in its paragraph 47 (a), which is worth quoting:  
Paragraph 47 
 The right to just and favourable conditions of work relates to specific workers:  
(a) Female workers: Progress on the three key interrelated indicators for gender 
equality in the context of labour rights — the “glass ceiling”, the “gender pay gap” 
and the “sticky floor” — remains far from satisfactory. Intersectional 
discrimination and the absence of a life-cycle approach regarding the needs of 
women lead to accumulated disadvantages that have a negative impact on the 
right to just and favourable conditions of work and other rights. Particular 
attention is needed to address occupational segregation by sex and to achieve 
equal remuneration for work of equal value, as well as equal opportunity for 
promotion, including through the introduction of temporary special measures. 
Any assessment of the “value” of work must avoid gender stereotypes that could 
undervalue work predominantly performed by women. States parties should take 
into account the different requirements of male and female workers. For example, 
specific measures might be necessary to protect the safety and health of pregnant 
workers in relation to travel or night work. Day-care services in the workplace 
and flexible working arrangements can promote equal conditions of work in 
practice. Workers benefiting from gender-specific measures should not be 
penalized in other areas. States parties must take measures to address traditional 
gender roles and other structural obstacles that perpetuate gender inequality. 
Even though it is, without a doubt, hard to determine violations of and compliance with all 
these aforementioned rights in general, especially because of the ambiguity in the definition of 
common expressions such as “the maximum of available resources” and “progressive realization”, 
usually present in the covenants and in its interpretations, this must not be used as an excuse for non-
compliance by states. As an example proving this point, General Comment No. 18, on its paragraph 
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19, affirms that the Covenant “also imposes on States parties various obligations which are of 
immediate effect. States parties have immediate obligations in relation to the right to work, such as 
the obligation to ‘guarantee’ that it will be exercised ‘without discrimination of any kind’ (Article 2, 
paragraph 2) and the obligation ‘to take steps’ (Article 2, paragraph 1) towards the full realization of 
article 6. Such steps must be deliberate, concrete and targeted towards the full realization of the right 
to work” (Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 2006, paragraph 19).  
However, regardless of these words, in reality the many obstacles concerning the 
implementation of Articles 6 and 7 in numerous states keep being a point of concern. Other problems 
also sprout from the general lack of attention given to economic, social and cultural rights (Alston, 
1992, p, 474), and from the fact that the CESCR was established under a resolution of the Economic 
and Social Council and it thus intrinsically connected to it (Shaw, 2008, p. 309). For example, the 
vagueness of the principles of the treaty, relative lack of legal texts and decisions related to it, 
ambivalence of many states in addressing economic, social and cultural rights, comparatively few 
non-governmental organizations focused on the area and problems with obtaining relevant and 
precise information can all be cited.  
From the treaties presented here and their definition of human rights, equality and non-
discrimination, it can be understood that women are entitled to enjoy the same rights and fundamental 
freedoms as other individuals. Also, as a particularly vulnerable group, they need to have special 
protection within the international human rights system. Although it seems like it should be clear that 
women’s rights should be considered an intrinsic part of that system, this has actually required 
considerable rethinking of the concept of human rights itself and challenges to some cultural, familial 
and religious institutions (Okin, 1998a, p. 32). No matter how much the expression “gender equality”, 
understood as “equal rights, responsibilities and opportunities of women and men and girls and boys” 
(Office of the Special Advisor on Gender Issues and Advancement of Women, 2001), was name-
dropped in general human rights treaties, it still did not guarantee that women are entitled to the full 
and equal enjoyment of all their human rights, without any form of discrimination. There was a need 
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for more focused protection, a need for creating a treaty that contemplated women as the sole subjects 
of the rights there contained, and that could contribute to the achievement of gender equality. 
4.2 Specific protection for women both in international and domestic societies: the advent of 
the CEDAW and the right to work in its context 
 
The answer the UN General Assembly found to the extensive gender discrimination that 
continued to exist in the world regardless of the existence of the International Bill of Human Rights 
was the creation of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against 
Women of 1979 (CEDAW), together with its Optional Protocol, as the leading UN treaties that deal 
specifically with discrimination in the area of sex and gender (Cusack & Pusey, 2013, pp. 54-92). As 
the CEDAW Committee General Comment 28 (2010), paragraph 4 confirms, the objectives aimed 
for in the document are to give equality of opportunity and treatment to women, adopting a 
completely gender conscious position. It does not aim simply for a gender-neutral future, or for a 
formal equality, but for a future that considers gender appropriately and thoroughly when building 
its legal and social structures. This includes, of course, the equal access to opportunities concerning 
employment. Article 1 defines the meaning of discrimination for the treaty’s purposes:  
Article 1 
For the purposes of the present Convention, the term ‘discrimination against 
women’ shall mean any distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of 
sex which has the effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the recognition, 
enjoyment or exercise by women, irrespective of their marital status, on a basis 
of equality of men and women, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the 
political, economic, social, cultural, civil or any other field. 
The right to work is included in the different fields of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms that are to be given to women, according to this article. In addition to that, building on this 
definition, Article 2 spells out the means to eliminate discrimination and guarantee gender equality, 




States Parties condemn discrimination against women in all its forms, agree to 
pursue by all appropriate means and without delay a policy of eliminating 
discrimination against women and, to this end, undertake: 
(a) To embody the principle of the equality of men and women in their national 
constitutions or other appropriate legislation if not yet incorporated therein and 
to ensure, through law and other appropriate means, the practical realization of 
this principle; 
(b) To adopt appropriate legislative and other measures, including sanctions 
where appropriate, prohibiting all discrimination against women; 
(c) To establish legal protection of the rights of women on an equal basis with 
men and to ensure through competent national tribunals and other public 
institutions the effective protection of women against any act of discrimination; 
(d) To refrain from engaging in any act or practice of discrimination against 
women and to ensure that public authorities and institutions shall act in 
conformity with this obligation; 
(e) To take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women 
by any person, organization or enterprise; 
(f) To take all appropriate measures, including legislation, to modify or abolish 
existing laws, regulations, customs and practices which constitute discrimination 
against women; 
(g) To repeal all national penal provisions which constitute discrimination against 
women. (emphasis added) 
Although these means are all equally important, in the context of this study, and thus of the 
Japanese society, some of them will be taken up with more care in the following chapters. The need 
to ensure the practical realization of the principle of the equality of men and women, that already is 
present in the Constitution of Japan, will be found in the background of every analysis, since it is 
 
 86 
also the final objective of the research. As ways if guaranteeing such realization, considering the 
criticisms Japan seems to receive from international organizations more often, there must be focus 
on the inclusion of sanctions in the parts of the national legislation that are needed and appropriate, 
on the modification or abolishment of existing laws, regulations, customs and practices which 
constitute discrimination against women, and on the repealing of all national penal provisions which 
are also gender discriminatory. Not only when it comes to legislation, Japan also faces issues 
concerning the effective protection of women by competent national tribunals and other public 
institutions, especially if you consider the lack of female agents in such environments. Most 
importantly, since the biggest challenge when talking about the realization of the right to work is the 
relationship between the public and private sectors, the duty of taking all appropriate measures to 
eliminate discrimination against women by any person, organization or enterprise must be also kept 
in mind.  
Complementing the general concept and definition, Article 15 of the CEDAW is responsible 
for giving women equality with men before the law, legal capacity (and the opportunities to exercise 
that capacity) identical to men in civil matters, equal rights to conclude contracts and to administer 
property and equal treatment in all stages of procedure in courts and tribunals. It also refers to the 
impossibility of the creation of “contracts and all other private instruments that are directed at 
restricting the legal capacity of women”, and to the equality in rights “with regard to the law relating 
to the movement of persons and the freedom to choose their residence and domicile”.  
Furthermore, talking more deeply about rights related to women’s empowerment and their 
participation in society, Article 5 is the base for protection:  
Article 5  
States Parties shall take all appropriate measures:  
(a) To modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and women, with 
a view to achieving the elimination of prejudices and customary and all other 
practices which are based on the idea of the inferiority or the superiority of either 
of the sexes or on stereotyped roles for men and women; 
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(b) To ensure that family education includes a proper understanding of maternity 
as a social function and the recognition of the common responsibility of men and 
women in the upbringing and development of their children, it being understood 
that the interest of the children is the primordial consideration in all cases. 
(emphasis added) 
From the article’s take on the issue of states raising culture and tradition as reasons for non-
compliance, and from the already mentioned feminist criticism towards this attitude, it can be said 
that this is not an acceptable practice. To the extent that some customs are extremely damaging to 
women’s enjoyment of their rights, they need to be reexamined and adapted according to the 
evolution in the principles valued by the international society. This adaptation of values can also be 
applied to basically the whole concept of women’s rights, which must not be understood as something 
that matters only to women anymore. Not only the concept of motherhood, as exemplified in Article 
5 (b), but all facets of women’s rights and their implementation are crucial for the betterment of 
society, and thus need to be taken seriously by men and women alike. 
Finally, in the context of the protection of the right to work specifically, Article 11 of the 
CEDAW is the one that addresses the obligation of states to eliminate discrimination against women 
in employment and occupation (Raday, 2012, p. 281):  
Article 11 
1. States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination 
against women in the field of employment in order to ensure, on a basis of 
equality of men and women, the same rights, in particular: 
(a) The right to work as an inalienable right of all human beings; 
(b) The right to the same employment opportunities, including the application of 
the same criteria for selection in matters of employment; 
(c) The right to free choice of profession and employment, the right to promotion, 
job security and all benefits and conditions of service and the right to receive 
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vocational training and retraining, including apprenticeships, advanced 
vocational training and recurrent training; 
(d) The right to equal remuneration, including benefits, and to equal treatment in 
respect of work of equal value, as well as equality of treatment in the evaluation 
of the quality of work; 
(e) The right to social security, particularly in cases of retirement, unemployment, 
sickness, invalidity and old age and other incapacity to work, as well as the right 
to paid leave; 
(f) The right to protection of health and to safety in working conditions, including 
the safeguarding of the function of reproduction. 
2. In order to prevent discrimination against women on the grounds of marriage 
or maternity and to ensure their effective right to work, States Parties shall take 
appropriate measures: 
(a) To prohibit, subject to the imposition of sanctions, dismissal on the grounds 
of pregnancy or of maternity leave and discrimination in dismissals on the basis 
of marital status; 
(b) To introduce maternity leave with pay or with comparable social benefits 
without loss of former employment, seniority or social allowances; 
(c) To encourage the provision of the necessary supporting social services to 
enable parents to combine family obligations with work responsibilities and 
participation in public life, in particular through promoting the establishment 
and development of a network of child-care facilities; 
(d) To provide special protection to women during pregnancy in types of work 
proved to be harmful to them. 
3. Protective legislation relating to matters covered in this article shall be 
reviewed periodically in the light of scientific and technological knowledge and 
shall be revised, repealed or extended as necessary. (emphasis added) 
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As it can be seen, its paragraphs 1 and 2 encompass both the need to secure equal 
employment opportunity for women, as well as to ensure their effective right to work, taking 
particularly female characteristics such as pregnancy in consideration (Raday, 2012, p. 284). 
Paragraph 3, on its turn, maintains the whole article relevant even in the passing of time, by ordering 
the constant review of norm related to it.  
Additionally, the article is broad, including many different but intertwined aspects of the 
concept of “work”. However, this research will focus in the points that are more apparently lacking 
in the case of Japanese women, considering the cultural and legal situation of the country, as well as 
the status of its actual implementation of the CEDAW provisions. Thus, more attention will be given 
to: the right to the same employment opportunities; the right to promotion, job security and all 
benefits and conditions of service; the right to equal remuneration, including benefits, and to equal 
treatment in respect of work of equal value, as well as equality of treatment in the evaluation of the 
quality of work; the prohibition of dismissal or discriminatory attitude on the grounds of pregnancy, 
maternity leave or marital status; the need to improve the system of parental leave and child-care 
facilities, together with promoting the idea that family obligations involve both parents, and that 
work-life balance is a concept that matters for both genders.  
It is a fact that these provisions by themselves were not enough to make the international 
community to uniformly classify women’s rights as human rights, since even after the advent of the 
CEDAW gender-related abuse kept being a much neglected and challenging field of human rights. 
However, the Convention did set off this process of global recognition, bringing to the forefront a 
feminist view towards the human rights concept, that began to show concern for the lives of women 
all over the world (Bunch, 1990, pp. 486-498). Then, after two decades of continuous work, the 
complete acceptance of women’s rights as human rights by the international community finally came 
during the 1990’s, when this message started being spread by the participation of NGOs dealing with 
the protection of women in the Vienna World Conference on Human Rights of 1993 (Yamashita, 
2005, p. 54). The Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action (World Conference on Human 
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Rights, 1993), the document that was born from the conclusions of the Conference, presents women’s 
rights as “a part of human rights”: 
Paragraph 18.  
The human rights of women and of the girl-child are an inalienable, integral and 
indivisible part of universal human rights. The full and equal participation of 
women in political, civil, economic, social and cultural life, at the national, 
regional and international levels, and the eradication of all forms of 
discrimination on grounds of sex are priority objectives of the international 
community. 
Gender-based violence and all forms of sexual harassment and exploitation, 
including those resulting from cultural prejudice and international trafficking, are 
incompatible with the dignity and worth of the human person, and must be 
eliminated. (…) (emphasis added) 
This paragraph also brings up “cultural prejudice” as something that cannot be used as basis 
for inflicting gender-based violence, albeit in a more roundabout manner. However, the interpretation 
of this reference together with paragraph 5 of the Vienna Declaration should have solved all possible 
confusion concerning the topic, at least in a strictly legal sense:  
5. All human rights are universal, indivisible and interdependent and interrelated. 
The international community must treat human rights globally in a fair and equal 
manner, on the same footing, and with the same emphasis. While the significance 
of national and regional particularities and various historical, cultural and 
religious backgrounds must be borne in mind, it is the duty of States, regardless 
of their political, economic and cultural systems, to promote and protect all 
human rights and fundamental freedoms. 
Arguably, human rights are universal, indivisible and interdependent and interrelated, and 
the duty of states, regardless of their political, economic and cultural systems, is to promote and 
protect them. Then, since women’s rights are a part of these human rights, logically these 
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characteristics must also be applied to them. Nevertheless, to put an end to any doubt that was left, 
afterwards this finally was categorically included in paragraph 14 of the Beijing Declaration of 1995: 
“women’s rights are human rights”. 
Regrettably, this process was not without backlash from some nations, which 
saw the movement for women’s rights specifically – and for human rights in 
general - as a manifestation of mainly western views, and the fact that it included 
a clear and strong rejection of “cultural” justifications for violating women’s 
human rights as a defiance to some aspects of their culture, notably family 
structures and religious practices. Consequently, regardless of the legal 
prohibition of such violations, many nations continue to abuse of their right to 
treaty reservations to protect cultural aspects that are harmful to women and girls, 
claiming the need of states to respect cultural differences and specially criticizing 
the hegemony of Western values.  
Although to a certain extent this might be a valid point, the international community must 
emphasize that valuable or neutral cultural aspects are undoubtedly to be safeguarded, while the ones 
that nullify women’s rights in practice must not be so. As Susan Moller Okin (1999) teaches, when 
thinking about the protection of group rights for minorities, one must also consider the differences 
of people that form this group and the situation of the group’s private sphere, because even non-
Western minority cultural groups are also deeply gendered and most of women’s rights violations 
occur outside of the public arena. These cultural practices tend to concentrate in regulating personal, 
sexual and reproductive life functions, and to expect women to stay in the domestic arena. Thus, 
carelessly prioritizing such customs over other rights, just because the former are cultural 
manifestations, means causing a much bigger negative impact in the lives of women and making it 
possible to perpetuate a situation where women are controlled by men. Furthermore, it must not be 
forgotten that cultural practices of Western nations themselves have also been changed over time, 
which shows that this evolution regarding women’s rights in not something that is unilaterally 
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imposed just by the Western side, but instead gradually constructed as a way to improve women’s 
lives. 
This clash between cultural practices and women’s rights is sometimes easily identified, such 
as in cases where religion plays a huge role in the governmental and social institutions and states 
clearly raise it as an impediment for full treaty compliance. On the other hand, the influence of culture 
is occasionally implicit in other explanations given. This is the case of the object of this research, 
Japan. When justifying its persistent issues in women’s rights implementation, specially in the 
context of the right to work, the Japanese government does not openly use arguments based in 
unchangeable cultural customs, but this does not mean that persistent discriminatory practices have 
nothing to do with them. Japanese gendered working culture and the societal pressure that women 
are to stay at home while men are to be the sole breadwinners contribute heavily to inequality. There 
is thus a need for deep change in this mentality, one that will probably require a level of persuasion 
from the international society and civil domestic groups. As explained in the context of the “spiral 
model”, in order to make Japan move from the phase of simple commitment to the final one of full 
compliance, simple socialization might not be enough. Instead, there is the need for a deeper level of 
dialogue between the state, civil society and international society, in the form of persuasion that 
modifies the Japanese present predominant understanding about women’s rights and equality.  
Lastly, in the context of carrying out treaty obligations, the CEDAW also has the CEDAW 
Committee as the one responsible for its interpretation, as well as the monitoring of states’ efforts to 
protect and promote women’s human rights and to comply to its duties. Through its General 
Recommendations (specially No. 25 and 28, concerning discrimination and equality in the context 
respectively of temporary special measures and of the Core Obligations of States Parties under 
Article 2), its Concluding Observations deriving from the process of receiving states' reports on their 
performance and commenting on them, and its judgments on complaints against countries which 
have opted into its Optional Protocol, the Committee develops and updates the contents of the 
convention, and contributes for its domestic implementation. The CEDAW General 
Recommendations actually differ from the ICCPR and ICESCR ones in two important points: first, 
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and rather obviously, they focus only in the protection of the rights of women, thus attempting to 
tackle the guarantee of human rights from a point of view that gave priority to females; second, the 
Committee does not limit itself to explaining its interpretation of the obligations assumed under the 
Convention and how should they be applied, but also tackling present issues affecting women and 
recommending that States parties devote more attention to them. Since the point of compliance to 
women’s rights norms needs special attention, this research will dedicate a following chapter to 
focusing on the relationship between Japan and the CEDAW, and move on to introducing the work 
of other relevant UN organization, the International Labour Organization in the next part. 
4.3 The International Labour Organization and women’s rights: focused efforts for gender 
equality in the workplace 
 
 Differently from the previously explained UN treaties, the International Labour Organization 
(ILO), established under the Treaty of Versailles in 1919, is the sole UN tripartite organization that 
brings together governments, employers and workers representatives of 187 member states, to set 
labour standards, develop policies and devise programmes promoting decent work for all women and 
men. By tripartite, it means that it gives an equal voice to workers, employers and governments to 
ensure that the views of the social partners are closely reflected in all its means of action 
(International Labour Organization, 2019a), which are comprised of the adoption and monitoring of 
international labor Conventions and Recommendations, dissemination of information and research 
on employment, social protection and related issues, and cooperation with governments and other 
actors (Trebilcock, 2014, p. 265). 
Regarding Conventions and Recommendations, it is important to know that the former are 
legally binding international treaties, effective upon ratification by states, while the latter are non-
binding guidelines. Also, even when it comes to the binding Conventions, it has been pointed out 
frequently by authors and the ILO Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and 
Recommendations (CEACR) that most of their provisions are considered to be non-self-executing. 
This non-self-executing characteristic can be either blatantly understood, when the conventions 
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specifically refer to the need for national laws or regulations to be adopted by the government, or 
more subdued, when they include mentions to a "competent authority" to be responsible for their 
implementation. In addition to that, provisions that require the adoption of penal sanctions are also 
usually said to not be self-executing (Leary, 1982, pp. 96-98).  
Still, regardless of the way it is expressed, this tendency towards non-self-execution hinders 
the domestic compliance to the principles promoted by the ILO, thus requiring attention to and 
probably a deep reevaluation of these documents by States parties’ legislative, executive and 
judiciary powers. Considering that, at least in monist systems, provisions that are of a self-executing 
character must be directly implemented and can be used as grounds of a judicial action without the 
need of interference from the legislative or the executive, compliance to them is arguably more easily 
achieved, which makes them more useful than its non-self-executing counterparts. Moreover, 
although some states are conscious of this advantage and have been proactive in implementing ILO 
instruments, such as the case of Argentina finding Article 2 of Convention No. 100 to be self-
executing despite it being often considered as a promotional obligation only (Leary, 1982, p. 87), 
many have not taken this approach. Regrettably, Japan is included in these, and I will tackle this issue 
more carefully when talking specifically about gender equality in the Japanese context.  
Regardless of this approach by the states, the fact is that the ILO is a leading institution in striving 
for the protection of gender equality and the women’s right to work, having given life to many 
Conventions on the topic. The key ones are the following: 
a) Convention No. 100, which deals with the issue of equal remuneration for men 
and women workers for work of equal value; 
b) Convention No. 111, which talks about equality of opportunity and treatment 
in respect of employment and occupation, with a view to eliminating any 
discrimination in respect thereof; 
c) Convention No. 156, about the need of each member state to make it an aim of 
national policy to enable persons with family responsibilities (women and men 
both) who are engaged or wish to engage in employment to exercise their right to 
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do so without being subject to discrimination and, to the extent possible, without 
conflict between their employment and family responsibilities;  
d) Convention No. 183, about the consideration of the circumstances of women 
workers and the need to provide protection for pregnancy, which are the shared 
responsibility of government and society (this Convention is a follow-up to and 
an improvement of related Conventions No. 3 and 103, which are still in force in 
some countries).  
These four Conventions are resources that help in understanding gender gaps and might be 
used in regional and domestic courts to guarantee women’s rights. The examples of this application 
are many and diverse, going from older cases focusing in the application of Convention No. 100 
(Supreme Court of India, Mackinnon Mackenzie v. Audrey D’Costa and another, 26 March 1987 
[India]; Turin Court of Appeal, Lanificio Tallia Gruppo v. Ceria Mary, 29 May 1964 [Italy]), to more 
recent ones making use of a larger number of Conventions (Constitutional Court, Actions calling for 
legal protection (tutela) lodged individually by 33 women v. various individuals and legal entities, 
13 February 2013 [Colombia]).8 It is important to note that there are no Japanese positive examples 
to be added here, as Japan has been continuously criticized for its passiveness in the ratification of 
Conventions and in the application of their provisions. This criticism is even more relevant 
considering that Japan is a founding member state of the ILO and has maintained a close relationship 
with the organization, excluding the period of the Second World War. Presently, it even holds one 
of the ten permanent government seats on the ILO Governing Body, and has actively collaborated 
with programs such as the Future of Work Initiative (International Labour Organization, 2019b).  
The problem is that Japan is proactive in giving technical and financial support to the 
organization, as well as engaging in dialogue with it, but does not display the same effort in 
integrating essential recommendations in its domestic working environment. Specially in the context 
                                                 
8 More decisions organized by subject can be found at the International Training Centre of the International 




of gender equality, it has not yet ratified Conventions No. 111 and No. 183, which are part of the 
core Conventions on the topic. In addition to that, it has not even successfully implemented the 
instruments it is a part of, Conventions No. 111 and No. 156, since the problems of gender pay gap 
and lack of work life balance policies for both genders still persist. If it wants to fully contribute for 
the betterment of labor standards, instead of focusing only in giving help to other nations, Japan must 
also focus on the improvement of its internal work system. 
In conclusion, as an international organization the ILO has not lost track of its objectives, 
even though it has clearly renewed its labor standards with the passing of time and the changes in the 
international legal and societal landscape and in the nature of employment relationships taking place 
in industrialized and developing countries in the last couple of decades (Sankaran, 2002, p. 856). For 
example, the organization’s initiative to adopt labor standards that deal with "atypical" employment, 
and to provide comparable benefits to those who are engaged in work outside formal employment 
relationships, indicates a growing concern facing people, many of whom are women, that work in 
the informal economy (Sankaran, 2002, pp. 868-869).  
 From this tendency, as well as from previous exposition concerning the other UN 
instruments for human rights protection, it is easy to reach the conclusion that gender equality and 
the women’s right to work are in the center of international society’s attention, and thus are being 
thoroughly materialized. This is, however, just a comfortable assumption that does not hold up when 
observing the lacking domestic reality of states, which are the same ones that draft, sign and join 
these apparently effective human rights treaties and organizations. It is possible to identify a clear 
compliance gap between the international legal system, international organizations’ policies and their 
implementation. By taking a closer look at this phenomenon, and by analyzing it with the teachings 
of the “spiral model” as a background, I can begin to understand this persistent substantial problem 
and suggest methods to attempt to overcome it. In the next chapters, I will take deeper look into this 
model of norm diffusion, and at how Japan has been trying to implement foreign law into its domestic 




Chapter 5. Gender Equality in Japan: The Implementation of Women’s Rights 
through the CEDAW 
 
In the previous chapter, I have introduced the general human rights protection system that 
the international society has been making use of since the middle of the 20th century, and have pointed 
out its most important provisions that deal with gender equality, discrimination and the women’s 
right to work. In this context of protecting women’s rights, as already noted, the text of the CEDAW 
and the activities of its Committee deserve special attention. Thus, following up on this past 
exposition, in this chapter I will take a deeper look at the present situation of Japanese women, and 
at how Japan has been attempting to implement the rights guaranteed to females by the CEDAW in 
its domestic legal and social environment.   
To the untrained eye, Japan might seem as a state where women’s rights are well protected. 
Indeed, in comparison to other countries that make headlines for their widespread violence and 
discrimination against women, Japan is on the better side of the spectrum: there are laws against 
gendered violence, and these crimes are not considered to be religiously and culturally accepted; the 
Constitution of Japan, in its Article 14, explicitly guarantees equality between men and women, by 
legislating that “all of the people are equal under the law and there shall be no discrimination in 
political, economic or social relations because of race, creed, sex, social status or family origin”; 
according to different indexes of global gender equality, Japan ranks high and has almost no 
inequality detected in areas such as access to health and education.9 
                                                 
9 For example, the United Nations Development Programme – Human Development Reports, on its 
Gender Development Index, places Japan on 19th place out of 189 countries, with high life expectancy at birth 
and long expected years of schooling. The World Economic Forum Global Gender Gap Report also gives high 
scores to Japan in its sub-indexes of educational attainment and health and survival. See “Table 4: Gender 
Development Index (GDI)”, United Nations Development Programme. (2018). Retrieved from  
http://hdr.undp.org/en/composite/GDI; and World Economic Forum. (2018). The Global Gender Gap Report 
2018, pp. 13-14. 
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However, one must not be fooled by this apparently positive situation, which is masqueraded 
by existing protective legislation, signed international treaties and selected categories of human 
development indexes. Taking a deeper look at Japanese society, things are clearly different than what 
they seem to be. Japanese women remain very much excluded from participating in decision-making 
processes, they are underrepresented in governmental offices, and they are less likely to be able to 
receive promotions and to attain seats at managerial positions within private companies. Moreover, 
in the public workplace the gender-pay gap, sexual, power and maternity harassment all persist, while 
in their own private homes, division of housework is unbalanced, falling mostly on female shoulders, 
and domestic violence cases remain high. These issues have been brought to light and to the media 
by Japan ranking in 110th place in the Global Gender Gap Report 2018, an annual gender equality 
index produced by the World Economic Forum (WEF). As it can be seen in figure 5 (World 
Economic Forum, 2018, p. 139), it stands way below average when looking at the distribution of 
countries by score. 
Figure 5. The general position of Japan 
 
The Report is a renowned document that ranks 149 countries on their progress towards 
gender parity on a scale from 0, meaning imparity, to 1, meaning parity. It evaluates the States across 
four fundamental sub-indexes, namely Economic Participation and Opportunity, Educational 
Attainment, Health and Survival, and Political Empowerment, and through these comparative 
rankings it aims to create global awareness of the challenges posed by gender gaps and the 
opportunities created by reducing them (World Economic Forum, 2017, p. VII, 3). Regarding its 
construction methodology, which has remained stable since 2006, the whole process is divided in 
four steps (World Economic Forum, 2017, pp. 5-7): 
a) All data is converted to female-to-male ratios, to ensure that the gaps between 
women and men’s attainment levels are captured; 
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b) The ratios are truncated at the “equality benchmark” considered to be 1 (except 
for two health indicators), meaning equal numbers of women and men. Plus, 
considering that the Index aims to prioritize data concerning gender equality, it 
uses a one-sided scale, which measures how close women are to reaching parity 
with men; 
c) Next, it calculates the weighted average of the indicators within each sub-index 
to create their scores; 
d) Finally, it calculates the final scores, binding them between 1 and 0, or equality 
and inequality.  
This process is consistent with the three concepts that the Index bases itself in, which are its 
focus on measuring gaps rather than levels, in capturing gaps in outcome variables rather than gaps 
in input variables, and in ranking countries according to gender equality rather than women’s 
empowerment.  
With this information in mind, it is interesting to compare how Japan has placed in relation 
to other countries. A comprehensive visual representation of the Japanese position in relation to many 
varied nations can be found in figure 6 (World Economic Forum, 2018, p. 12), but it is important to 
point out some specific comparisons between Japan and states that it has relevant relationships with. 
First, one cannot talk about Japan without considering where it stands its geographical, political and 
cultural aspects. Thus, how Japan fares in comparison to other powerful Asian countries that it shares 
common cultural values with must be observed. For example, South Korea ranks a little lower than 
it, as no. 115, while China gets a slightly better result and comes in no. 103. It is interest to observe 
that the three of them can be found in the lower half of the comprehensive ranking including all East 
Asia and the Pacific countries, regardless of them being considered nations with good and relatively 
stable economic and political situations, that are usually ranked above other less developed States. 
This goes to show that a nation’s economic development does not necessarily grows parallel to the 
betterment of women’s social situation, especially when it comes to political empowerment and 
economic participation and opportunity.  
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On the other hand, it must also be noted how Japan performs when compared to Western 
developed nations that traditionally hold the image of being proactive protectors of human rights and 
gender equality. In this case, it ranks incredibly lower. Germany and the UK come in the higher 
places, respectively in no. 14 and no. 15. The US comes lower in no. 51, but even this placement is 
more than 2 times better than the Japanese one. Also, it becomes more remarkable if the fact that the 
US is not a State party of the CEDAW, while Japan is. Another relevant point of comparison is to 
notice where Japan stands within the other G20 nations. Again, it is ranked extremely low, in front 
only of South Korea, Turkey and Saudi Arabia. Considering that both Turkey and Saudi Arabia are 
Muslim countries, whose governments and laws receive huge religious influence and consequently 
tend to limit the possibility of women to grow freely economically, politically and socially, it is even 
more worrying that states like Korea and Japan, which are not under this religious pressure, rank as 
worse as them.   
Figure 6. The position of Japan in different subcategories 
 
The black markings represent the approximate position of Japan. Editing by the author. 
 Another worrisome point is that the Japanese ranking has mostly been decreasing in the latest 
years. Although it managed to slightly rise from no. 114 (2017) to no. 110 (2018), before that it had 
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been in a downward route, sliding down 3 positions when compared to the 2016 results and 13 
positions from the 2015 results. That considered, it can be said that there has been no material 
progress in the gender equality front for at least the past 4 years. This is even worse when considering 
that, at the same time, the Japanese government has been loud in making its efforts towards the 
protection of women’s rights known. As of 2019, the Abe administration has been pushing gender 
equality and women’s empowerment, specially in the workplace, as one of the key pillars of its 
“Abenomics”. The expression “building a society in which women can shine”, coined by Prime 
Minister Abe in 2013, can actually be found all over the government’s official websites and 
declarations, and policies for the betterment of women’s situation, such as increasing women in the 
workforce, improving the precarious daycare situation and actively appointing women to 
governmental senior management positions, dubbed as “womenomics”, have been continuously put 
forward (Assmann, 2014, pp. 1-2).  
One must wonder why, then, with all these statements being said, and policies being 
implemented, the situation of Japanese women refuses to improve considerably, at least according to 
the measurements of the WEF and also to the Japanese official statistics. In this chapter, I will attempt 
to suggest answers to this question, while keeping my research focused on the realization of the 
women’s rights to work, since the deficiency of its implementation is closely related to the gender 
equality gaps Japan seems to have the biggest difficulty in bridging: women’s lack of economic 
participation, empowerment and opportunities. Thus, I need to start by providing an overview of the 
relationship between Japan and the concept of gender equality, brought to light specially after the 
ratification of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women 
(hereinafter, CEDAW). Through this analysis, I shall identify what are the main problems recognized 
in the past Japanese state reports and the following Concluding Observations, concentrating my 
efforts in the latest combined seventh and eighth periodic reports. I will also include relevant 
information concerning the Japanese domestic legislation on the topic of the right to work and on the 
state’s efforts towards the implementation of international women’s rights provisions. Lastly, as a 
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complementary point related to the matter of labour, I will touch upon the application of ILO 
Conventions related to gender equality in the Japanese context.  
5.1 Delving deeper into the CEDAW: Basic concepts and problems with implementation  
 
The CEDAW, created in 1979, together with its Optional Protocol of 1999, is one of the 
leading United Nations (hereinafter the UN) human rights treaties, dealing specifically with 
discrimination concerning sex and gender. It can be said that it is the answer of the UN General 
Assembly to the extensive gender discrimination that continued to exist in the world even after the 
adoption of the treaties that compose the International Bill of Human Rights. The organ responsible 
for its interpretation, which is done directly by the adoption of General Recommendations, as well 
as for the monitoring of states’ efforts to protect and promote women’s human rights, which is done 
through the reporting procedure, is the CEDAW Committee (hereinafter also called the Committee). 
These activities have a direct influence on how effective a tool the CEDAW is for advancing 
women’s rights, collectively and individually (Cusack & Pusey, 2013, pp. 54-92).  
Concerning its objective, the CEDAW aims to eliminate all forms of discrimination against 
women so that they can enjoy their human rights fully, and have equal access to opportunities in all 
areas, including, but not limited to, political and public life, health, education and employment. In 
this sense, paragraphs 4 and 5 of General Recommendation No. 28 (Committee on the Elimination 
of Discrimination Against Women, 2010) are extremely relevant as recent and updated 
interpretations of the treaty’s objectives. Paragraph 4 makes explicit that the focus of the document 
utilizes a view of gender equality that prioritizes issues that women tend to face, so that they can 
attain equality of opportunity and treatment. 
Paragraph 4 
The objective of the Convention is the elimination of all forms of discrimination 
against women on the basis of sex. It guarantees women the equal recognition, 
enjoyment and exercise of all human rights and fundamental freedoms in the 
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political, economic, social, cultural, civil, domestic or any other field, irrespective 
of their marital status, and on a basis of equality with men.  
The underlined parts illustrate the female focus of the Convention. Furthermore, the meaning 
of this “female” focus is set by Paragraph 5, as it expands the understanding of the work “sex” used 
by the CEDAW.  
Paragraph 5 
Although the Convention only refers to sex-based discrimination, interpreting 
article 1 together with articles 2 (f) and 5 (a) indicates that the Convention covers 
gender-based discrimination against women. The term “sex” here refers to 
biological differences between men and women. The term “gender” refers to 
socially constructed identities, attributes and roles for women and men and 
society’s social and cultural meaning for these biological differences resulting in 
hierarchical relationships between women and men and in the distribution of 
power and rights favouring men and disadvantaging women. This social 
positioning of women and men is affected by political, economic, cultural, social, 
religious, ideological and environmental factors and can be changed by culture, 
society and community. The application of the Convention to gender-based 
discrimination is made clear by the definition of discrimination contained in 
article 1. (…)(emphasis added)  
 The paragraph is clear when it affirms that any discrimination against “women” or “females” 
is supposed include not only discriminatory actions based on biological aspects, but also the ones 
based on socially constructed gender roles and prejudices. To reach that conclusion, it explains that 
the interpretation of the definition of the term “discrimination against women” present in Article 1 
of the CEDAW must not be restricted, but instead it must be built on the meaning of Articles 2 (f) 
and 5 (a). In other words, when Article 1 says that the “term ‘discrimination against women’ shall 
mean any distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex”, the expression “sex” is 




States Parties condemn discrimination against women in all its forms, agree to 
pursue by all appropriate means and without delay a policy of eliminating 
discrimination against women and, to this end, undertake: 
(f) To take all appropriate measures, including legislation, to modify or abolish 
existing laws, regulations, customs and practices which constitute discrimination 
against women; 
Article 5 
States Parties shall take all appropriate measures: 
(a) To modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and women, with 
a view to achieving the elimination of prejudices and customary and all other 
practices which are based on the idea of the inferiority or the superiority of either 
of the sexes or on stereotyped roles for men and women; (emphasis added) 
 Both articles mention social and cultural practices, prejudices and customs, and stereotyped 
roles, which allowed the Committee to conclude that the word “sex” in the context of the CEDAW 
also includes the meaning of gender. From this definition, the importance of the work of the 
Committee can be witnessed first-hand, as it is the organ that breathes life into the words of the 
Convention, and is responsible for making sure that it is always evolving together with the values of 
the international society. It also means that there is another legal document taking the same approach 
concerning the definition of “sex” and “gender” that I do on this thesis. 
Furthermore, in the context of this research, Article 11 of the CEDAW10 exemplifies very 
well the focus of the Covenant in the rights of women, by making the scope of the right to work to 
include specifically the requirement of the elimination of discrimination against females, instead of 
the common gender-neutral prohibition of sex discrimination. The expression “discrimination 
against women” is present in its paragraphs 1 and 2, and this latter also includes protection 
                                                 
10 Full text of Article 11 can be found in Chapter 4. 
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concerning maternity and pregnancy, which are situations characteristic of women. This 
interpretation can be applied to the whole document, and thus it may be said that it doesn't aim simply 
for a gender-neutral future, but for a future that considers gender appropriately and thoroughly when 
building its legal and social structures.  
 In addition to that, and in consonance with the recent interpretations of the ICCPR and the 
ICESCR, the way the Committee interprets the range of equality and discrimination included in the 
CEDAW nowadays contains the application of formal and substantive concepts of equality, covering 
everything from the elimination of direct and indirect discrimination to structural discrimination and 
gender stereotyping, including mentions to the existence of intersectional discrimination.11 Attention 
is constantly brought to the need of tackling issues not only on the public, but also in the private 
sphere, and that both actions and omissions from states configure a breach of their obligations 
towards women (Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, 2010, paragraphs 
10, 13, 16, 24). 
In theory, the CEDAW is supposed to be covering all its bases in the fight for guaranteeing 
women’s human rights. However, as already mentioned, the Convention’s application is not without 
problems. Even with the broad and comprehensive interpretation given to its text internationally, 
domestically the realization of formal and substantial equality remains incomplete, as a high number 
of state parties still haven’t reached a satisfactory level of protection of women’s rights. This lack of 
implementation is even more apparent when it comes to the prohibition of discrimination in the right 
to work and other economic rights, as can be apprehended from the existence of a bigger and more 
                                                 
11  According to paragraph 18 of the CEDAW Committee General Recommendation No. 28 (2010), 
intersectionality in the context of discrimination of women means that “discrimination based on sex and gender 
is inextricably linked with other factors that affect women, such as race, ethnicity, religion or belief, health, 
status, age, class, caste and sexual orientation and gender identity” and thus it “may affect women belonging 
to such groups to a different degree or in different ways to men”. This kind of discrimination must also be 
prohibited, as it is highly likely to bring an even stronger negative impact on women.  
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varied body of jurisprudence concerning issues like reproductive health and gender-based violence 
(Cusack & Pusey, 2013, p. 83), in comparison to cases of blatant discrimination in the workplace, 
for example.  
The key reason for this difference is in the way the Committee itself applies the rights to 
equality and to non-discrimination in material cases, making use of weaker or stronger gender 
analysis. There is undoubtedly a more carefully constructed, robust and consistent gender analysis 
when interpreting such rights in cases that focus on specific health needs of women, or in cases that 
concern socially sanctioned gendered violence against women. On the other hand, when it comes to 
cases dealing with civil, political or economic rights of women, this gender analysis becomes looser 
and less consistent, which results in the Committee as a whole failing to guarantee their rights many 
times (Cusack & Pusey, 2013, p. 84). Intrinsically related to this phenomenon is the fact that the 
focus of the majority and the most widespread part of the feminist legal and international relations 
scholars’ work is on reproductive health and violence related violations of rights. An example of this 
situation is the Nguyen v Netherlands case, in which dissenting opinions considered the implications 
that a gendered division of labor and the disproportionate effect of disadvantageous part-time 
conditions have specifically on women, but this was not enough to raise a positive conclusion from 
the Committee (Cusack & Pusey, 2013, p. 85). Thus, even within the work of the Committee 
problems can be found, and this research aims to take one step closer to solving them, by 
strengthening the gender analysis in the context of the right to work and its implementation. 
Another set-back to the CEDAW is the fact that the effects of its Optional Protocol, which 
permits individuals to have the chance of attaining their rights through a communications procedure, 
depends on the willingness of states to ratify that protocol. From the consideration of these two 
problems, I realize that, at the same time that the protection given by the CEDAW can be considered 
more well focused, pro-active and comprehensive than other treaties, this also ended up becoming 
an impediment to its realization, for it sometimes causes confusion even within the Committee and 
also exacerbates the already lengthy discussions between state parties when it comes to the treaty’s 
content and how to implement it.  
 
 107 
Moreover, this broader protection is also the reason many signatory states make stricter 
reservations to the CEDAW articles, especially ones that are related to the duty given to governments 
of improving the situation of discrimination within cultural, familial and religious spheres. A 
reservation may be defined as a statement that “purports to exclude or to modify the legal effect of 
certain provisions of the treaty in their application to that State” (United Nations, 1969, Article 2). It 
is made when ratifying a treaty and can be withdrawn in a later date. They are a common occurrence 
when it comes to human rights treaties, with the ICCPR having 66 out of its 170 state parties to make 
some kind of reservation or declaration upon ratification, and the ICESCR having 51 out of its 167 
state parties doing so. The CEDAW regrettably also has been subject to a large amount of them, with 
77 out of 189 state parties having made reservations upon ratification. However, it should be noted 
that, in comparison to other treaties, more reservations to the CEDAW have been modified or 
removed (Keller, 2014, p. 311). While 16 of its states parties have removed these impediments, only 
3 of the ICCPR and 5 of the ICESCR have done so. Furthermore, reservations are legally permitted 
by the text of Article 28 of the CEDAW, as long as they are not considered to be incompatible with 
the object and purpose of the Convention. Thus, considering that the biggest chunk of reservations 
is done to Article 29, that deals with the procedural topic of dispute resolution and specifically allows 
States to enter a “opt-out” kind of reservation, not much discussion is held regarding them. China is 
one of the countries that has made a reservation in that sense. 
Regardless of these easy to overlook reservations, the problem here is the persistence of 
reservations to materially relevant, core articles of the Convention. Such reservations attempt to base 
and justify themselves in the fact that national law, tradition, religion or culture are not congruent 
with Convention principles. For the CEDAW, the “worst offenders” in this sense are the reservations 
to Article 2 and Article 16. Article 2,12 by spelling out that the “states parties condemn discrimination 
against women in all its forms, agree to pursue by all appropriate means and without delay a policy 
of eliminating discrimination against women”, and by listing up various duties these states must 
                                                 
12 The full text of the CEDAW Article 2 can be found in Chapter 4. 
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undertake, represents the whole meaning of the CEDAW. Article 16 is also a core provision of the 
treaty, since it protects women’s rights on a basis of equality of men and women in the realm of 
marriage and family relations:  
Article 16 
1. States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination 
against women in all matters relating to marriage and family relations and in 
particular shall ensure, on a basis of equality of men and women: 
(a) The same right to enter into marriage; 
(b) The same right freely to choose a spouse and to enter into marriage only with 
their free and full consent; 
(c) The same rights and responsibilities during marriage and at its dissolution; 
(d) The same rights and responsibilities as parents, irrespective of their marital 
status, in matters relating to their children; in all cases the interests of the children 
shall be paramount; 
(e) The same rights to decide freely and responsibly on the number and spacing 
of their children and to have access to the information, education and means to 
enable them to exercise these rights; 
(f) The same rights and responsibilities with regard to guardianship, wardship, 
trusteeship and adoption of children, or similar institutions where these concepts 
exist in national legislation; in all cases the interests of the children shall be 
paramount; 
(g) The same personal rights as husband and wife, including the right to choose 
a family name, a profession and an occupation; 
(h) The same rights for both spouses in respect of the ownership, acquisition, 
management, administration, enjoyment and disposition of property, whether free 
of charge or for a valuable consideration. 
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2. The betrothal and the marriage of a child shall have no legal effect, and all 
necessary action, including legislation, shall be taken to specify a minimum age 
for marriage and to make the registration of marriages in an official registry 
compulsory. 
Both articles are not simple procedural provisions. They are core parts of the CEDAW that 
guarantee equality to women and forbid discrimination against them in all forms, and thus should 
not be target of reservations. To make reservations to articles like these means to disregard the “soul” 
of the treaty. Still, examples of the states that have made these kinds of reservations are varied, 
including South Korea and the UK.13 Reservations to these two articles have been explicitly called 
impermissible by the Committee, which has made clear that they would not allow a state party to 
avoid their implementation and has repeatedly asked states to reconsider these and many other self-
imposed limitations. It does so through its statement on reservations (Committee on the Elimination 
of Discrimination Against Women, 1998, pp. 47-50) and its General Recommendations No. 4 (1987), 
No. 20 (1992) and No. 28 (2010). General Recommendations No. 4 and No. 20 are concise and deal 
specifically with the topic of reservations. The former expressed “concern in relation to the 
significant number of reservations that appeared to be incompatible with the object and purpose of 
the Convention”, and encourages the states parties to reconsider them. The latter, in its second 
paragraph, recommends that states parties should: 
(a) Raise the question of the validity and the legal effect of reservations to the 
Convention in the context of reservations to other human rights treaties;  
(b) Reconsider such reservations with a view to strengthening the implementation 
of all human rights treaties;  
                                                 
13 As a side note, even though Japan has not made any reservations to the Convention, and thus should have 
even less excuses for its non-compliance, it maintains legislation and customs that go against it, such as the 
Civil Code prohibition of women to remarry within 100 days of their divorce date, and the custom of women 
being the spouse that should change their name after marriage.  
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(c) Consider introducing a procedure on reservations to the Convention 
comparable with that of other human rights treaties. 
 In addition to these more general provisions, the General Comment No. 28, in its paragraph 
41, brings up the problem of reservations specifically to Article 2, which it considers “to be the very 
essence of the obligations of States parties under the Convention”. Thus, the Committee judges that 
such reservations should be considered, at least in principle, “incompatible with the object and 
purpose of the Convention” and should not be permitted. Even in the cases where states parties 
attempt to justify the need for these reservations, they should inform the Committee of how they 
influence on the implementation of the CEDAW, and should always strive to withdraw them. Adding 
to this pressure, state parties to the Convention may also challenge others’ reservations through their 
observations, which could be seen a mechanism of socialization to improve domestic implementation.   
It may be said that if a state would follow these guidelines set by the Committee, it would 
transmit the message that they are determined to remove the hurdles to women's full equality and are 
committed to ensuring that women are able to participate fully in all aspects of public and private 
life, contributing immensely to achieve both formal and substantive compliance to the Convention 
(UN Women, 2019). However, these reservations do persist in great number, and this culminates in 
the clear contradiction of having a treaty created with the aim of eliminating discrimination, but in 
truth still allowing member countries to prioritize customs and policies that are obviously harming 
to women, to the point of mitigating even the most basic and relevant content of the CEDAW. To 
make matters worse, even the states that have not openly made reservations, such as Japan, still avoid 
following some of the provisions and end up not reaching satisfactory treaty compliance. Thus, the 
blame for this situation cannot be pinned in only one factor. I suggest that this lack of implementation 
is arguably the result of a combination of issues that start in the way the international human rights 
system dialogues with states, and that culminate in the way these states allow women to suffer 
domestically with inequality and discrimination instead of adapting themselves to the requirements 
of human rights principles.  
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In conclusion, in this part I presented the basic international legal background on the 
structure of the CEDAW and on how it deals with equality and non-discrimination. Based on this, 
on the next part I take a step further and apply this general information to the specific case of Japan, 
in an attempt to understand the circumstances surrounding the country’s deficiency on women’s 
rights implementation. 
5.2 The relationship between CEDAW and Japan: understanding a three-decade long 
interaction 
 
In this part, I will introduce general information concerning how the Japanese executive, 
legislative and judiciary have reacted to the advent of the CEDAW, in order to understand the 
relationship built between the state and the Convention over the past decades. The treaty was signed 
and ratified by Japan respectively in 1980 and 1985, and the country was among the ones that had 
voted for the CEDAW’s adoption in 1979, which shows an apparent interest and proactivity of the 
state towards becoming a guarantor of women’s rights. To be effective, however, this attitude taken 
on the international stage then needed to be introduced to the civil society, translated into domestic 
laws and policies, and applied by national courts. By looking into the developments made by Japan 
under the guidance of the CEDAW Committee and of the international community, this work will 
attempt to clarify the background that culminated in the present Japanese situation. 
5.2.1 Japan’s incorporation of the CEDAW and the insufficiency of its application by the judiciary  
 
As an instrument of international law, the way the CEDAW is applied domestically by its 
signatory states varies according to their legal specificities. Thus, some fundamental information on 
how Japan incorporates international human rights treaties is warranted here. According to the 
Japanese Constitution in its Article 98 (2), Japan is of monist legal tradition, and thus self-executing 
treaties ratified by the Cabinet and promulgated in the official gazette have automatic legal binding 
force and shall be faithfully observed, prevailing even over statutes and inconsistent domestic law 
(Hayashi, 2013, p. 343). On the other hand, the treaties that are not considered as self-executing 
 
 112 
require legislative or administrative action before becoming part of the national legal system 
(Goodman, 2008, pp. 170-172). Two issues must be raised here.  
First, this theoretical monist approach does not translate into reality, as Japan technically 
supports this “internationalism” but still insists in applying only domestic laws to domestic matters, 
closing itself off (Goodman, 2008, pp. 173). Related to this tendency, the second and most important 
point is that it is crucial to determine whether treaty provisions are considered self-executing or not 
for Japan. The general opinion of Japanese scholars is that treaties are self-executing, but that 
statement is met with many contradicting opinions, both from government officials and academics 
themselves, and is promptly disregarded in courts.14 Moreover, Japan adds to this already confusing 
concept the idea of direct applicability, which requires a treaty to specifically require that its terms 
take effect immediately. If its terms are only directional and take form over time, it is said to be a 
treaty of progressive realization (Goodman, 2008, p. 173). Thus, a treaty could even be considered 
self-executing, but still not directly applicable, which is a practical escape route for the Japanese 
government to justify any action that might be criticized by the international community. 
For Japan, even though it has not been explicitly said so, it is possible to conclude that the 
CEDAW fits in this definition of non-direct applicable treaties. The government has taken the 
position that it is a treaty of “progressive character”, and thus does not prevail over domestic law or 
must be obligatorily applied in courts (Goodman, 2008, p. 174). In fact, CEDAW provisions have 
been invoked by plaintiffs before Japanese courts several times, including in labor law cases, but 
these courts have not been very receptive of the arguments raised (Conforti & Francioni, 1997, pp. 
252-253).15 In addition to that, even though it appears eager to follow global trends and to join the 
                                                 
14 The inconsistent views of the Japanese government towards the nature of the ICCPR illustrate this point, 
according to Conforti, B. & Francioni, F. (Eds.). (1997). Enforcing international human rights in domestic 
courts. The Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, pp. 239-246. 
15 The authors also cite as examples of such disregard for the arguments using the CEDAW the Judgement of 
4 July 1990, Tokyo District Court, (case number Showa 55(WA)1866), and the Judgement of 4 December 
1986, Tokyo District Court, (case number Showa 53 (WA) 587). In addition to these, the more recent Konami 
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international discussion on the protection of women’s rights, Japan is still adamant on disagreeing to 
give individuals access to international individual complaint mechanisms, and thus it has refused to 
sign the Optional Protocol to the CEDAW, like it did (and still does) with all other UN human rights 
treaties protocols of similar content (Hayashi, 2013, p. 342). With these attitudes, Japan has been 
quite successful in disassociating its national judiciary environment from international influence. 
In the same sense, when it comes to Japanese courts, they have been shying away from the 
application of the ILO Conventions that deal with gender quality, and have been even accused of not 
observing them. The report of the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and 
Recommendations (CEACR) that was set up to examine the representation alleging non-observance 
by Japan of the Equal Remuneration Convention (No. 100), published in 2011 (International Labour 
Office, 2011), is a perfect illustration of how this lack of action even reached higher levels within 
the ILO. Further criticism is warranted from the fact that Japan has ratified only Conventions No. 
100 and No. 156 out of the key ones, and that there are many observations made by employers and 
worker’s organizations pending a response from the government, CEACR comments still under 
examination, and requested reports and replies to CEACR comments still due in the following years. 
The lack of proactive consideration of international instruments by Japanese courts, specially 
of the CEDAW and its principles, has been continuously criticized both by national and international 
voices. Because this theme is extremely broad, the ways the CEDAW Committee, as well as Japanese 
judges, scholars and NGOs have dealt with this issue will be brought up again in many other instances 
throughout this work. 
5.2.2 Japanese attempts of introducing the CEDAW provisions domestically through its legislation 
 
                                                 
Digital Entertainment Case (Rodo Hanrei. (2011). Tokyo High Court. Judgement of December 27, issue n. 
1042, p. 15.), in which the court also promptly dismissed the plaintiff’s argument that included the CEDAW 
and its provisions, can be brought up. 
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 The many problems concerning the deficiency in the implementation of the CEDAW 
through the judiciary needed – and still need - to be addressed. In the aforementioned context of 
reluctance of Japanese courts to apply international norms in their judgements, the logical 
development to improve the implementation of the CEDAW within Japan’s jurisdiction would be 
for the state to create new domestic laws and to modify already existing provisions, all based on the 
international women’s rights principles protected by the CEDAW and the international community. 
This approach gave and continues to give origin to sparse changes made to discriminatory norms 
existent in the Japanese Civil and Criminal Law throughout the more than 30 years since the adoption 
of the Convention. Some of them were very relevant, such as the change in Japan’s Nationality Act, 
which in 1984 granted Japanese nationality to children of Japanese women and foreign fathers, and 
the much necessary reform given in 2017 to the definition and punishment of the crime of rape 
presented in the Criminal Code. On the other hand, many legal modifications meant to bring gender 
equality were incomplete or virtually useless, such as the problems brought by the maintenance of a 
period of prohibition of remarriage required solely for women or by the fact that the apparently non-
discriminatory requirement for Japanese couples to share one surname actually means that 96% of 
women end up giving up their last name (Rich, 2016). 
 In addition to these changes, the adoption of the CEDAW in Japan kick started a considerable 
revolution in the field of the women’s right to work. In an attempt to comply with Article 11 of the 
CEDAW and to bring the discussion about gender equality to the realm of labor law, the Japanese 
government created in 1985 the Equal Employment Opportunity Law (hereinafter, EEOL). Specially 
after its two revisions, in 1997 and 2006, the EEOL can be considered the main provision for the 
protection of women in the workplace. Other relevant laws that have been guiding the path towards 
non-discrimination within Japanese society are the 1999 Basic Act for a Gender-Equal Society, 
which focuses on the importance of gender equality and of sharing responsibilities between men and 
women in order to create a society that thrives with equal participation of both sexes, and the Basic 
Plan for Gender Equality, which tries to solve the problem of the lack of female empowerment and 
the small rates of their participation in roles that require decision making, such as faculty and 
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leadership positions. However, the positive effects of these legal instruments are at least questionable, 
when one considers that regardless of their promulgation the actual number of women in positions 
of power remains low, and that they still must face various hurdles in their workplace. 
 Even with all the setbacks that still remain, it can be said that some of the most important 
changes brought by the CEDAW to the Japanese society were indeed materialized through legislation. 
Especially when it comes to labor rights and empowerment policies, the Japanese legislative has been 
slowly taking action and attempting to improve its laws. Thus, in order to give this topic all the 
attention it needs, this work will dedicate its Chapter 7 to explaining specifically about these laws, 
with special focus on the EEOL, and on how the civil society has welcomed and criticized them.   
5.2.3 Dialogues between the Japanese government and the CEDAW Committee: The importance 
of the periodic report system 
 
In this context of persistent gender-based discrimination within Japan, a tool that has been 
fundamental to address the roots of inequality and the legislation and policies that need to be amended 
is the country report system of the CEDAW. Countries that have ratified or acceded to the 
Convention are legally bound to put its provisions into practice, and under its Article 18, they also 
have the duty to submit national reports, at least every four years, clarifying the measures they have 
taken to comply with their treaty obligations. Concerning the details of the procedure, the CEDAW 
Committee receives the country reports and holds a meeting with state parties in public. There is 
input also from NGOs and the civil society, and the Committee may make questions and ask for 
clarifications, making the analysis of the documents similar to a conversation, with multiple 
contributors. The review of a state report ends with the release of Concluding Observations, in which 
the Committee makes specific recommendations to the state concerned, and initiates a follow up 
procedure, in which it requests the state to provide information in its next periodic report on how it 
has been implementing the recommendations and to submit additional information on pressing issues 
(United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2019c). From 1985 until now, 
Japan has experienced such constructive dialogues with the CEDAW Committee five times, with its 
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first report being evaluated in 1988, its second and third ones in 1994, the fourth and fifth ones in 
2003, the sixth one in 2009 and most recently, the seventh and eight ones in 2016.  
In these two latest reports, presented in 2014, the Japanese national government, through 
dialogues with citizens, NGOs and local governments, and hearings with intellectuals and related 
ministries and agencies, identified advances in ways of solving persistent legal and social problems 
that have been pointed out by the CEDAW Committee in the previous reports. Regarding progress 
made on the policies related to gender equality, the report brought up the enactment of the 
aforementioned 1999 Basic Act for a Gender-Equal Society and the efforts based on the Basic Plan 
for Gender Equality, explaining that this latter sets the basic direction of governmental policies and 
specific measures to be adopted to foster gender equality-related measures in a comprehensive and 
planned manner based on the Basic Act. However, as it was already established, such efforts have 
until now only reached incomplete and unsatisfactory results, especially when it comes to fulfilling 
the “30% by 2020” target goal (meaning the objective of increasing the share of women in leadership 
positions to at least 30% by 2020 in all fields in society) set by the government, which has culminated 
in the need for continuous reforms of the Basic Plan. Now on its fourth formulation, the most recent 
version of the plan, put into practice in 2016, focuses on the improvement of the following four items 
(Government of Japan, 2016, p. 3):  
 to reform labor practices that are based on male-oriented and fixed working styles, since 
for women to contribute actively to the workplace and enjoy fulfilling working lives, it 
is key to ensure that they can choose from a variety of flexible working styles;  
 to foster measures to increase the recruitment and promotion of women and develop 
female human resources who will be in managerial positions in the future with an eye to 
expanding women’s participation in all fields of society;  
 to establish an environment in which women can live with peace of mind by giving 
careful consideration and support to women faced with difficult situations;  
 and to enhance measures to eliminate violence against women.  
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As it can be seen, the Basic Plan has attempted to prioritize the guarantee of women’s rights 
in the workplace, female empowerment and the expansion of their participation in all fields of society. 
Furthermore, in addition to the Basic Plan, other policies have been added to the Japanese rooster of 
measures to “build a society where women can shine” and to change the persistent situation of 
inequality. The 2018 Intensive Policy to Accelerate the Empowerment of Women, which is a yearly 
compilation of the government’s priority measures, included “empowerment” and “full participation” 
in its basic topics, engaging with the concept from various points of view, such as economy, career, 
safety and security (Gender Equality Bureau Cabinet Office, 2019c, pp. 26-27).  
In the same empowerment context, but focusing on the right to work, the 2016 Act on 
Promotion of Women’s Participation and Advancement in the Workplace emphasizes the fact that it 
is increasingly important that women are able to pursue a work life of their own volition, one that 
they can fully show their capabilities. For that, this temporary 10-year act bases itself in providing 
work-related opportunities to women (all while considering the impact that traditional practices and 
gender roles have in women’s lives), in making sure that work-life balance is being guaranteed and 
in that women have their individual will respected. It has worked in evaluating the efforts of 
companies to provide a less discriminatory working environment for women, certifying them 
publicly and making databases available (Gender Equality Bureau Cabinet Office, 2019c, pp. 28-29). 
However, this creates a focus on having as enforcement measures only the feeble awarding of 
certifications, the awarding of extra points in situations of evaluation for public procurement and the 
appeal to the idea that Japanese companies prefer to avoid being publicly shamed, the same way that 
other Japanese law that deals with women’s rights, like the Equal Employment Opportunity Law 
(EEOL), tends to do. Instead of contributing for the improvement of an inherently discriminatory 
situation, it ends up giving companies opportunities for non-compliance, and thus this enforcement 
method, or better said, lack of thereof, has been constantly criticized as insufficient to bring change.16 
                                                 
16 This work will tackle this issue more thoroughly in Chapter 6, when talking specifically about the EEOL. 
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 All these laws and policies have been developed and managed by the Japanese government 
through the Council for Gender Equality, an essential part of the Framework for Promotion of Gender 
Equality.17 Existing under this same name since 1994, the new Council for Gender Equality came to 
life in 2001, as a result of the administrative reform the central government went through. It expanded 
the functions of the previous Council, which was more of an advisory body, and became the organ 
responsible for monitoring the implementation of gender-related policies and for studying their 
impact on society. Furthermore, not only it has a direct connection with the Gender Equality Bureau 
of the Cabinet Office, which is the responsible for creating and coordinating gender equality policies, 
but now it also has a bigger involvement with other related ministries too, since it is formed by both 
intellectuals and cabinet ministers (Government of Japan, 2003, p. 1).  
As it can be seen, at least on theory the Japanese government has been creating a national 
machinery for the guarantee of women’s rights and had been giving special attention to the promotion 
of women’s empowerment and active participation in society, emphasizing that the “expansion of 
women’s participation in policy decision-making processes is an urgent issue in Japan, especially in 
the fields of politics and the economy” (Government of Japan, 2014, paragraph 228). These two are 
not the only fields that concern should be openly given to, though. When it comes to education, the 
reports have shown that the biggest issue is the lower number of women advancing to higher 
education institutions, and the unbalanced proportion of men and women depending on specific 
subjects. While women occupy the majority of seats in subjects like home economics, arts, 
humanities and education, their proportion is low in social sciences, agriculture, science, and 
engineering. Furthermore, this trend amongst female students repeats itself in regards to female 
educators. For example, junior colleges have around 50% of women in their teaching staff, at the 
same time that universities have only 21%. Colleges of technology, in an even more worrisome figure, 
                                                 
17 A map of the whole framework can be found at Gender Equality Bureau Cabinet Office. (October 16, 2019c). 




have merely 7.7%. Even though it is true that this difference is overall on the decrease, more efforts 
are necessary to accelerate this process (Government of Japan, 2014, paragraphs 263-286).  
The situation concerning women’s employment and their empowerment through work has 
problems very similar to the ones concerning their public participation in positions of power in areas 
other than labor. In a society in which the work culture is centered on men, Japanese working women 
struggle to reach the same level of relevance given to their male counterparts. The Japanese report 
attempts to soften this issue, and it focuses on how the number of women in the labor force has been 
on the rise, in general and for women that are married and have children (Government of Japan, 2014, 
paragraphs 17-18, 21), and how the existence of a dual career ladder system is not a discriminatory 
practice in itself. The text of paragraph 293 (Government of Japan, 2014) is exemplificative of this 
last point. 
Paragraph 293 
Such systems as the dual career ladder system are not problematic under the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Act, as long as they do not treat workers differently by 
gender but categorize them depending on their duties and specialties and treat 
them accordingly by category in their deployment and promotion. However, 
companies adopting the dual career ladder system tend to have fewer female main 
career track employees with lower female ratios or to lack reasonableness and 
transparency in differences in the details of duties and treatment for each 
category.(…) 
As it can be seen, the Japanese Government flips the blame for the lack of women in the 
main career track towards the companies, and not on the dual career ladder system itself. However, 
by focusing in the aforementioned issues, it glosses over the whole problem of indirect discrimination 
on the workplace, the fact that employment rates in all age groups remain lower for women than for 
men, that most of these working women are in more precarious and lower positions than men, that 
they are more prone to take low paying, part-time jobs, that the wage discrepancies between men and 
women prevail, and that the M-shaped curve in the ratio of women’s participation in the labor force 
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when tracked by age group in Japan persists (Gender Equality Bureau Cabinet Office, 2019c, pp. 8-
10). Specially the existence of this M-shaped curve, in other words, the phenomenon that a great 
number of Japanese women tend to abandon their jobs after marriage and pregnancy, to return to the 
labor market only years later when their child rearing responsibilities lessen, usually to part-time or 
lower positions, contributes immensely to the fact that women cannot grow in their careers and reach 
the same level of managerial positions as men.  
Despite the lack of improvement, Japan does seem to be aware of these problems. In the 
reports, it brings up the problem of the considerable wage difference between men and women (an 
average rate of 73.4% by 2016) (Gender Equality Bureau Cabinet Office, 2019c, pp. 8-10), and how 
it worsens in relation with the workers age.18 Also, it points out that despite formal protection existing, 
amongst consultations received by the Equal Employment Opportunity Department, those citing 
sexual harassment and the detrimental treatment due to marriage, pregnancy and childbirth, etc. 
remain respectively occupying the first and second positions (Government of Japan, 2014, paragraph 
299). The government also understands that it urgently needs to further facilitate support for 
balancing work and child raising, and has done so through legislation by promulgating the Act to 
Partially Revise the Act on the Welfare of Workers who Take Care of Children or Other Family 
Members, Including Child Care and Family Care Leave and the Employment Insurance Act in 2009. 
Regardless, in reality the number of men taking childcare leave remains as low as 5.14% by 2017, 
which shows that society has not been willing to adapt its ways (Gender Equality Bureau Cabinet 
Office, 2019c, pp. 11-12). 
The seventh and eight reports also cite progresses and problems related to all other articles 
of the CEDAW, but giving them much less relevance. Clauses in the Japanese Civil Code that have 
been heavily criticized for creating unreasonable discriminatory situations in women’s lives. For 
example, the difference in the marriageable age between men and women (which still persists despite 
                                                 
18 Government of Japan, Seventh and Eighth Periodic Reports on the Implementation of the Convention 
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (2014), paragraph 315. 
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a recent attempt at a legal update by the government) is criticized for enabling the existence of abuse 





Article 731 A man who has attained 18 years of age, and a woman who has 
attained 16 years of age may enter into marriage. 
Another issue that is the provision forbidding a husband and wife to adopt separate surnames of 
their own accord, which recently in 2015 was considered to be constitutional by the Japanese 




(Surname of Husband and Wife) 
Article 750 A husband and wife shall adopt the surname of the husband  
or wife in accordance with that which is decided at the time of marriage. 
This decision basically ignored the reality that shows women as comprising 96% of the 
spouses that change their names, and the social implications that brings. With the same lack of tact 
                                                 
19 English coverage of the decision can be found at Soble, J. (2015, December 16).  Japan’s Top Court Upholds 
Law Requiring Spouses to Share Surname. Retrieved from 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/17/world/asia/japan-court-ruling-women-surnames.html 
The full text of the decision, in Japanese, can be found at Minshuu [Repository of Civil Judgements]. (2015). 




and regardless of it recently have been shortened from 6 months to 100 days (Umeda, 2016), the 
existence of a period of prohibition of remarriage required solely for women has also been maintained. 
The only way a woman does not have to wait to remarry is if she can produce an official document 
from a doctor to prove she is not pregnant at the time of divorce, which is a sexist and discriminatory 




(Period of Prohibition of Remarriage) 
Article 733 (1) A woman may not remarry unless six months have passed 
since the day of dissolution or rescission of her previous marriage. 
These issues and many others only continue to be hidden and excused by the government 
behind feeble allegations like the lack of citizen’s awareness, effective discussion and consensus, 
and even like the need to determine the paternity of the child in an early stage, concerning the matter 
of the remarriage prohibition (Government of Japan, 2014, paragraphs 383-386).  
However, it must not be forgotten that the periodic reports, despite being an important 
primary font for research and statistical data, are still a one sided document made by the Japanese 
government. Thus, the information contained there must be taken with a grain of salt, and read 
together with other related reports by different organizations. Within these, the text of the Concluding 
Observations of the CEDAW Committee are essential for the good understanding of the states’ 
situation.   
5.2.4 The importance of the Concluding Observations: Criticisms towards Japan that continue to 
make a difference 
 
Overall, the whole text of the report is obviously more optimistic than what has in fact been 
happening within Japanese society, as the Concluding Observations publicized in March of 2016 
show us. The document does list several positive points that agree with the improvements brought 
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up by the Japanese government, starting with welcoming the progress achieved in the field of 
legislative reforms by Japan since the analysis given to its sixth periodic report back in 2009. For 
example, revisions to the Part-time Labor Act were important for women, since most workers of that 
category are female. The adoption of new law, like the Anti-Stalking Act in 2013 and, in the context 
of the right to work, of the Act on the Promotion of Women’s Participation and Advancement in the 
Workplace, in 2015, show that attempts of change have slowly been made. In addition to legislation, 
policies were also created and revised, such as the continuous changes brought to the Basic Plan for 
Gender Equality, as it evolved through its third and fourth versions, respectively in 2010 and 2015. 
Lastly, Japan showed its will of complying to international norms by ratifying some important 
international instruments, such as The Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, in 
2014.20  
However, when compared to the Japanese reports, the Concluding Observations are much 
more incisive in its criticisms. Dividing its text into principal areas of concern and recommendations, 
they start by stressing the importance of the legislative power in ensuring the implementation of the 
CEDAW, showing concern that the Convention has not been applied to its full extent, that previous 
recommendations remain not implemented, and that in 2014, the High Court of Tokyo ruled that it 
cannot recognize the Convention as directly applicable or self-executing. This decision, made on the 
matter of the unconstitutionality of previously mentioned Article 750 of the Civil Code, which deals 
with the surname system in Japan, went on to become the base for a final decision by the Supreme 
Court of Japan that completely disregarded the principles of the CEDAW and the advice of the 
Committee (Minshuu, 2015), concluding that the provision was constitutional regardless of clear 
proof that in reality the majority of people changing their surnames are women and that they face 
many difficulties because of such system.  
                                                 
20 A detailed description of all the advances made by Japan can be found in Committee on the Elimination of 
Discrimination Against Women. (2016) Concluding observations on the combined seventh and eighth periodic 
reports of Japan,  paragraphs 4-6.  
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Considering there is still no explicit intention from Japan towards ratifying the CEDAW 
Optional Protocol, this refusal to apply it in its decisions is a clear withdraw of the judiciary when it 
comes to protecting women against discrimination. Moreover, even after 30 years since its 
ratification, the CEDAW provisions are yet not sufficiently known by the public, which hinders 
people’s chances of fighting for their rights, and there is not even a domestic comprehensive 
definition of discrimination against women encompassing direct and indirect discrimination in both 
the public and private spheres of life, or a comprehensive anti-discrimination law that covers 
intersectional discrimination against women belonging to various minority groups.  
At the same time, discriminatory provisions persist in legislation as relevant as the Civil 
Code, as it was specified above by showing the articles that regulate marriageable age, the period of 
prohibition of remarriage and a couple’s surname. Another discriminatory provision that directly 
affects children and indirectly affects their mothers is the fact that rules such as the obligation of 
including in the family register a written notification that specifies whether the child is born in or out 
of wedlock (Article 49, paragraph 2, number 1) have been maintained in the Family Register Act.  
In addition to legal instruments, the state also lacks statutory temporary special measures to address 
the under-representation of women, insisting in using less effective voluntary incentives instead of 
statutory quotas to increase the participation of women in decision-making positions.  
Lastly, the creation of an independent national human rights institution is still pending, and 
thus the state remains uncompliant with the Paris Principles (United Nations General Assembly, 
1993). Adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1993, these principles identify the 
international guidelines which national human rights institutions must abide to so they can be 
accredited by the Global Alliance of National Human Rights Institutions. These institutions must 
“protect human rights, including by receiving, investigating and resolving complaints, mediating 
conflicts and monitoring activities, and promote human rights, through education, outreach, the 
media, publications, training and capacity building, as well as advising and assisting the Government” 
(Global Alliance of National Human Rights Institutions). Although Japan has created a basic 
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framework within its government to deal with issues of gender equality, it remains far away from 
having an independent national human rights institution. 
Moving away from the government and the law and looking at the issues within society, it 
is noted that patriarchal attitudes and deep-rooted stereotypes regarding the roles and responsibilities 
of women and men in the family and in society persist, being reflected in the media and educational 
textbooks. Women keep being shown and perceived as either sex-objects or caregivers, which limit 
their educational and life choices and creates a vicious circle of inequality. This also influences in 
the way violence against women is dealt with. Issues existent in the Penal Code, such as the narrow 
definition of the crime of rape, were analyzed by a reviewing committee. This specific example 
culminated in the 2017 reform of the Article 177, but even with such revision many criticisms remain, 
like the fact that the new law does not include provisions to lighten the burden of proof that falls on 
the victim, and that violent assault or intimidation that make it extremely difficult for the victim to 
resist the abuse are still required for a charge of rape. In addition to that, the CEDAW Committee 
remains concerned with other related problems, for example that marital rape has not been explicitly 
criminalized and that the age of sexual consent remains low, at 13 years.  
Concerning other kinds of violence, the Committee is concerned that Japan remains a source, 
transit and destination country for trafficking in persons, in particular women and girls, for purposes 
of labor and sexual exploitation (Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, 
2016, paragraph 26). Within the country, Japanese women are still subjected to sexual exploitation 
in the entertainment industry, particularly for prostitution and pornographic film production. It has 
been reported that some model and actor agencies use fraudulent recruitment techniques to make 
women sign vague contracts and then force them through threats to engage in sexual acts to produce 
pornographic materials. Runaway teenage girls, children of foreign and Japanese citizens who have 
acquired citizenship, their foreign mothers, and women in poverty or with mental disabilities, are the 
preferred victims of these schemes. They are also the biggest targets of sex trafficking operations 
lead by organized prostitution networks, that prey on vulnerable women and girls. In addition to 
being a provider, Japan is also said to be a source of demand, as reports have shown that Japanese 
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men are still consumers of child sex tourism in Asia. Furthermore, the Industrial Training and 
Technical Internship Programme, regardless of its good intentions as a policy, has created a situation 
where many women and girls that come to Japan to work end up being made to do forced labor and 
are sexually exploited. For these reasons, the State has been considered not only as a source and 
transit country, but also as a major destination for human trafficking (U.S. Department of State, 2014). 
The same way that Japan shows awareness of such issues in its reports, the Concluding 
Observations bring up the lack of female participation in political and public life, and the situations 
of inequality persistent in the areas of education and employment. The low participation of women 
is rampant in basically all positions of power, be it in the legislative, ministerial, local government 
levels, in the judiciary, diplomatic service and in academia. Examples of this inequality are very easy 
to find: According to the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications Statistics Bureau, as of 
2018 only 13% of the total Diet Members were female (Government of Japan, 2018, p. 190); 
According to the Government of Japan, as of 2013 only 10.5% of the Japanese Ministers were female 
(Government of Japan, 2014, annex 46); Also according to the government, as of 2012 only 6.2% of 
senior posts above director level in local governments were occupied by women (Government of 
Japan, 2014, annex 30), and as of 2013 women were 31% of the Japanese judges, and 14% of 
Japanese prosecutors (Government of Japan, 2014, annex 48,49); Lastly, according to the Ministry 
of Internal Affairs and Communications Statistics Bureau, as of 2017 only 31% of graduate school 
students were women (Government of Japan, 2018, p. 174). Additionally, and in the same sense of 
this last example, men remain dominating the higher teaching and management seats in universities 
and graduate schools, specially in fields of studies such as science, technology engineering and 
mathematics.  
Following this tendency, in terms of employment, women tend to occupy low paid and part-
time sectors, with 55.5% of female workers having part-time positions, against only 21.9% of men 
(Government of Japan, 2018, pp. 128-129). Also, the gender pay gap keeps being wide (as seen in 
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Figure 7, reproduced from Government of Japan, 2014, p. 135),21  there is a lack of adequate 
prohibition and sanctions for sexual harassment, and Japan has not ratified the ILO Convention No. 
111 concerning discrimination in respect of employment and occupation. To make matters even 
worse, there are no temporary special measures aimed at changing these situations, and this under-
representation and other issues are way more pronounced when it comes to women from minorities 
such as Ainu, Buraku and Zainichi Korean, as they have to deal with discrimination originating from 
their cultural backgrounds in addition to the discrimination they suffer just for being women 
(Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, 2016, paragraphs 30-35).  
Another way of showing how urgent is the inequality problem in Japan is to compare these 
statistics on representativeness with data from other economically strong East-Asian nations, from 
other developed nations that are leaders in equality, and with the world average. For example, when 
looking at the proportion of seats held by women in national parliaments, Japan is reported to 
compute only 10%, falling way behind Asian countries like South Korea and China, which have 17% 
and 25% respectively. It also has a lower percentage than the world average of 23.9%, not to mention 
when compared to gender equality leaders such as Sweden, which boasts 46% (Inter-Parliamentary 
Union, 2017). When it comes to positions in education, South Korea and China also overcome Japan 
in the number of female university professors, with 20.2% (data of 2012) (Government of the 
Republic of Korea , 2015) and 46.48% (data of 2010) (Government of China, 2012, paragraph 151) 
against only 13.4% (data of 2012, from Government of Japan, 2014, annex 7). Even Iceland, which 
receives some criticism for its lack of female lecturers despite having the majority of its tertiary 
education students being women, is way above Japan, with 25% (data of 2010, from Heijstra, 
O'Connor, & Rafnsdottir, 2013, pp. 324-341). Knowing this information, it becomes even clearer 
that the Japanese situation of gender inequality must be seriously tackled, so that Japan can at least 
begin approaching the level of other nations. 
                                                 
21 Refer also to Government of Japan. (2014). Seventh and Eighth Periodic Reports on the Implementation 
of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, annex 13. 
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Figure 7. Differences in male and female monthly contractual earnings 
 
One issue which is almost ignored by the periodic reports, but is brought up in the 
Concluding Observations, as well as in other UN human rights mechanisms such as the Committee 
on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, is the unresolved problem of the so called “comfort 
women”. The Committee acknowledges the Japanese efforts to resolve the issue, but it regrets 
specially that the state has not implemented the recommendations from other mechanisms. It also 
criticizes the Japanese position that this problem does not fall within the mandate of the Committee, 
justifying it by the fact that these women’s rights violations occurred before the CEDAW entered 
into force for the state party in 1985. In paragraph 97 (Government of Japan, 2014) of the report, it 
claims that: 
Paragraph 97 
As this Convention does not apply to any issues that occurred prior to Japan’s 
conclusion thereof (1985), the Government of Japan considers that it is not 
appropriate for this report to take up the comfort women issue in terms of the 
implementation of State Party’s duties regarding the Convention. 
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 This goes against the interpretation of the Committee, which focuses in the continuous effect 
of the crimes committed towards these women. This is reiterated in paragraph 29 of the Concluding 
Recommendations (Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, 2016). 
Paragraph 29 
The Committee reiterates its previous recommendations (CEDAW/C/JPN/CO/6, 
paras. 37 and 38) and observes that the issue of “comfort women” gives rise to 
serious violations that have a continuing effect on the rights of victims/survivors 
of those violations that were perpetrated by the State party’s military during the 
Second World War given the continued lack of effective remedies for these 
victims. The Committee, therefore, considers that it is not precluded ratione 
temporis from addressing such violations, (…) 
Regardless of this other valid interpretation, Japan bases itself only in its own allegation and 
regretfully glosses over the issue, refusing to reference the problem of the lack of mention to the 
situation of “comfort women” in textbooks and to adopt a victim centered approach to the matter. It 
also refuses to accept criticism towards the 2015 Japan-South Korea accord on the matter, regardless 
of all the issues that have been pointed out concerning it (“Tokyo insists 2015 Japan-S. Korea 
‘comfort women’ accord ‘irreversible’,” 2017). 
Lastly, to a smaller extent, the document brings attention to other specific points: health 
related concerns like problems related to radiation following the Fukushima Dai-Chi Nuclear Power 
Plant accident in 2011 and the high ratio of abortion - which is aggravated by the fact that spousal 
consent is needed for its performance -  and suicide among teenage girls and women;22 poverty 
among women; low participation of rural women in decision making, particularly when it comes to 
                                                 
22 Although in 2014 female suicides made up for only 30.9% of the total cases, the number of suicides in Japan 
have been consistently high, being at 19.7 suicides per 100000 people in 2015, which is almost double the 
global average. Data from the World Health Organization. (2016). Suicide crude rates per 100000 population.;  
and World Health Organization. (2014). Suicide Prevention, Country Profiles - Japan. 
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policies that are directly related to their interests; low participation of women in leadership roles in 
the area of disaster risk reduction and management at the national and local level; persistence of 
multiple and intersecting forms of discrimination towards women of indigenous, ethnic and sexual 
minorities; lack of legislation that governs the distribution of property upon dissolution of marriage 
and other issues related to marriage and family relations. 
In this chapter, I aimed to clarify the long relationship between the CEDAW and Japan, 
bringing up the influence the former has had in various parts of Japanese society. Needless to say, 
this is not meant to be a complete account of all the Japanese attempts of implementing the CEDAW 
through courts, laws and policies, as that would be an unnecessarily extensive account, possibly even 
counterproductive to the final objective of this work. In the same sense, there was also the need to 
make a focused summary of the documents cited, especially when one considers their length and 
depth. As was already explained before, and was again reinforced in this part, what guides the 
exposition here made are two of the biggest issues identified in the present Japanese society: the lack 
of female empowerment and the inequality women continue to face in their work environment. 
Without straying away from these topics, this basic background information on the CEDAW and 
Japan will serve as an introduction and be expanded in the next chapter, with a focus in the Japanese 
government’s efforts towards guaranteeing empowerment and implementing the right to work for 





Chapter 6. The Dialogue Between the CEDAW, Japan’s Domestic Labor Legislation 
and NGOs: Laws, Policies and the Role of the Civil Society in the Implementation of 
Women’s Rights 
 
 In Chapter 5, the relationship between Japan and the CEDAW was analyzed in a general 
manner, including basic information about how the state has been attempting to implement the treaty 
in its domestic environment. The successes and shortcomings of this long and arduous process have 
been recorded through the work of the CEDAW Committee, which makes use of the periodic report 
system to receive communications concerning the application of the treaty provisions and principles 
within the state, and to give advice to state parties. From the examination of the latest Japanese 
periodic reports and the Committee’s Concluding Observations, it can be concluded that there is still 
much to be done domestically for the realization of women’s rights, especially when it comes to 
legally guaranteeing their empowerment and their right to work.  
Building on that, in this chapter I will delve deeper into what Japan has achieved and in what 
can still be improved in the area, focusing in the way its laws and policies have changed through the 
decades. Following an introductory section that clarifies, through Criminal Law examples, the 
gendered issues persistent in the Japanese society, special attention will be given to the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Law (hereinafter, EEOL), the Basic Act for a Gender-Equal Society and 
the Basic Plan for Gender Equality, specifically its contemporary fourth formulation. Lastly, this 
legal information will be put in a social context, through a consideration of how the Japanese civil 
society, by making use of the strength of NGOs, has been interacting with the CEDAW as an 
international instrument and with the Japanese domestic laws and policies. This all will be used as a 
spring board to the analysis, in the following chapters, of the status of international norm diffusion 
in Japan and how it can be improved, which will be done by applying the contents of the “spiral 
model” to the reality concerning female empowerment and labor rights in Japan.  
6.1 Japan’s deep rooted gender inequality and the CEDAW: The contribution of legal 




Even before the advent of the CEDAW, the common way of legally accomplishing gender 
equality has been to treat women and men in the same way when enacting legislation, mostly by 
using sexually neutral language. However, this passive approach, which remains until this day and 
is based on an illusion that guaranteeing formal equality would be enough to solve the Japanese 
problems concerning inequality, has only served to maintain a gendered status quo. This idea, which 
is in accordance with the text of the Constitution of Japan, still pervades the country’s legislation, 
especially when it comes to the Civil Code, influencing norms related to education, family, social 
security and labor law. On the other hand, Japan also maintains in its legislation many instances 
where women are clearly treated differently and worse than men, which contributes to the 
maintenance of gender inequality even more than the state’s feeble attempts to solve the issues by 
giving women formal equality only. As already mentioned, Japanese law is peppered by cases where 
women are subjected to discriminatory circumstances, such as the prohibition of remarriage within 
a certain period of time. Moreover, even when this different treatment was supposed to improve the 
situation of women, it was done in such a way that it only contributed to female segregation, as it 
can be exemplified by the first version of the EEOL and its consequences for working women.   
 To further make clear how deeply rooted the issues in Japanese law and society are, the Criminal 
Code, that includes double standard provisions concerning rape, abortion and prostitution, should be 
brought up. For example, until the year 2017, the article that criminalized rape read as follows:  
Article 177 (Rape) 
A person who, through assault or intimidation, forcibly commits sexual 
intercourse with a female older than thirteen years of 
age commits the crime of rape and shall be punished with a sentence of a 
minimum of 3 years in prison. The same shall apply to a person who commits 
sexual intercourse with a female under thirteen years of age. 
 It had continuously been harshly criticized for having a restrict definition of rape and a very 
small punishment for such a terrible crime, until when, in July of 2017, it was finally changed. Some 
of the most relevant changes include the raising of the minimum penalty to 5 years of imprisonment, 
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the inclusion of males as possible victims, the broadening of the definition of the criminal act to 
include acts other than vaginal penetration by male genitalia, and, as a result of this latter, the 
changing of the name of the crime to “forced sexual intercourse”. Even though these changes were 
revolutionary in a sense, as they were actually the first amendment of the Criminal Code in 110 years. 
The fact that it took so long for any change to happen is incredibly worrisome, since it shows how 
reluctant Japan is to adapt itself even in cases that involve the direct safety of its female (and, to a 
lesser extent, male) citizens.   
 Concerning the crime of abortion, Article 212 of the Criminal Code says that “a pregnant 
woman who has an abortion with the use of medical substances or with other methods, will be 
punished with a prison sentence of one year or less”. There have always been critics of the 
criminalization of the act of aborting, since in a way it is a limitation of women’s reproductive rights, 
but the case of Japan is worse than just that. Specially during the Japanese expansion era and the 
Second World War, women were seen as tools for enhancing the country’s population, a way of 
thinking that was legally backed up by the criminalization of abortion (Ohashi, 2003, pp. 16-18). 
Then, after the end of the war, the creation of the Eugenic Protection Law of 1948 made medical 
abortions available at clinics, under certain circumstances. But while this seemed like an advance in 
women’s reproduction rights, it was actually an act motivated by the need for population control and 
it aimed to stop disabled and sick women of giving birth, validating even their sterilization. To get 
away from this historical background, a “new face” was given to the law in 1996 and excluded its 
eugenic purpose, culminating in the Maternal Protection Law. However, regardless of this law’s 
intentions, it is still highly criticized, including by the CEDAW Committee (Committee on the 
Elimination of Discrimination against Women, 2016, paragraph 38), because its Article 14 sets up 
many difficult conditions that must be met for an abortion to be possible, and it also requires women 
to get consent from their spouses in order to be able to do the procedure. In Japanese law, women’s 
bodies are still controlled by men. 
 Prostitution is another criminalized act that has many gendered implications. The Criminal 
Code itself, in its Article 182, only defines inducement to promiscuous intercourse, which means that 
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“a person who, for the purpose of profit, induces a female without a promiscuous habit to engage in 
sexual intercourse,” will be punished criminally. On the other hand, the Anti-Prostitution Law of 
1956 is more encompassing and criminalizes both the sale and the purchase of sexual intercourse 
(Government of Japan, 1956, Article 3), but it lacks in the fact that it does not define a judicial penalty 
for the act and it does not forbid the commercialization of any other kind of sexual acts. This makes 
the law easy to bend, and guarantees little to no protection at all for Japanese women that might find 
themselves involved, willingly or not, with the broad, booming and male controlled sex industry of 
Japan. This issue is even noted by the CEDAW in paragraph 26 of the Concluding Observations on 
the combined seventh and eighth periodic reports of Japan: 
Paragraph 26 
(...) The Committee is, however, concerned that (...) 
(a) Women continue to be subjected to sexual exploitation in the entertainment 
industry, particularly for prostitution and pornographic film production; and  
(b) Women and girls coming to the State party under the Industrial Training and 
Technical Internship Programme continue to be subjected to forced labour and 
sexual exploitation.  
All these laws and many others contribute to the maintenance of the status quo of women as 
culturally and socially belonging to a supporting role in comparison to male protagonists. From this 
situation, it has become clear that Japan’s attempts to create de jure equality for women has not been 
enough to bring de facto equality, especially when one realizes how much the legal status of women 
is still connected to their perceived social roles. In fact, most Japanese people of the time of the 
advent of the CEDAW themselves understood that men and women were not treated substantially 
equally, with women being viewed primarily as homemakers and secondarily as a supplemental 
workforce (Kamiya, 1986, p. 447, 452, 458), but nothing had been actively done to change this 
situation. It would have depended then on the government to take the first step towards changing this 
perception and this reality, and to actually create appropriate legal and social measures to eliminate 
gender discrimination.        
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In this sense, the CEDAW was a welcomed breath of fresh air, being the trigger for women’s 
issues to be brought to the forefront of the public’s and the government’s attentions, and causing 
Japan to finally bend to the pressures of the international community. In addition to this external 
impact, domestic demands and manifestations also had an influence in the acceptance of the 
Convention. Some of the most noteworthy ones are the Women’s Liberation movement (a female-
led movement coming from the civil society that embraced feminism and tried to achieve political, 
economic, cultural and social rights for women in the 1970’s) and an NGO network created and led 
by feminist politician Fusae Ichikawa, which was a highly respected organization that represented 
many women’s voices (Flowers, 2009, p. 78).  
Yet, without major general public support or strong administrative, parliamentary and 
judiciary backing, the efforts of these national social movements towards the implementation of the 
CEDAW and the transformation of Japanese traditions ended up being not sufficient by themselves 
to bring enough change to the treatment given by Japan to questions related to gender equality. Thus, 
even after the small evolution that happened in the 1980s, many of the issues existent before the 
implementation of the Convention, especially the ones founded in the social role attached to women 
and the lack of attention given to feminist movements in Japan, persisted then and to this day. The 
opinion of society itself, concerning whether men or women get more preferential treatment, shows 
us how little impact those policies and changes have had. As can be seen in Figure 8 (Gender Equality 
Bureau Cabinet Office, 2019c, p. 18), in the minds of most of both Japanese men and women believe 
that men continue to receive preferential treatment. 
Still, it cannot be said that absolutely nothing has improved since then. Just after the advent 
of the CEDAW, influenced by the World Plan of Action for the Implementation of the Objectives of 
the International Women's Year (1975) and other workings part of the United Nations Decade for 
Women (1976-1985), the Japanese government finally started reviewing its policies and legislation, 
and creating a new plan of action. Aiming to bring changes in areas such as education, employment, 
health care, and to improve female participation in policy and decision making, the government 
created organs like the Headquarters to Plan and Promote Women's Issues, made amendments to and 
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promulgated new legislation (Kamiya, 1986, p. 459). Just before ratifying the Convention, the 
government amended the Nationality Law, which was incompatible with its Article 9. The 
amendment expanded the law’s jus sanguinis approach and finally enabled Japanese women to pass 
their Japanese nationality on to their children regardless of the nationality of their husband. It also 
the leveled the requirements for spouses of Japanese people to naturalize, ending the period when it 
was almost impossible only for husbands of Japanese women to do so. In addition to that, in 1989, 
the Ministry of Education amended the national curriculum and made it so that home economics 
became compulsory to all students, and just not only to girls. Other significant laws, such as the 
Fundamental Law on Gender Equality (1999) and the Law on Prohibition of Spousal Violence and 
Protection of Victims (1999), have also been adopted in a variety of fields (Hayashi, 2013, pp. 343-
344), amongst which labor law and women’s empowerment are found to be some of the most 
discussed ones. As these relevant themes are necessary for the development of any society and for 
the realization of other fundamental rights, they will be the guidelines limiting the range of this work, 
and the analysis of the main legal and policy-related endeavors will be the focus of the next part of 
this chapter. 




6.2 Japan’s application of the CEDAW in the context of the right to work: The Equal 
Employment Opportunity Law and labor related policies 
 
The Equal Employment Opportunity Law was created in 1985, as a way of complying with 
the work-related content of the previously mentioned Article 11 of the CEDAW and to overcome the 
lack of the term “sex” as one of the illegal grounds of discrimination mentioned in Article 3 of the 
Japanese Labor Standards Law. Its enactment was no easy feat, marked by controversies between 
women’s civil organizations wishing for equality, and the business community unwilling to lose any 
previously owned perks. While the law was promulgated by the government allegedly as a 
compromise good enough to follow the requirements of the Convention, there was plenty of pertinent 
criticism against it. For example, its lack of effective enforcement measures, as it does not have any 
sanctions in case employers fail to take the measures it suggests, and it only offers conciliation and 
administrative guidance as solutions, both of which are not enforceable in courts.23 In fact, it has 
even been called just a guideline for companies, rather than a law that provides policies that can be 
enforced (Assmann, 2014, p. 7). The EEOL’s loose standards when dealing with the obligation to 
not discriminate, as illustrated by the use of the weak expression “endeavor to promote 
the full working lives of workers,” are also a problem.24 Some women at the time also were vocal 
against the maintenance of the idea that family responsibilities fall to women, as there is no legal 
mention concerning men taking on parental duties (Kamiya, 1986,  pp. 460-461). Adding to that the 
fact that Japanese courts are very reluctant in using international treaties in its judgements, a law with 
so many issues was bound to not only fail to improve women’s situation, but even contribute to 
worsening it.  
                                                 
23 Refer to Government of Japan. (1985). Act on Securing, Etc. of Equal Opportunity and Treatment between 
Men and Women in Employment (Equal Employment Opportunity Law). Articles 11-13, Article 14, and to 
Articles 18-27. 
24 As written in Government of Japan. (1985). Act on Securing, Etc. of Equal Opportunity and Treatment 
between Men and Women in Employment (Equal Employment Opportunity Law). Article 2, paragraph 2. 
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To try and make the law more effective, revisions were made to its text in 1997 and 2006. 
Based on social pressures and in the government’s worries concerning the declining in the birthrate 
– and consequently in the number of available workers in the country – that began in the 1990’s, the 
first revision of the EEOL in 1997 was arguably more of a way of avoiding a downturn in the 
economy by making it easier for women to join the work force. Backed up by the creation of the 
Office of Gender Equality in 1994, the changes in the law tackled the protection of women’s rights 
indirectly, since their final aim was not to give them protection based on their status as women, but 
instead it was to solve the birthrate/working force problem.  
However, regardless of its aim, the revision did manage to strengthen the EEOL in some 
ways. It targeted discrimination in all stages of employment such as recruiting, hiring, job placement, 
and promotion, by clearly saying that employers were prohibited from discriminating against women. 
Furthermore, also began recognizing sexual harassment as a form of gender discrimination, even 
placing an affirmative duty on employers to prevent sexual harassment in the workplace (Starich, 
2007, p. 559). Most importantly, it also worked in strengthening the law’s enforcement mechanism, 
albeit only slightly. Now, it granted the employee the right to force her employer into mediation, by 
which the Ministry of Health Labor and Welfare was responsible. And, in a form of public shaming, 
if a company failed to comply to the mediation, its name could be released to the media by the 
Ministry. 
Nevertheless, this punishment was not effective enough, as it only consisted of 
administrative guidance and of putting too much emphasis in the fact that Japanese employers tend 
to value their reputations and to strive for maintaining group harmony. Even worse, it completely 
ignored the strong influence that these employers themselves have in the creation of labor legislation. 
In addition to that, the changes also failed to address the law’s one-sidedness, and it remained being 
applied exclusively to women even when it would be more interesting to include protection to men 
in some situations, such as the ones related to child rearing. Lastly, it also left the issue of indirect 
discrimination unaddressed, specially contributing to the maintenance of women being confined to 
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lower jobs and having less opportunities of growth, supported by the widespread use of the dual 
career ladder system by companies (Starich, 2007, p. 560). 
These remaining problems prompted the Japanese government to review the law again in 
2006. While the concerns related to the declining birthrate and its economic effect were still 
predominant, this time the revision was also a reaction to international pressure lead by the United 
Nations and to the rise of domestic lawsuits claiming gender discrimination. The most relevant 
changes made dealt with the issues of indirect discrimination, adverse treatment for taking childcare 
leave, the lack of enforcement measures for sexual harassment, and the unwarranted one-sided 
language of the previous law, which contemplated only women (Starich, 2007, p. 561). 
 Concerning indirect discrimination, it was finally defined as a situation when “1) an 
employer seemingly adopts gender-neutral conditions or criteria and applies these equally to both 
men and women, but 2) these conditions or criteria result in being disadvantageous for one gender 
(predominantly for women), and 3) these conditions lack reason or justification, are not based on 
rational grounds, and are not related to the specific needs of a company” (Shibata, 2007, p. 179). 
Acts that fell under these characteristics became, to a limited extent, forbidden by the text of the 
reviewed law. This prohibition, laid out in Article 7 of the new EEOL (Government of Japan, 1985, 
Article 7), was welcomed specially since it gave origin to ordinances of the Ministry of Health Labor 
and Welfare that attempted to challenge the traditional dual track career system that exists in the 
majority of Japanese corporations, as well as to forbid other indirect forms of segregating women, 
such as the inclusion of conditions like height or weight in hiring requirements and the obligation of 
people to accept mobility and transfer clauses in order to advance in their careers (Assmann, 2014, 
p. 8). Additionally, these ordinances are not exhaustive, as they end with an open “etc.” indicating 
that the Ministry intended on at least leaving open the opportunity to, in the future, set further 
instructions and prohibitions related to the topic. However, it must be noted that in reality companies 
continue to make use of these now forbidden practices, and some of the legitimate, but ultimately 
false justifications they give end up even being accepted by the courts and the Ministry of Health, 
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Labour and Welfare itself (Starich, 2007, p. 562). That can clearly be seen in the recent and high 
profile legal cases that I will cite in part 6.3.  
Regardless, it is undeniable that the 2006 revision of the EEOL expanded the applicability 
of the law, at least on paper. First, it enhanced the prohibition of employers from giving employees 
disadvantageous treatment, which includes specifically protection for women workers against 
termination based on their situation of pregnancy (and even within one year after giving birth) or 
childcare leave (Starich, 2007, p. 564). 25  Second, according to Starich (2007, pp. 561-562) it 
broadened the reach of the law by making it be applicable to employees of both genders. The EEOL 





The basic principle of this law is that workers be enabled to engage in a full 
working life without discrimination based on sex, with due respect for the 
maternity of female workers.” 
With this expansion, it might be easier to start arguing against work practices that are also 
prejudicial to men, and to bring the topics of labor rights and work-life balance even more to the 
forefront. In addition to that, Articles 5 and 6 also had their wording modified to fit this new basic 
concept of equality. Thanks to that, it could now be said that after 20 years the Japanese law had 
finally reached the standard of application that had already been present in other developed countries. 
第五条  
                                                 
25 Read together with the Government of Japan. (1985). Act on Securing, Etc. of Equal Opportunity and 





Article 5  
With regard to the recruitment and hiring of workers, employers shall provide  




Article 6  
With regard to the following matters, employers shall not discriminate against  
workers on the basis of sex. (…) 
This was important because it evolved the concept of equality present in the law, managing 
to now give much needed protection to all people in diverse discriminatory situations while still 
contemplating women in special. For example, thanks to this expansion, sexual harassment of both 
genders became illegal (Government of Japan, 1985, Article 11), and previously accepted attitudes 
such as using the protection of female workers’ welfare as an excuse for employing only women 
under part-time positions and segregated jobs were explicitly forbidden (Nakakubo, 2007, p. 12).  
Third, additional forms of gender-based employment discrimination concerning the actions 
of demotion, alteration in employment status, and coercion to make an employee to retire or quit 
were included to the already existent list of forbidden actions, and the term “job assignment” was 
expanded to include the distribution of tasks and the grant of authority (Starich, 2007, pp. 562-565).  
With all this considered, it may be said that this latest revision did improve the text of the 
EEOL and its application to a certain extent, specially in situations related to indirect discrimination 
towards female employees in a situation of pregnancy or motherhood. They are also important 
because, as journalist Kaori Shoji puts it, “as with most things in Japan, things never change unless 
they change in the workplace” (Shoji, 2008). Regrettably, however, this legal protection is still 
limited, and an expansion of its interpretation depends on how the Japanese courts and the Ministry 
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of Health, Labour and Welfare decide to deal with cases that go beyond the circumstances clearly 
stated in the law and in Ministry ordinances (Starich, 2007, p. 565). Also, it must not be forgotten 
that just these small changes took more than 20 years to be made, and they worked only to a very 
little extent, creating ambiguity and leaving many problems unsolved until the present day. This is a 
clear indicator of how much background work and pressure was necessary, and continues to be so, 
to transform Japanese traditional employment practices and social values.  
  After the advent of the EEOL, many other laws and policies that aimed for the betterment of 
the inclusion of women in society were put into motion. One of the most fundamental ones, as its 
name says, is the Basic Act for a Gender-Equal Society, which was created in 1999 and put into 
legislation the significance of gender equality and of sharing responsibilities between men and 
women all areas of life including family and professional life, so that a society in which both 
participate equally can be created. It was designed first and foremost as a guideline, and thus as a 
legal form, it is a general law that does not overrule other laws. However, in reality, it is considered 
to be superior to other laws in the area, as it shapes the most relevant policy measures (Yanagimoto, 
2003, p. 5).  
The Act specifies what is its definition of a gender-equal society in a very broadly manner, 
as a “society in which both men and women, as equal members, have the opportunity to participate 
in all kinds of social activities at will, equally enjoy political, economic and cultural benefits, and 
share responsibilities” (Assmann, 2014, p. 8). However, the approach of the bill towards the issue, 
specifically the motives for the law’s creation and the wording used there, has been criticized by 
Japanese scholars. First, it is argued that the Act was deemed as necessary primarily not because the 
Japanese government and lobbying businesses saw that women deserved equal rights. Instead, it was 
because they understood that without women becoming a pure domestic labor source, they would 
not be able to overcome political problems such as the declining birthrate, the aging of Japanese 
society and the economic recession enhanced by these factors. At least, they would not be able to do 
this without opening the country to immigrants. When it included the expression “people of the nation” 
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in its Article 10, the Basic Act made it clear that including Japanese women as human labor assets 
was the indicated way for achieving particular political agendas (Yanagimoto, 2003, p. 7). 
 Second, but still related to the first topic, the way the Act puts into words its goals and 
obligations allows it to also be criticized as a legal document that differs completely from the aims 
of the CEDAW, and instead tries to just integrate women into a nationalist agenda, using them just 
as tools to solve economic and political issues. Yukako Yanagimoto spells this out clearly, by 
exemplifying that the text of the law cites “men and women being cooperative,” not “men and women 
as equals” as its goal; that it strives for the “securing of opportunities” rather than “equality in 
reality”; that even though it defines “the obligation to ensure the equal right of men and women,” it 
does not have measures to eliminate discrimination against women as stated in the CEDAW; that it 
reinforces traditional gender roles, by making its goal the “balance of home and other activities”; and 
that it allows the possibility of human rights being sacrificed depending on socio-economic 
conditions (Yanagimoto, 2003, p. 8). Considering all these distorted motivations, it becomes easier 
to understand why the Basic Act has not been able to actively create a more equal society in Japan. 
It is also possible to suggest that this is another proof that the state still finds itself following a strict 
logic of consequences, which has made it stay stuck in the tactical concession/prescriptive status 
phases of the “spiral model” and has been hindering the development of the protection of women’s 
rights in reality.   
 Thus, it is not a surprise that Japan’s attempts of creating some concrete progress in the form 
of continuously churning out Basic Plans for Gender Equality have been lackluster, as they are based 
on the same motivations the Basic Act was and follow its principles. This is clear just by looking at 
the results of the 2010 Third Basic Plan for Gender Equality, which tried to concretely respond to 
women’s low participation rates in faculty and leadership positions in other professional roles. In 
theory, it sought to establish numerical targets and deadlines, specifically to achieve 30% of female 
participation in all leadership positions by 2020. For that, it claimed it would focus on positive action 
programs, on eliminating social structures based on discriminatory and stereotypical assumptions 
about gender roles, and on encouraging government agencies to work on policies in the area. It also 
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gave a nod to the international community, by vowing to act according to its expectations (Assmann, 
2014, p. 9). However, these so-called efforts again fizzled when it came to their application. 
According to Assmann, universities as famous as the University of Tokyo made claims of raising the 
number of their female academics, but years after their self-proposed deadlines, the number of 
women in leading academic positions remains as low as ever. Men continue to dominate also in the 
academic workforce. 
Witnessing these bad results, the Japanese government went on to approve the Fourth Basic 
Plan for Gender Equality, in 2015. According to the statement by the head of the delegation of Japan 
to the CEDAW Committee, the Plan set a basic and comprehensive direction of governmental 
policies and measures in order to foster gender equality. Again, it was based on the contents of the 
Basic Act, but it attempted to give civil society a louder voice in the dialogue, considering and 
incorporating public comments, public hearings and the knowledge of experts in its contents. 
Considering this, it sets four targets to create a more gender equal society (Gender Equality Bureau 
Cabinet Office, 2016, pp.  29-30; Government of Japan, 2016, pp. 2-3): 
 To strive for a society made vibrant and rich in diversity, giving the chance to 
men and women of making their own choices and making the best of their 
individual abilities; 
 To build a place where the human rights of men and women are respected and 
where they can live with dignity. Specifically, it needs to be an environment in 
which women can live with peace of mind and find themselves supported with 
careful consideration when they are facing difficult situations, including here 
all situations of violence against women; 
 To focus on realizing work-life balance of both women and men through 
changing the country’s male focused working culture, which takes for granted 
working long hours, overtime and transfers, and instead offering a variety of 
flexible working styles, so that all workers can contribute with all their 
potential, but without sacrificing other aspects of their lives to the labour 
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market. Furthermore, there is the need to actively expand female participation, 
by creating positive actions to increase the recruitment and promotion of 
women, giving them substantially equal access to managerial positions; 
 To focus on making the Japanese society one that is recognized internationally 
for gender equality. 
In these objectives, attention is given to diversity, dignity and empowerment specially 
through work. Also, there is a clear mention to raising Japan to a position of respect within the 
international society, in the context of gender equality. This is an important point, as it may serve as 
a suggestion on what should be considered in the Japanese case when thinking about how to improve 
the domestic implementation of international provisions. Maybe a stronger external push towards 
compliance, aimed not only at government officials, but also towards the civil society, by giving 
them information and support concerning their rights, would be helpful to change Japan’s approach 
to the issue and give better implementation results.    
Following the creation of the Fourth Basic Plan, and aiming to concretize the targets there 
stated, the Japanese Diet passed in 2016 the Act on Promotion of Women’s Participation and 
Advancement in the Workplace, a law requiring large corporations in private and public sectors to 
disclose their gender diversity goals. By doing so, it aims to promote the participation and 
advancement of women in the work force, reinforcing the targets already explained in the latest Basic 
Plan: to create opportunities to hire and promote women; to improve the Japanese working 
environment, so that women and men can achieve a good work-life balance; and to respect women’s 
choices concerning career and family. 
Specifically, the law focuses its efforts only in collecting and analyzing data on issues of 
gender, provided by government agencies, local government and private sector corporations with 
more than 300 employees. Following guidelines by the national government, some examples of this 
information are the rate of newly hired female employees, the gender gap in the length of continuous 
employment, working hours and the number of women in managerial positions. Then based on these 
analyzed figures, the companies must create and present to their staff and to authorities definite action 
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plans to improve gender equality in the workplace. Lastly, they are made to release all the data 
regarding women’s participation and advancement, since it contributes to women’s career decisions 
(Gender Equality Bureau Cabinet Office, 2019b). This whole procedure culminated in the creation 
of the Eruboshi system of qualification, which certifies companies in three levels of proactivity in 
the promotion of women’s participation in the workplace. Until now, it has certified more than 775 
companies in total (Gender Equality Bureau Cabinet Office, 2019c, pp. 28-29). 
These high numbers are deceptive, however, and this advancement is not without criticism. 
First, it took 30 years after the creation of the EEOL and 17 years after the Basic Act for a policy like 
this to begin gaining traction. In addition to that, it must not be forgotten that it is still a temporary 
act, scheduled to last only for 10 years, and there aren’t any specified numerical targets to be reached, 
because of the strong opposition of the industrial lobby. This allows for the law to be interpreted in 
way too many ways, which consequently makes it possible for it to be overlooked and misused. In 
this same context, the classification made by lawyer and politician Mizuho Fukushima sheds some 
light into the problem of creating and implementing gender-related law in Japan. She suggests that 
in Japanese society, legislation related to women’s rights can be divided into three categories: (a) 
issues involving a victim, (b) issues so abstract that no one understands the meaning, and (c) issues 
in which women are being audacious. She affirms that the first two types of bills are relatively easy 
to pass, while the last one has almost no chance of being accepted, and exemplifies them all 
respectively: the Domestic Violence Prevention Law is in category (a); the Basic Act for a Gender-
Equal Society would fit into category (b); the struggle of women that fight for the right of separate 
surnames for married couples would be in category (c) (Yanagimoto, 2003, p. 6). This is an 
interesting classification, and if the Act on Promotion of Women’s Participation and Advancement 
in the Workplace is analyzed through those lens, one could say that it fits category (b). This is because 
of the above-mentioned lack of specification and a variety of interpretations that exist within the law, 
as well as for its unsatisfying sanctions. Thus, although its text appears to attempt to be clear and 
concise in its meaning, in the end it lacks strength and the Eruboshi certification ends up being just 
another form of legal lip-service. This is proven by the fact that even certified companies find it hard 
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to continuously keep the standards that make for an equal workplace and end up being unable to 
retain and promote female employees. 
Another recent legal development that has shown only limited success is the Act on 
Promotion of Gender Equality in the Political Field (Government of Japan, 2018). Aiming to 
effectively and positively promote gender equality in the political field by making the numbers of 
male and female candidates for national and local elections as even as possible, from the beginning 
the enactment of the bill was had to face resistance from the leading party, the Liberal Democratic 
Party (LDP). In fact, it is said that it only passed because it is nonbinding, and thus there are no 
penalties at all even if the legal goals are not achieved, and because of a concurrent media uproar 
over the sexual harassment of a female reporter by an ex-Finance Ministry bureaucrat, and the 
downplaying of the criminal situation by Finance Minister Taro Aso (Osaki, 2018).  
This obstruction by the leading party also showed itself in the results of the bill, one year after 
its enactment. While opposition parties showed a lot of commitment to the cause, achieving near-
parity with 49.6%, the ruling coalition averaged only about 13%. This low number is backed up by 
the mentality of the members of the leading party. In a research conducted in spring 2019, 41% of 
the respondents from the LDP blamed the lack of women on them not considering politics an 
attractive career choice, while only 11% were able to do some self-reflecting and replied that the 
main reason was because the parties are not committed to recruiting and fostering female candidates. 
Of course, the excuses from the LDP do not hold up against reality, because the political parties are 
the ones that nominate candidates themselves, and because of the attested success of other parties in 
increasing the number of women in their ranks according to their targets (Miura, 2019). In addition 
to that, another survey conducted by the Cabinet Office with about 4000 local assemblywomen has 
corroborated this conclusion, as they replied that the factors that most contribute to the lack of 
political participation of women in Japan are difficult achieving work-life balance (78.6%), the lack 
of understanding from family (73.4%) and the deeply ingrained stereotype that politics is the domain 
of men (59.1%) (Osaki, 2018). In other words, what is stopping women’s empowerment is not their 
own decisions, but society’s mindset and structure which keeps favoring men. 
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In this part, I focused on showing how Japanese legal initiatives have failed to bring significant 
improvements to the situation of women. All these laws without any actual innovative objectives 
have spilled their lack of effectiveness to other institutions too, specially the judiciary. In the next 
part, I will briefly give some examples of how this situation has been causing real damage to the 
implementation of women’s right to work in Japan.      
6.3 The lack of attitude from Japanese courts towards women’s rights implementation 
 
 Since the advent of the EEOL and of other labor related protective laws, women that had 
their rights infringed have constantly turned to Japanese domestic courts for the resolution of such 
conflicts. These domestic decisions are even more important specially considering that Japan is not 
a signatory of the CEDAW Optional Protocol or of any other protocols that guarantee access to 
human rights-related international decision-making organs through individual complaints.  
  The problem is that until now, Japanese women have not been able to count on courts to 
homogeneously decide such disputes. In the field of women’s labor rights, for as many cases that 
have been decided in favor of working women, you can find others that, albeit similar in factual and 
legal content, have been decided instead in favor of the employer. For example, you can find positive 
decisions where a reassignment order causing inconvenience to family life was understood as an 
abuse of rights (Nestlé Japan (Reassignment Main Action) Case - Rodo Hanrei, 2006), or where 
discrimination in promotion was understood to be an effect of the personnel management system 
being divided in male and female courses (Sumitomo Metal Industries Case - Rodo Hanrei, 2005; or 
the Kanematsu Case - Rodo Hanrei, 2008). Even more difficult cases, for example the ones where 
the company has an objectively gender-equal personnel management system, have had instances of 
the court acknowledging discrimination (Showa Shell Sekiyu K.K. Case - Rodo Hanrei, 2009). 
However, decisions that go completely against these trends continue to be given by higher courts, 
making Japanese women unable to trust judicial precedents. 
In this part, I will introduce some recent and relevant cases that exemplify this lack of 
consideration of Japanese courts towards the implementation of the internationally-guaranteed 
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women’s right to work. I will focus on three major issues: the gender pay gap, direct and indirect 
discrimination brought by a gendered career track system and maternity harassment.  
6.3.1 The Chuugoku Denryoku Gender Pay Gap Case 
 
The first case is the Chuugoku Denryoku (or Chugoku Electric Power) Case (Rodo Horitsu 
Junpo, 2013). Concerning the facts, the plaintiff X claimed that she had been discriminated in 
promotions and upgrades of job ranks because of her being a woman. She asked for monetary 
compensation for such discriminatory treatment, payment of her attorney’s fees and to be promoted 
to job rank she was supposed to be in, in comparison to her male colleagues. However, even though 
she could prove male workers were clearly making more money than female workers, all her claims 
were rejected. The Supreme Court also rejected the appeal in 2015. 
The Hiroshima court gave some main reasons for such decision. First, it said that the 
defendant Y’s procedures for personnel evaluation was objective. They based that on the allegation 
by the defendant that the valued both each employee’s own performance and their ability and 
performance in promoting workplace unity and improving teamwork. Under these standards, they 
had found X’s performance to be unsatisfactory in terms of ability to improve cooperative 
relationships and leadership skills. Related to this point, the court raised its second argument, 
agreeing with Y that X’s abilities were indeed low. Lastly, the court argued that there is a “tendency 
for women to shy away from appointments to management posts, (and that) voluntary retirement is 
not uncommon among women”, taking into consideration also the protective, but discriminatory and 
excluding, provisions of the Women’s Protection Act, which was in effect until 1999.  
These arguments do not hold up when facing the facts, though. It was clear (and admitted by 
the court) that was considerable gender disparity in upgrades and promotions made by Y. If the court 
had looked at the collectivity of workers, they should not have been able to deny that the 
discriminatory undertones of the promotion standards of that company were a violation of public 
policy, regardless of the discretion allowed to companies when handling their employees. They 
completely ignored the existence of indirect discrimination in an apparently objective system. The 
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evaluation standards used by the company were also highly abstract, so the court should have pointed 
out whether that was fair towards the employees. The most legally upsetting, however, is the use of 
the Women’s Protection Act and its “protective” dispositions forbidding women to work overtime 
or during the night to justify the treating them prejudicially. This goes completely against the spirit 
of the law itself.26 
As it can be seen from this case, the lack of definition concerning discrimination, especially 
indirect discrimination is extremely harmful for women, and decisions like this one just serve to hide 
even more the discriminatory nature of the Japanese work environment. 
6.3.2 The Towa Industries Career Track Discrimination Case 
 
The second case is the Towa Industries Career Track Discrimination Case (Rodo Hanrei, 
2015). Concerning the facts, the plaintiff X was hired as a clerical worker by the defendant company 
Y in 1987, but from 1990 her responsibilities changed and she started working as an industrial 
designer, even getting the certifications for it. Then, in 2002 the defendant substituted the wage 
system separated by gender and introduced a dual track system, like many other Japanese companies 
did. However, all men got automatically included in the main career track (総合職), while the women 
were relegated to the clerical track (一般職). 
This is when the issue started. X was the only female in the design department, and she was 
also the only one to be designated to the clerical track, receiving a lower salary despite doing exactly 
the same job as her male coworkers and having way more qualifications. In fact, her wages were 
even lower than the ones of her unqualified male juniors. She then filed a lawsuit because her pleas 
to be reclassified as an employee in the main career track were completely refused by the company.  
Concerning the judgement, both the District Court of Kanazawa and the Kanazawa branch 
of the Nagoya High Court gave very similar decisions. In 2015, the former did order Y to pay X the 
difference in wages, other premiums and consolation money, acknowledging a violation of Article 4 
                                                 
26 This case introduction is based on the full judgement and on Aizawa (2017); and Kanno (2016). 
 
 151 
of the Labor Standards Act. However, even though discriminatory treatment was perceived by the 
court, it did not recognize a violation concerning difference in wages based on ability evaluations, 
which had been one of the plaintiff’s main complaints.  
Answering to X and Y’s appeals, in 2016 the Kanazawa branch decided that de facto gender 
discrimination had occurred thanks to the dual career track system not considering the employees 
tasks and responsibilities. The same discrimination was not acknowledged in Y’s system of 
evaluation of professional ability, and the court prioritized the company’s discretion when it came to 
pay raises and promotions based on personnel evaluations. Lastly, X appealed to the Supreme Court 
in 2017, but her case was dismissed. 
 This case is a clear-cut illustration of the struggles women went through before the advent 
of the EEOL. And even though nowadays the discrimination is usually more indirect, as in the 
Chuugoku Case, cases like this, where female employees are the target of typical and exposed 
inequality in the Japanese workplace, are still common. With the forbidding of discriminatory 
treatment against women in the workplace with the 1997 EEOL revision, Japanese companies found 
in the dual track career system an easy way to fake compliance. In the case of company Y, it took 
them until 2012 to introduce a new career system, and only in 2013, after X had already resigned, 
was the first woman hired for the main career track. 
Other than this blatant failure to give equal opportunities and treatment to women and men, 
another complication is that the career track system concept is very different than the concept of “job 
title”. Instead of considering employees’ individual responsibilities and capacities, the track system 
slaps a general tag in people working in both tracks: main career track workers have a broader range 
of duties and can be relocated, while clerical track workers have limited duties and cannot be 
relocated. The same is true for labor law, which also ignores the concept of job title and gives too 
much importance to the discretion of the employer, contributing to the continuation of unfair attitudes 
in the workplace and misguided judicial decisions like this, especially when it comes to the gap in 
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wages based on widely varied and sometimes even arbitrary kinds of ability evaluation.27 These 
court-endorsed practices give fuel to the employer’s mindset that there are no qualified women for 
higher positions, while in reality what is happening is that biased evaluations stop women that work 
well from receiving fair appraisals.  
6.3.3 Konami Digital Entertainment Maternity Harassment Case 
 
The third case is the Konami Digital Entertainment Maternity Harassment Case (Rodo 
Hanrei, 2011). Concerning the facts, the plaintiff X was removed from her original position after 
coming back from maternity and child care leave. Because of the demotion, she lost her previous 
role of overseas licensing, being limited to domestic licensing, and her role grade was also reduced, 
which caused her salary to also be lowered. Not only that, her days of leave were not counted for the 
calculations of her bonus payment, which meant she was paid much less that year than before getting 
pregnant. Because of that, X began the lawsuit. 
Then, in 2011, the Tokyo High Court decided that such demotion by the employer Y was 
illegal because it infringed X’s employment contract and was disadvantageous to the worker’s career, 
ordering the defendant to pay compensation based on her remuneration of the previous year. In other 
words, the court recognized the general illegality of connecting role grades and remuneration grades 
(some limited exceptions were accepted), and understood that a vast reduction in wages was unlawful. 
Despite this small victory, the court still did not stop companies from discretionarily changing 
women’s work duties, and it also refused, without a substantive reason, to respond to the plaintiff's 
claim regarding violation of the CEDAW.  
For a career woman who is also a new mother, getting her salary immensely cut and being 
unable to do the job she loves just because she had a child, something that regardless of personal 
fulfillment is incredibly beneficial to Japanese society, is a situation that only adds up to the stress 
and responsibility of motherhood. Also, knowing that there is a high possibility of being treated this 
                                                 
27 This case introduction is based on the full judgement and on Aizawa (2017); and Hamaguchi (2018). 
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way by their company and having to go to court to protect their rights (without even the guarantee 
of winning the case), influences a lot in the decision of working women to get pregnant in the first 
place. Additionally, because there are no provisions that can guarantee women – and men - will be 
reinstated to their pre-leave jobs, this can easily affect the decision of such employees to take leaves 
too. This flaw should be corrected in the future, be it by the law or the courts themselves.28 
Considering all these cases and the legal documents presented, it is undeniable that Japanese 
law continues to be lacking and suffering from the influence of parts of society that have no interest 
in truthfully committing to improving women’s rights. The same can be said for the work of Japanese 
courts, which has collaborated immensely for the lack of women’s rights implementation. If Japan 
wants to change that situation and reap the benefits of having women actively participating in the 
labor force, it will need to face the problem head on and stop relying on weak legislation and sporadic 
good judicial decisions only. It is necessary to create actual positive long-term actions, like the 
institution of rules concerning the minimum numbers of female workers in high level positions, such 
as managers and directors on company boards. But most importantly, there needs to be a change in 
the mentality of the whole country, brought to life through stronger and more defined initiatives to 
promote women’s involvement in the workplace and the establishment of a trend for companies and 
the government, both national and local, to naturally and actively strive for female advancement. 
I suggest that this change in mentality may be prompted by joint efforts of international and 
domestic groups of influence. As mentioned in the context of the Basic Act, Japan wants its society 
to be recognized internationally for gender equality. It recognizes that there is a logic of 
appropriateness, and as a result wants to be seen as if fulfilling the terms of the global script even if 
it runs counter to the logic of consequences, whereby Japan does not necessarily means to uphold 
these international standards. It can be said that the logic of appropriateness in masking the 
underlying logic of consequences existent here, which allows us to identify an example of a state 
acting conform Krasner’s organized hypocrisy theory. What must be done is to gradually change that 
                                                 
28 This case introduction is based on the full judgement and on Kanno (2016). 
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into a logic of appropriateness based on persuasion, so that the issue may be tackled in its core. For 
that to happen, the work of the Japanese civil society organizations cannot be overlooked. Specially 
NGOs are of essential importance in the fight for women’s rights implementation, as they can offer 
a localized perspective that makes their ideas easier to be accepted than something completely 
external as an international convention. Thus, in the next part, I will go deeper into how Japanese 
NGOs have been interacting with the international society, more specifically through the CEDAW. 
6.4 Japanese women’s rights NGOs and their relationship with the CEDAW: How civil society 
cooperates in bridging the gap between commitment and compliance 
 
Previously in this work, the report system constantly used by UN treaty committees and the 
documents that originate from these dialogues between the organizations and their member states 
has been introduced, with special focus on the CEDAW, on its Committee and on Japan. In this part, 
I resume this analysis, but now concentrating my efforts in entities that are not part of the government, 
but still represent Japan before the international society: The non-governmental organizations. 
This whole reporting process, from the production of the reports to them being sent to and 
analyzed by the Committee, needs to be complemented by the input of various NGOs and civil 
society groups that work for the implementation of the CEDAW. With that, the UN can have a better 
insight on how the people have been understanding and how are they being affected by the 
convention’s provisions, and a richer dialogue can be established both domestically and 
internationally. The Japan NGO Network for CEDAW (hereinafter, JNNC), “a coalition of some 40 
NGOs29 that aim to reflect the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against 
Women in Japanese policies” (Japan NGO Network for CEDAW, 2016, p.1), is the main player of 
this field, in the Japanese context. Other than having submitted the written information for the Pre-
                                                 
29 Full list of members in Japanese and English can be found at Japan NGO Network for CEDAW. (2015). List 





Sessional Working Group for the 63rd session, it also was responsible for the Japanese NGO Joint 
Report with regard to the consideration of the combined seventh and eighth periodic reports of Japan 
sent to the aforementioned session itself, in which it provides updated information and suggested 
recommendations from their member NGOs.  
Even just a quick overview of the document is enough to show that the organization is 
extremely more incisive than the Japanese government in the way that it approaches issues 
concerning the CEDAW. Just in its introduction, some of its clear worries can already be quoted, as 
it points out that “the stance of the current Abe administration has had the tendency to introduce 
policies that bring about new discrimination towards women since its start” and that it is concerned 
that the reason Japan has not as much progress in the last thirty years after the CEDAW’s ratification 
“is that the Japanese government makes light of the Convention and does not work on the realization 
of the idea seriously” (Japan NGO Network for CEDAW, 2016, p.1).  
In each section of the JNNC report, different member NGOs answer to different parts of the 
questions proposed in the “List of issues in relation to the seventh and eighth periodic reports of 
Japan”, encompassing all the areas that have been afflicted by implementation problems.30 Within 
these, special mention is given to the groups which strive for the implementation of labor rights, and 
thus it is worth citing that the Japanese Association of International Women’s Rights, the Action to 
Eliminate Gender Discriminatory Remarks by Public Officials, the New Japan Women’s Association 
and others were the organizations responsible for writing about stereotypes and harmful practices, 
while the Working Women’s Network, the Equality Action 21, the National Confederation of Trade 
Union Women's Bureau and others are the ones that dealt with the area of employment. Comparing 
the government official answers with the ones from the JNNC report is especially interesting, as it 
gives us two extremely different perspectives of the implementation of the same international 
instrument. The work of NGOs is even more relevant when considering this gap between the 
                                                 
30 The full list is included in annex 1 of the Japan NGO Network for CEDAW. (2016). NGO Joint Report 
(Japan) with regard to the consideration of the combined seventh and eighth periodic reports of Japan for the 
sixty-third session of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, pp. 88-91. 
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provided information and how, logically, the Japanese government would have more incentives to 
enhance its achievements and blur its issues in order to demonstrate compliance. In addition to that, 
more than 20 other different NGOs (refer to Annex 1 in the end of the chapter) also sent their own 
individual reports and participated in briefing meetings during the process, making for a very diverse 
compilation of data. 
Unfortunately, the differences between the official report and the JNNC one are too 
numerous to be all mentioned in this work. However, raising some of them as examples is interesting 
so as to create an illustration of how has the civil society’s understanding and acceptance of 
governmental actions been up until recently. First, concerning the equal participation of women in 
the political and public activities, the first point raised by the report is that, regardless of the existence 
of the Basic Plans, no voluntary action by political parties had actually been taken to achieve the 
target by accepting the request from the government. It also slams the government’s slogan of making 
the "promotion of active participation of women" one of its fore of policies, by simply pointing out 
that, by 2015, the number of female Cabinet ministers was of only three people. It goes on to finally 
raise the fact that sexist behaviors and customs remain within all levels of the government, with sexist 
remarks and sexual harassment being are widespread and usually easily covered up (Japan NGO 
Network for CEDAW, 2016, pp. 35-36).  
Second, concerning the position of women in academics and education in general, the report 
does a good job in clearly showing the low numbers of women in positions of power, such as school 
principals and university or college presidents. For example, the rate of female primary school 
principals is of just 18.5%, the one of female junior high school principals is only 5.6%.  The 
percentage rises as little for senior high school principals and for university or college presidents, 
being respectively of 6.5% and 8.7%, but that is still ridiculously low. Although the official 
governmental report touches on the issue, it is nowhere as incisive as that. 
Lastly, on the topic of employment, the JNNC report starts by claiming that the Japanese 
comprehensive policies to promote employment equality between women and men had always been 
insufficiently developed. Concerning the Act on Promotion of Women’s Participation and 
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Advancement in the Workplace, it criticizes the fact that very important issues, such as wage 
disparity and numbers and proportions of female and male employees promoted to upper job grades, 
are not included in its four obligatory items of consideration, but only in the twenty-one optional 
items from which companies and local governments are required to select as needed and establish 
action plans on. Thus, if companies choose to not bother with these problems, they are legally 
allowed to do so, as they can freely select which and how many optional items they want. 
Furthermore, a key point of the whole Act is that only companies with over 300 employees are 
required to follow its provisions, with the rest only needing to make efforts towards improving the 
situation. However, companies with 300 employees or less actually account for 90% of Japanese 
companies, and thus are exempted from the above-mentioned obligations, basically nullifying any 
effect the law might have. That considered, it is unlikely that the law will bring effective change to 
this situation of gender inequality (Japan NGO Network for CEDAW, 2016, p. 42).  
 The report also refutes any excuse the Japanese government might have for maintaining a 
dual track system of employment. Pointing out that only 5.6% of women was in the main career track 
and the overwhelming majority continued to be treated as general track workers, it clarifies the 
gendered unfairness of the system, since only workers in the main career track get opportunities for 
promotion to managerial positions (Japan NGO Network for CEDAW, 2016, p. 43). Since men keep 
dominating the main career track, which requires workers to do long hours and to deal with location 
transfers, and the Japanese culture has been long perpetuating the idea that this is a female 
responsibility, it is only obvious that men will not take time to care for their children or the housework. 
Thus, there is no surprise in the fact that the report points out that there has been no big increase in 
male child-care leave percentages, with only 2.03% in private and 2.77% in public sector male 
employees taking leave (numbers as of the 2016 report). Because of that, women are made to keep 
bearing excessive family responsibility, having often to quit their jobs or change to part-time 
positions, closing this vicious circle of inequality (Japan NGO Network for CEDAW, 2016, p. 48). 
Furthermore, the report also reinforces the point that has already been made in this work, concerning 
the attitude of Japanese courts towards international women’s rights treaties: That judicial rulings in 
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Japan have hardly been effective in guaranteeing compliance with international conventions, namely 
the CEDAW and the ILO Convention No. 100 (Japan NGO Network for CEDAW, 2016, p. 53).  
 From these examples, the importance of the role of NGOs in keeping the government in 
check and fighting for the compliance to internationally guaranteed rights is already noticed. 
Together with scholars and other parts of civil society, they are in the frontline of women’s rights 
protection, and they deserve due attention in the equation aiming to improve such rights’ 
implementation.  
In conclusion, taking in what can be understood from all the different reports and from 
analyzing enacted legislation and policies, it is undeniable that the government of Japan needs to 
improve the efficiency of its actions. And although all issues are without a doubt highly relevant to 
Japanese women, it can be said that, for its intersectionality with almost all other areas, its historical 
relevance in the process of guaranteeing women’s rights, and the difficulty of influencing private 
organizations, the problems related to the fundamental guarantee of the right to work and to female 
empowerment need to be the object of this study. Employment and career paths of men and women, 
female participation in academia, law and politics, the rise of women in part-time positions, the 
gender-pay gap, work-life balance and combining work and childcare for both genders are all 
interconnected aspects of this right, which spill over other areas like social security and poverty. 
Thus, the effective guarantee of the right to work is the basis for allowing women to attain social and 
economic empowerment and development in both the public and private spheres of society, which 
on its turn influences in the growth of the state itself. Even though there is the need to be careful to 
not reduce women’s rights and gender mainstreaming only as something necessary to the economic 
betterment of the country (a mistake that it might be said that the Japanese government continues to 
make), it is undeniable that this economic growth will be an appreciated consequence of the correct 
implementation of the rights present in the CEDAW, which increases the need for the topic to be 
tackled. Furthermore, this pressure over Japan for the realization of gender equality in the realm of 
work has been a focus not only of the UN. Internationally, the European Union (through direct action 
such as programs of its Delegation to Japan and the production of research like the EU-Japan 
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Comparative Report on Women’s Economic Empowerment, as well as indirectly through trade 
policies) and the International Labour Organization (by reinforcing the importance of Japan to ratify 
its Conventions related to women’s rights) have also been active players. On the other hand, 
domestically there are NGOs continuously putting pressure on the Japanese government, as their 
participation in the CEDAW reporting procedures proves, and also the will of the government itself 
to have Japan recognized internationally as a state that thrives in gender equality.   
If all these points concerning the implementation of the women’s right to work are analyzed 
thoroughly and correctly, it might be possible to propose ways of solving some issues, especially the 
ones related to the difficulty women face to achieve the same results as men when it comes to 
reaching positions of power and decision making and to earning the same wages for work of equal 
value, including there the discrimination they suffer on the grounds of pregnancy and motherhood, 
which are inherent characteristics of women that can become a reason for stereotyping and prejudice 
against them.      
The aim here is to overcome the present lack of true governmental effort to create a gender-
equal society, which has been hiding behind a rhetoric concerning gender equality and discrimination 
which masquerades as if based on a logic of appropriateness, but in fact is based on an economy-
driven logic of consequences. For that, the traditional social and cultural attitude towards women 
who take active roles in all levels of society needs to change, and gender equality needs to be 
perceived as a universal right, not as a response to economic or demographic pressures (Assmann, 
2014, p. 17). Together with creating better and more efficient legislation and policies, that surpass 
the level of recommendation and are actually enforceable, there is also the need to engage with the 
civil society in a grassroots movement mindset that works from the bottom to the top. Thus, in 
addition to the more traditional analysis of academic literature, this study draws extensively on 
information provided directly by NGOs active in the field of the right to work, such as the Working 
Women’s Network, and in the more general goal of ending stereotyping and harmful practices, such 
as the Japanese Association of International Women’s Rights. This information was obtained through 
the realization of semi-structured interviews with representative members of these civil society 
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organizations. Another angle of analysis that was undertaken was conversing with female Japanese 
scholars in the field of the right to work and feminism, such as Mutsuko Asakura. I hope to be able 
to shine a light on the bleak situation of Japanese working women, giving the necessary regard to 
their actual experiences and ideas and distancing ourselves from the prevailing Japanese concept of 
gender equality that prioritizes the pre-existing male focused structure of society and labor. 
Annex 1 - List of Shadow Reports sent to the 63rd Session and to the Pre-Sessional Working 
Group (PSWG) by Civil Society Organizations 
Association to Achieve True Equality between Men and Women (submission for the session) 
Coalition of Three Parties for Communicating Historical Truth (submission for the session) 
Gay Japan News and ILGA (submission for PSWG) 
Happiness Realization Research Institute (submission for the session) 
Japan Family Value Society (submission for the session) 
Japan Federation of Bar Associations (submission for PSWG) 
Japan Federation of Women's Organizations (submission for the session) 
Japan National Group of Mentally Disabled People (JNGMDP) and CPAO (Child Poverty Action 
Osaka) (submission for the session) 
JNDMDP and CPAO joint submission (for PSWG) 
JNNC joint submission (for PSWG) 
Join NGO submission (for the session) 
Kaleidoscope HumanRights Foundation and DLA Piper (submission for the PSWG) 
Minority Women, Indigenous Ainu, Buraku and Zainichi Korean (joint submission for the session) 
Nadeshiko Action (submission for the session) 
Nadeshiko Action, Japanese Women for Justice and Peace (JWJP) (submission for PSWG) 
New Japan Women’s Association (submission for the session) 
NGO GAHT-US Corporation (submission for the session) 
Ninohashi Club (submission for the session) 
OutRight Action International (submission for the session) 
Researchers of History on Modern Japan (submission for the session) 
Solidarity Network with Migrants Japan (submission for the session) 
Space Allies (submission for PSWG) 
The Korean Council (submission for the session) 
Women's Active Museum on War and Peace (submission for the session) 




Chapter 7. Analyzing the Interview Results: A Look at the Women’s Right to Work 
through the Eyes of Japanese Women 
 
 After looking at the theoretical particularities of the “spiral model”, there came the need to 
apply its framework to the reality of Japanese society. To do that, after careful consideration I decided 
to conduct face-to-face semi-structured interviews with a variety of people who are intrinsically 
connected with the issue of gender inequality in the Japanese workplace, specifically domestic NGO 
representatives, established scholars, young students, female workers and government officials. The 
main reason for approaching the topic through such a method is because I could benefit from the 
located expertise of Japanese women, living this commitment/compliance gap in their daily lives 
could give me a clear picture of how Japan has been dealing with (or rather, not dealing with) its 
discrimination issues. Thus, it is clearly of significant benefit to reach out to them and get their input 
in the usefulness of the “spiral model” framework to help understand the Japanese case study. 
 This chapter is structured as follows. In part one, I will explain the details related to the 
selection of subjects and the creation of a question list. Moving on to part two, I will analyze the 
answers obtained from the interviews according to a norm diffusion point of view. Lastly, in part 
three I will present the conclusions that can be reached from such analysis, focusing on its relation 
to the “spiral model” of norm diffusion and other complementary theoretical approaches. Particularly 
concerning the structure of the interview analysis in part two, I will focus on five main points, each 
based on the questions that were asked to every interviewee. The following table fully illustrates this 
structure, showing the division of part two into the aforementioned main points, how these points are 
divided into subtitles for clarification, and which questions form the base for each subtitle.  
Table 3. Structure of the interview analysis 
1. Who are the interview subjects and what is their relation to the feminist movement and 
feminist theoretical approaches? (Discussed in section 7.2.1 below) 
7.2.1.1 The interviewees’ background information 
The answers are a response to interview questions including: 
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 Please introduce yourself/your organization and your main activities. What was the main 
reason for establishing an organization/focusing on this topic? 
7.2.1.2 Interviewee relationships with feminism and the Japanese feminist movement 
Question included: 
 The Japanese government has been trying to deal with a deeply gender unequal society 
since the 1980s. Were you/your organization active in that period? What are your 
conclusions considering the actions taken by the government in that period, and its 
reaction to feminist movements? What about society’s reaction to the situation? 
2. Level of interaction of interview subjects with other organizations or individual actors, 
both domestic and international (Discussed in section 7.2.2 below) 
The answers are a response to interview questions including: 
 In this thesis, I aim to use the “spiral model” (an influential theory of norm diffusion 
which attempt to explain how the diffusion of human rights norms works and who has the 
normative power to perform such diffusion) to try to understand the socializing effects of 
international society, specially focusing in the interactions of international and domestic 
institutions. Specifically, I will analyze the Japanese case concerning the women’s right 
to work through these lenses.  
So, based on that, I want to ask what are the organizations or individuals that inspire 
you/your NGO? Are any of them from outside of Japan? Do you also get domestic 
incentives? 
 Do any other actors, especially non-Japanese actors, give funding, ideas or help of any 
kind to you/your organization? To what extent do they act like this? 
 How would you relate this Japanese situation to the phases of the “spiral model” and to 
Japan’s intentions of continuing to be part of the developed international society (in other 
words, to its level of social vulnerability)? Do you agree that this shows a lack of 
persuasion, or even of socialization of the Japanese government and society?   
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 Looking at the interaction process between the national and the international in the context 
of creating change in the women’s rights protection, do you think any point of this process 
can be identified in the case of Japan, specially in the protection of women’s right to 
work? (linear process of the spiral model – Figure X – used as reference)* 
 Do you think your organization has been relevant in any phase of this process? If yes, how 
so?* 
3. What are the interviewee opinions concerning the spiral model framework? Do they 
consider the spiral model to be a helpful framework through which to understand Japan’s 
issues? (Discussed in section 7.2.3 below) 
7.2.3.1 Japan’s attitude towards women’s rights situated in the spiral model phases 
The answers are a response to interview questions including: 
 The spiral model is divided into five phases of human rights implementation: repression 
(phase 1); denial (phase 2); tactical concessions (phase 3); prescriptive status (phase 4); 
rule-consistent behavior (phase 5). Phase 1 consists of active attempts by authoritarian 
regimes to stop any opposition groups of bringing human rights norms to the light. Phase 
2 begins if transnational groups manage to start the advocacy process with the information 
they have on the domestic rights violations. They help domestic groups that still might 
not be able to fight for themselves, through international lobbying and pressure that are 
strong enough to evoke denying claims from the abusing government. Here there is a 
discursive engagement and international socialization. In phase 3, the violating state starts 
using concessions to get the international human rights community to stop pressuring it. 
This instrumental logic empowers domestic advocacy groups and makes them increase in 
mobilization, and this could lead the state to react in a complying way or in a repressive 
way. Phase 4 happens when the state discourse shifts and it starts granting human rights 
norms prescriptive status through a defined set of state actions and practices, such as laws 
and policies. Lastly, in phase 5 the state shows clear behavioral change and sustained 
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compliance with international human rights. It means that at both domestic and 
international levels, there is now actual implementation of prescribed norms. 
Based on this explanation, could you identify in which phase of the model would Japan 
belong, in the context of the gender equality in labor? Why? 
7.2.3.2 The Japanese society’s relationship with the processes of socialization and persuasion 
The answers are a response to interview questions including: 
 Within the spiral model, there are five scope conditions under which one would expect 
socialization mechanisms to encourage compliance with human rights by both state and 
non-state actors. Thus, there is a need to identify where the state under study fits in the 
following categories: democracy or autocracy; consolidated or limited statehood; 
centralized or decentralized rule implementation; high or low material vulnerability; high 
or low social vulnerability.  
Considering where a state is categorized in these conditions, some socialization 
mechanisms might be more effective than others. In general, the spiral model identifies 
the following mechanisms: Coercion, by force and legal enforcement; Conditionality, 
which is manifested in the form of sanctions (negative incentives) and rewards (positive 
incentives), that change the cost-benefit calculations of actors; Persuasion and discourse; 
Capacity building, meaning the education, training and the building up of administrative 
capacities necessary.  
In a follow up work, other mechanisms are also brought up: Socialization, meaning that 
actors start acting in order to meet specific social expectations; Competition, which 
involves change by actors competing over meeting a certain performance criteria; Lesson-
drawing, when actors facing a political or economic problem look to other actors for 
effective policies and rules; Mimicry, which happens when actors emulate others for 
normative reasons. 
The next questions will have these scope conditions and mechanisms of diffusion, applied 
to the Japanese situation, as their background. 
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 Do you think that Japan has been through socialization (just acting to meet international 
social expectations), but not yet persuasion (actually internalizing international norms that 
say that gender equality must be guaranteed)? For example, do you think that there are 
enough efforts being made to allow men to understand and put into practice that they too 
need to balance work, child rearing and home making obligations with women? How 
important do you think this point is to implementing gender equality in Japan? 
 Japan is said to be a high context culture, where verbal communication is often given less 
importance when compared to implicit social exchanges. Do you think this high context 
characteristic might have some influence in the perpetuation of women’s rights violations 
within Japan?* 
7.2.3.3 The importance given by Japan to its position in international society and its approach to 
international law 
The answers are a response to interview questions including: 
 Do you think such policies (for gender equality) are unique to Japan, or that they were 
based in experiences of other countries? In other words, has Japan used mimicry or lesson-
drawing to create any of its laws and policies on gender equality? If yes, how successful 
were they? 
4. How has the commitment/compliance gap been addressed by the Japanese government? 
What are the issues that have been persisting because of this gap? (Discussed in section 7.2.4 
below) 
7.2.4.1 Opinions concerning the Abe government’s policies aiming for gender equality 
The answers are a response to interview questions including: 
 Most recently, the Abe Cabinet has pushed gender equality as one of its most important 
pillars for development, going as far as to talk about “womenomics”. What do you think 
about the effectiveness of these current Japanese national policies and norms? Would you 
suggest any changes to them? 
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 Do you believe there is an active attempt at hindering female empowerment in Japan, 
specifically by the men currently in power? If so, why do you think that happens?* 
7.2.4.2 The lack of strength of Japanese labor law in the context of the women’s right to work 
The answers are a response to interview questions including: 
 Still concerning the gender equality policies created by the Japanese government, the 
situation of their implementation has been highly decentralized. This is because of the 
nature of gender equality rights related to labor and the fact that full compliance to them 
depends mainly on different companies, which have not satisfactorily abided to them. 
What do you think are the reasons for this problem? How could this be changed? 
7.2.4.3 Japan’s continuous low position in the WEF Gender Gap Index 
The answers are a response to interview questions including: 
 It is a fact that Japan is constantly in the lower tiers of gender equality indexes. Do you 
think these results have been publicized and considered enough, especially when it comes 
to the general population? Would you link this to a lack of internalization concerning the 
importance of guaranteeing gender equality in the Japanese society? 
7.2.4.4 The insincere Japanese approach to international treaties dealing with women’s rights 
The answers are a response to interview questions including: 
 Japan has tried to take a proactive approach internationally too, by becoming a signatory 
of treaties that deal directly with gender discrimination, such as the CEDAW and the ILO 
Conventions. However, it has made reservations or refused to sign important treaty terms 
such as the Optional Protocol to the CEDAW. What do you believe are the reasons and 
the consequences of this refusal? 
 Do you believe Japan has been sufficiently implementing international treaties, such as 
the aforementioned ones? If not, what do you think are the hurdles that have been creating 
this gap in the implementation of international norms? 
7.2.4.5 The passive role of Japanese courts in women’s rights’ implementation 
The answers are a response to interview questions including:  
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 Concerning the Japanese judiciary, what are your thoughts concerning the approach 
usually taken by judges in cases that deal with gender inequality, especially in cases that 
deal with labor rights and indirect discrimination? Do you believe Japanese courts should 
make more use of internationally sanctioned norms, or they should keep relying only on 
original domestic law and on international norms transposed into national law? 
7.2.4.6 Observing other topics of relevance within the interviewees’ answers  
5. What are the perspectives of interview subjects on the future, both concerning their 
organizational activities and the evolution of Japanese society? Do the interviewees have any 
suggestions to improve the present situation? (Discussed in section 7.2.5 below) 
The answers are a response to interview questions including: 
 Lastly, what are the biggest difficulties you/your organization has been facing in your 
activities? Do you think the introduction of some of the aforementioned mechanisms of 
diffusion might ease these issues? 
 Do you have any data or knowledge about how many Japanese women actually think their 
present situation in society is unfair?* 
*These are questions which were asked during follow-up interviews 
 
Also, in addition to including my own analysis when explaining the subjects’ answers, I will 
include as background information some commentary related to the atmosphere of the interviews or 
some extra topics that were discussed during these conversations, so as to clarify as much as possible 
every relevant point that was brought up. Such interjections will be identified separately to avoid any 
confusion related to who is responsible for each point. 
7.1 The decision-making process concerning the interviews: What, whom and how to ask 
 
 The first step after deciding to conduct interviews was to make a question list, which would 
serve as a regulating guideline for the conversations. The first draft was finalized by the end of 2018, 
including 15 questions that touched upon the interview subjects’ backgrounds, their opinions on how 
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the spiral model could explain Japanese case, their views on the current situation of Japan, their 
approval of domestic policies for gender equality, their prospects for the future, amongst other related 
topics. After going through several rounds of revision and refinement, the official question list 
including 16 questions was finalized (refer to Table 3 for the questions included in the list). 
 Then, I proceeded to deciding who would be the interview targets. The most important 
attribute of the interviewees was that they should be Japanese actors familiar with the situation of 
this lack of women’s rights implementation, be it because of their academic background, their field 
of work or real life experience. This condition prompted a translation of the question list to Japanese 
in order to facilitate communication. In other words, nationality (or at least the geographical field of 
activity) and the women’s right to work being the focus of the subjects’ work or interest were the 
deciding factors, particularly to enhance the data collected from the interviews. Other than these 
conditions, the initial search for subjects did not have any limitations concerning age, gender, 
experience or social position, which allowed us to have a wide but well-defined range of contacts.  
 As a result of this methodology, in total 12 individuals from 8 different organizations were 
interviewed (refer to Table 4). However, as it can be seen from the lack of their information in the 
table, one of the interviewees who was related to a governmental office did not want to be identified 
and asked for their answers to not be included in the text of this thesis. Thus, I will use the insight 
provided to me through that interview just as a base for my own conclusions. Other than that, all 
other interviewees consented to the use of their name and answers, which can be proven by collected 
interview consent forms easily accessible upon request. Concerning how the interviews were carried 
out, I favored a face-to-face direct approach, where I could shift the interview questions according 
to the course of the conversation. With the exception of the Union Bochi Bochi, which I interviewed 
through a teleconference, I met with all the other interviewees in places of their choice and I talked 
for around 40 minutes to one hour. 
 After finishing the first round of interviews and reviewing their answers, I decided that since 
the interviewees had provided us with highly insightful answers, it would be helpful for the 
understanding of the topic to go back for follow up interviews. Although all participants had greatly 
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contributed to this research, interviewees 1, 2, 3, 4 and 11, because of their academic backgrounds 
and real-life experiences, were incredibly helpful and showed a great grasp of the “spiral model”, 
norm diffusion and of the Japanese present and historical situation concerning the implementation of 
the women’s right to work. This allowed us to ask them more focused questions related to such topics. 
The follow-up question list included questions related to the participation of the interviewees 
organizations in the process of norm diffusion and concerning other possible propositions for why 
the commitment/compliance gap exists. The list of additional questions, divided according to the 
topic they are related to, can be seen in Table 3. 
 Here, there is the need to bring up the positionalities of these interviewees and how they 
might have reacted to my questions, taking into consideration my position as a Brazilian researcher 
studying the Japanese work environment through the eyes of Japanese women. Even though I tried 
to take a step back and let the interviewees speak freely, even sometimes going off-topic, there is 
always the possibility that they might have given me answers, based on their positionalities, that are 
different from what they would have given a Japanese researcher. I cannot guarantee that they were 
more or less open with me, but it is a fact that they were very welcoming of my presence and of the 
questions (our interviews often run over time and veered into other topics), that they agreed with the 
idea that there is a universal paradigm on the production of women’s rights, and that they even invited 
me to join many of their events and lobbying activities, where I was usually the only westerner, if 
not the only foreigner. This points to the high possibility that the interviewees trusted me and 
communicated openly with me regardless of my nationality or cultural background, which likely 
contributed to the candor of their answers. Furthermore, by creating interview questions that 
operationalize a theory of universal human rights and of norm diffusion in as value-neutral way as 
possible, I attempted to anticipate and screen out the possibility of the interviewees’ positionality and 
my own positionality affecting the answers beyond acceptable bias.   
 With these formalities clarified, I can move on to relaying and analyzing the contents of the 
interviews, looking into specially on how they can help us have a better insight on the Japanese 




Table 4. Details Concerning the Interviewees 
NGO Name of the Interviewee Interview Reference 
Gender= (NPO法人ジェンダーイ
コール) 
Kurumi Shinohara Interviewee 1 
Mutsuko Asakura（浅倉むつ子） Mutsuko Asakura Interviewee 2 
JNNC (日本女性差別撤廃条約
NGOネットワーク- Japan NGO 
Network for CEDAW)/ 
Equality Action 21 (均等待遇アク
ション 21) 




ズ・ネットワーク – Working 
Women’s Network) 
Shizuko Koedo Interviewee 4 
Kinuko Ishida Interviewee 5 
Union Bochi Bochi (関西非正規等
労働組合ユニオンぼちぼち) 
Hinaka Ozaki Interviewee 6 
Students from the Shinagawa Joshi 
Gakuin (品川女子学院) 
Anna Katou Interviewee 7 
Hanano Fukuhara Interviewee 8 
Kanako Nakashima Interviewee 9 
Hanae Iriyama Interviewee 10 
Zenroren (全国労働組合総連合) Yuri Nagao Interviewee 11 
 




 As already mentioned, this chapter and the analysis of the interviews will be divided into 
five parts, following a logical structure that will be essential to clarifying and organizing the voices 
of so many subjects. I will start with introducing their backgrounds, to illustrate what is the basis of 
their activities, and then I will move on to focusing on how the “spiral model” framework can be 
identified and applied to their situations. Finally, I present their perspectives on the future and 
suggestions that could possibly be effective in improving the current situation.  
 
7.2.1 Who are the interview subjects and what is their relation to the feminist movement and 
feminist theoretical approaches? 
 
 In this part, I will introduce the interviewees, presenting their and their organization’s 
backgrounds and their view towards feminism, with a focus on the Japanese feminist women’s 
liberation movement of the late 60s and 70s.  
7.2.1.1 The interviewees’ background information 
 
 My first interview was with Gender = (pronounced as “gender equal”), a group that was 
created in 2016 and became an NPO in 2017. The creators are mothers that got to know each other 
because their children were in the same class in preschool, the majority of them women working full 
time. Looking at their own situations, they started questioning the fact that only they were responsible 
for taking care of the children daily. Even more, they started questioning why this was seen as such 
a natural situation by society. 
The interviewee Shinohara (Interviewee 1) felt special aware of this issue, as she had the 
opportunity to go to graduate school and of studying abroad in the USA, thus experiencing other 
approaches to gender there. As someone who had always studied in the same level as men in the field 
of science and joined a company in the main career track (総合職), she was incredibly aware of her 
change of status as soon as she had a child. Even her relationship with her husband, which had been 
somewhat equal before, changed shockingly and the role of mother and housemaker was suddenly 
enforced on her. 
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Interviewee 1 pointed out that her company treated her differently after she became a mother 
by lowering her importance as an employee and acting like they were doing a favor to her by allowing 
her to stay in the company. She and the other organization members did not want other women (she 
specifically worried about the future of her three daughters) to feel alone and to go through the same 
hardships, which became the reason for the group’s creation.  
 My next interview was with Professor Asakura (Interviewee 2). When asked about why she 
decided to specialize in labor law, she answered that when she was a university student in 1967, the 
discrimination against women was a given at the Japanese companies, and no one went against it. As 
a person studying law, she wanted to change that situation. And even before entering university, in 
high school, she was inspired by a book by Goto Shoujiro on judicial cases with false charges and 
realized how important human rights were for society. The Sumitomo Cement case (Hanrei Times, 
1967) and its good outcome were also a major influence for her. (Interviewee 2)  
 My third interviewee was Yunoki (Interviewee 3), who is both the representative of Equality 
Action 21, an NGO started in 2000 to help female workers guarantee their rights before their 
employers and to end indirect discrimination, and the joint representative of the JNNC. She answered 
my questions focusing on her work for the Equality Action 21, as this is her main organization. 
The group started by offering a series of lectures aiming to let people know about gender 
discrimination issues, and then the project evolved to an official organization. Their first name was 
Equality Action 2003, because they believed they would have made enough progress by then, but 
when that clearly did not happen they decided to change it to 21, to represent the 21st century. They 
are planning on continuing their activities for more 2 years and then reviewing their results. They 
have also made many pamphlets and newsletters through the years, including information about their 
activities and about issues related to CEDAW and the ILO conventions, both those Japan has signed 
and those it has not, which she kindly provided me. (Interviewee 3) 
Particularly about her interest in these topics, Interviewee 3 mentions that the Showa Shell 
cases (Rodo Hanrei, 2003, 2009), were the trigger for her activities, both because of her own 
discriminatory experiences at the company and because she had been deeply involved in the court 
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procedures as a union leader. Concerning the former, she used to work for Shell, which was an 
international company and thus had very good work conditions, with the industrial union holding 
consistent activities, such as holding a strike in 1972 aiming for better payment. To break those 
activities, the company tried to split the union and create a different organization to weaken the 
complaining workers. In that belligerent context, the merger between Shell and Showa happened, 
and Showa, as a national company which was listed in the stock exchange, was made the continuing 
main company. The president of Showa declared the company would use a Japanese business model, 
which according to her meant that women were treated as “cheap tools” with no importance in the 
office. For example, there were tea cupboards and dish cloth holders in all offices of the Showa 
company before the merger, and women had to make and serve tea four times a day (first thing in 
the morning, at 10am, at noon, and at 3pm). This was inexistent in Shell, where the tea services were 
outsourced. The work women did at Showa was also only assistance work, which shocked female 
workers from Shell. Even more shocking was the fact that these women from Showa were not getting 
pay raises or promotions. To make matters worse, the pay was higher in Shell, but with the merger 
only the men from Showa got a pay raise to match this amount, while the women did not receive the 
same benefit. The Shell female workers also were excluded from getting incentives for qualifications, 
which became a reason used to not raise their salaries, contributing to the growth of this gender pay 
gap and leading 12 workers, including her, to sue. (Interviewee 3) 
Concerning the her experience as an union leader, a member of another union, Nozaki, had 
her compulsory retirement in 1992, and complained to her union about all the aforementioned 
discriminatory issues. Interviewee 3 and other experienced members were called to help, and 
complained to the authorities, with no success. Seeing the company just denying the discriminatory 
acts without any proof or documents, Nozaki decided to sue in 1994, which turned into the famous 
Showa Shell case. She won her case in the first instance in 2003, with the court deciding that the 
company had a written policy for the career of males and another completely discriminatory policy 
for women. Even with the company’s appeal, the final decision was still a win, especially because 
the court branded the company as a company that discriminated against women. (Interviewee 3) 
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However, even with some significant wins, Interviewee 3 realized that the Japanese courts were 
unreliable, and thus decided that the better approach was for Japanese women to be able to use the 
individual complaint system in the CEDAW. She is now fighting for its ratification. 
 After that, I interviewed Koedo (Interviewee 4) and Ishida (Interviewee 5), from the WWN 
(Working Women’s Network). Interviewee 4 is the main representative of the WWN, which was 
created back in 1995 by around 50 women and had as it background the Beijing World Conference 
on Women and the Sumitomo Cement case. They held a very successful workshop in Beijing 
concerning the lawsuit, where they could feel the support of other women from many different places 
towards their case. They did not want their work to end with their participation on the Sumitomo 
Case decision, so they decided to continue fighting and helping working women guarantee their 
rights by merging with three other already existing groups and creating the WWN. (Interviewee 4) 
Interviewee 5 got involved in this fight for women’s rights because she was a plaintiff in the 
Sumitomo Case (a lawsuit that aimed to end gender discrimination in the workplace) as a worker 
from Sumitomo Kagaku, which was one of the companies involved in the case. The first case to be 
judged was from Sumitomo Denkou in 2000, and the result was a non-favorable decision that said 
that even though there was disparity between men and women, that did not go against labor laws at 
the time. The same result was given in the case of Sumitomo Kagaku, in which the she and the WWN 
were more involved. They appealed in both cases to the Supreme Court, which ended with the same 
result: a settlement was reached, allowing the plaintiffs to be moved to managerial positions and 
advising the Japanese government to revise its position on the matter. Although this kind of 
settlement can be counted as a win, it makes it difficult to build precedents, and thus she and the 
other plaintiffs wanted to actively keep being involved in the cause and use that result to help other 
people. (Interviewee 5)  
Next, I interviewed Ozaki (Interviewee 6), from Union Bochi Bochi. Concerning her interest 
in the topic of gender equality, she explained that she is a transgender woman, and that around the 
year 2010 she was unfairly dismissed by her employer for that reason. The organization that helped 
her at that time was Union Bochi Bochi, and her wanting to pay it forward to other women was the 
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beginning of her relationship with the Union. Also, in her specific case, she used to be a sex worker. 
According to her, in Japan sex workers and “night workers” (women working in cabarets and hostess 
clubs) tend to have very weak or non-existent labor unions. Interviewee 6 wants to try improving this 
situation, and the Union has helped her do so, for example by organizing a workshop around 2014 to 
teach how sex workers could make better use of labor unions. Although there have not been many 
societal changes in this matter, they want to keep tackling these issues. 
About the Union itself, it started in 2005, after the original members were dismissed from 
their jobs in a convenience store and decided to create their own union to fight against this unfair 
treatment. They grew their numbers first by inviting friends to join, so it can be said that this is a 
very private and grassroots union, where individual people support and help other individuals solve 
their problems. (Interviewee 6) 
After interviewing so many older women, I had the chance to talk to Katou (Interviewee 7), 
Fukuhara (Interviewee 8), Nakashima (Interviewee 9) and Iriyama (Interviewee 10), four teenage 
high school students from the Shinagawa Joshi Gakuin. Their activities were introduced to us by 
Interviewee 1, who had helped them with research before. These four interviewees explained that 
their interest on the topic started because of a project included in the subject of home economics, 
called CBL (challenge based learning). Basically, each class had to choose a topic and research about 
it, offering solutions for the issues found. Interviewee 7 and Interviewee 8 explained that at first they 
researched about discrimination in society in general, but then decided, since they were women, to 
focus a more deeply on the issue of discrimination against women. They also wanted to be prepared 
for the kind of discrimination they might face in the future, and to understand the things their mothers 
still go through. Concerning the different kinds of discrimination against women present in society, 
their focus is in helping change the position of women in the workplace and the gender-pay gap, 
mainly because they think it’s unfair to study the same as men and still receive less pay. Also, even 
though their activities were originally just schoolwork, they wanted to expand it and thus they became 
a union-like extracurricular group. (Interviewee 7) 
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 Lastly, I went to the Zenroren (全労連 or National Confederation of Trade Unions) office to 
interview Nagao (Interviewee 11), who is a vice-chairman of the organization. Concerning the 
organization’s history, it welcomed its 30th anniversary in November 2019. Plus, the division 
Interviewee 11 is responsible for, the women’s bureau (女性部 in Japanese), will turn 30 in April 
2020. However, the organization has been active since before the Second World War, only under 
another name. Back in 1989 the 総評, or General Council of Trade Unions of Japan, was separated 
into the Rengo (連合 or Japanese Trade Union Confederation) and the Zenroren, for political reasons 
and also because of specific labor policies of the time. (Interviewee 11) 
Interviewee 11 got involved in the organization around the year 1979. After graduating 
university, she worked as a teacher in Osaka, but soon after that she got married and had children, 
which made her need to use the services offered by the Zenroren in order to be able to work and raise 
her family at the same time. She said that she was only able to do so because of their help and the 
women’s rights they had fought for, and thus she wanted to give back to the organization by working 
there. For example, at first only three kinds of professions were allowed the benefit of childcare 
leave: teachers, nurses and nursery school teachers. One of her first jobs as a member of the Zenroren 
was to fight for the expansion of this right to include the women working in private companies and 
men, through the creation of a law regulating childcare leave. Thanks to their efforts, taking such a 
leave has become a legally guaranteed right for both genders, even though sadly the number of men 
making use of it is still very low. (Interviewee 11) 
 These very different women, who all share the same will of improving the lives of other 
women and ending gender discrimination, form the group of interviewees who will give this thesis 
the necessary insight into the plight of working women in Japanese society. 
7.2.1.2 The interviewee relationships with feminism and the Japanese feminist movement 
 
In this part, I will present the relationship between the interviewees, their organizations and 
feminism in Japan. This analysis is important to measure the connection – or lack of connection - 
between labor-related movements and feminist approaches, and if they influenced each other in any 
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way. Also, it gives us an indication on how much feminism is present and relevant in contemporary 
Japanese society, and if it could affect the difficulty of norm diffusion and implementation in the 
domestic stage.   
In Interviewee 1’s experience, the change in attitude of her company and husband after her 
pregnancy made her painfully aware of discrimination, changing even her views towards feminism. 
Before, she used to think that feminists were complaining just because they didn't have the ability to 
compete with men, but then, when no one around her listened to her complaints concerning a clearly 
unfair situation, she finally could empathize with them. Still, she was doubtful of the relevance of 
her situation for a long time, only understanding how valid her concerns were after self-teaching 
herself through books, which took around three years.  
Also, when asked about feminism in Japan, particularly the women’s liberation movement, 
Interviewee 1 said she didn't identify herself with the movement. She pointed out that it is difficult 
for Japanese people to raise their voices and fight for their rights, as shown by the lack of social 
impact the “#metoo” movement had in Japan. For her, this is because in Japan the people and the 
culture are more uniform than when compared to Western nations. Additionally, according to the 
activities of her NPO, she affirmed that cultural aspect of uniformity remains even in the younger 
generation. However, she does think that the situation got a little better because of the possibility of 
women using the internet and social networks to raise their voices and spread information.  
For Interviewee 2, when it came to understanding the feminist movements in Japan around 
the 70s, she admits she didn't understand or connect deeply with them at the time. She believes 
sociologists like Chizuko Ueno and other writers and psychologists were the force behind this 
movement, as they took the first step in questioning society. On the other hand, law scholars were 
the last to understand it. According to her, in Japan the law is seen as a power tool used by the state 
to control citizens, and thus the new ideas of feminism were not even brought up in her university 
classes. Although she knew about it and agreed with some points of the movement, she still thought 
it didn't apply to her studies. Plus, the Japanese government was very vocal about being against it, 
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and consistently discredited the movement’s members with conservative claims about family and 
society, which also affected the perception of the public towards feminism. (Interviewee 2) 
Interviewee 2 linked this point with the creation of the Equal Employment Opportunity Law 
(EEOL) in 1985, which was just a way of the Japanese government to stop the international pressure 
brought over itself by the signature of the CEDAW (Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women), not taking the law seriously at all and continuing to support the 
unwillingness of companies to actually hire and treat women fairly. Regardless of the flaws in this 
law, the actions of those women fighting for their rights cannot be overlooked, and they definitely 
contributed a lot for this kick-off pressure towards the government (Interviewee 2). Interviewee 3 
shares a similar position. She knew of the works of Chizuko Ueno, but she did not understand them 
at all. Even if she was involved in cases of gender discrimination and saw some of the protests, she 
did not see herself as a part of the movement. Other members of the Equality Action 21 dealing with 
other gender inequality issues also had the same feeling of not being an active part of the feminist 
movement. 
Interviewees 4 and 5 from the WWN also thought the same. Interviewee 4 said that there 
was a general feeling that it was a movement to make women superior to men and they did not follow 
it very closely, since what the feminist movement was doing felt extremely distant from what 
working women were fighting for. She mentioned that working women in general did not question 
their position in the workplace until the EEOL came and gave origin to the double track system, 
which prompted them to study the issue, finally deciding that lawsuits were the most effective 
solution. In other words, their movement started from their reality. Interviewee 5 said that at the time 
she thought the feminist movement was not a movement coming from the workplace, from and for 
the workers, in addition to not being as strong in Osaka, where the WWN is based. 
According to Interviewee 6, because the Union was created more recently, they do not have 
a strong connection to the original feminist movement in Japan, but they do consider feminist 
approaches when gender issues come up in individual cases of women being treated unfairly in their 
jobs. They actually need to understand feminist points of view to a somewhat deep extent, since even 
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though they do not advertise their union directly to women, the majority of women work in irregular 
employment and thus end up asking often for the Union’s help. In fact, more than half of the union’s 
cases involve women (Interviewee 6). On the other hand, Interviewee 6 herself identifies as a feminist. 
Even though she has not studied it officially and treats it more as a hobby, she has used feminist 
teachings and logic in her approach to real life issues. However, she sees her feminism as something 
completely different than the Japanese past take on feminism, as she identifies more with the 
teachings of Judith Butler and other authors that deal with gender identity, and less with the ideas of 
the women’s liberation movement in Japan. In fact, she tends to read more international works than 
Japanese ones. 
In the same sense, Interviewee 11 replied that her and the Zenroren were not very connected 
to the women’s liberation. Of course, the organization also aimed to raise women’s social status, but 
their activities towards such goals were not directly related, as the feminist movement was more 
connected to sociology and sociologists than labor activists. Their connection only went as far as 
them reading works by movement leaders such as Chizuko Ueno and inviting them to give lectures. 
Still, more than seeing the feminist movement members as equal comrades in a fight, it was more of 
a feeling of joining hands (Interviewee 11). She emphasized that this is her view on the issue, and 
that no official position was ever taken by the Zenroren. However, she acknowledged that it is a fact 
that many of the things they both fought for were the same, such as allowing women to keep working 
after marriage and increasing the number of women in management positions. According to her, the 
Zenroren was just a bit more practical and wanted more concrete general policies and results. But 
after some thought Interviewee 11 concluded that now the Zenroren has been fighting more and more 
for individual rights, such as in harassment cases, which shows that in fact they ended up having 
more things in common with the feminist movement that she thought at first. 
 Lastly, mirroring the tendency seen in the responses to this question, Interviewees, 7, 8, 9 
and 10 did not actively identify with feminist theories and approaches either. From this general 
picture, it can be inferred that even though the feminist movement that spanned through the end of 
the 60s to the 80s was influential in many societal changes and the way that a lot of women saw 
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themselves inside of Japanese society, when it came to a direct relation to work rights’ movements 
it was not so strong. This was a counterintuitive finding, because generally the equality basis of 
feminist theories seems to be very much aligned with the fight for the women’s right to work. From 
the interviewees responses, it seems likely that the image of the movement transmitted to the public 
made it difficult for people to associate themselves with it. Even though that changed to an extent, 
as some of the interviewees now actively identify themselves as feminists, many others skill keep a 
distance from such classification. Moreover, viewing this situation through the lens of the “spiral 
model” and through my understanding of persuasion based on Checkel’s theory, this separation 
between feminists and the people fighting for the women’s right to work becomes a problem. This is 
because feminists, by attempting to change people’s views on gender roles and on what constitutes 
discrimination, are the ones more likely to engage in promoting persuasion domestically. Thus, a 
disassociation between these two groups may contribute to Japan being stuck in this status of barely 
committing to international law. By connecting the women’s right to work, norm diffusion and 
feminism in this thesis, I intend to clarify and improve the connection between these topics in the 
Japanese context. 
7.2.2 Level of interaction of interview subjects with other organizations or individual actors, both 
domestic and international 
 
This next part will focus linking the interviewees’ activities with the “spiral model” of norm 
diffusion, by taking a look at the connection between them or their organizations and other actors in 
the field of the realization of the women’s right to work. This question is important because it helps 
me recognize to what extent I can apply the framework of the model to the Japanese case and identify 
points that could explain the difficulty Japan has in implementing women’s right to work. As a 
reference to help the interviewees visualize the processes of the spiral model, I used the diagram in 
Figure 9, which is a linear representation of the five phases of the model and of the relationships 




Figure 9. Linear representation of the processes of the “spiral model” framework 
 
When asked about the relationship of her organization with international actors, Interviewee 
1 said that Gender= didn't receive any influence from other organizations specifically. She herself 
had no interest in gender issues when she was in New York for her studies, and thus did not make 
significant connections at the time. Also, except for one of them, the founding members have also 
never officially studied law, gender issues or politics (Interviewee 1). However, she believes that this 
is their strength: that they are only a group of normal Japanese women wanting to change an unfair 
situation through a grassroots movement. Regardless, she does intend to go abroad to expand her 
ideas someday. About national connections, they do not have many either. One example of this lack 
of support given by her was a recent crowdfunding that was not as successful as expected, and that 
some friends put some distance between them and the members after they started the organization. 
For her, there is a general misconception that Japanese society is already fair and equal, which makes 
people think that fighting for equality means fighting to make women superior to men, and 
consequently makes the topic of gender equality and feminism something that not many people want 
to support, regardless of gender. As a group, they want to change this aspect of Japanese culture in a 
way that allows women to fight for their rights.  
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On the other hand, Interviewee 2 has had a very fruitful interaction with international actors. 
She first went abroad when she was already an assistant professor. Through her connections with the 
Japan Lawyers International Solidarity Association (日本国際法律家協会), she went to Cambridge 
to participate in an international meeting about women’s rights, because there was no one else in the 
Japanese ranks that could do a presentation on the topic. There, she could meet people from many 
different cultures and listen to many varied ideas, including the equality-based socialist view which 
was strong among the participants. However, even the participants from socialist countries shared 
their stories of being discriminated, which made her aware of how reality was different from theory. 
Even though she had some knowledge on the topic, this conference was her first real contact with 
the theme on a deeper level and what made her aware of the gap between law and reality (Interviewee 
2). Furthermore, concerning funding, she said she never received any from abroad, although she did 
receive from MEXT and the Japanese British Council the opportunity to do short international 
exchanges.  
Interviewee 3 focused in the point that members of labor unions in Japan do not have a lot 
of knowledge related to international treaties or organizations, which makes the JNNC and Equality 
Action 21 to strive for the implementation of these instruments by visiting their offices, dialoguing 
and sending reports to the commissions of the CEDAW and the ILO, specially. However, she feels 
hopeless regarding the position of the government in these matters, as even during the short-lived 
period the Democratic Party of Japan was in power there was not a considerable change. Concerning 
Japan’s attitude towards external organization and the international society, Interviewee 3 affirmed 
that the country is aware that if it wants to be treated as a developed country, it has to follow the 
standards of other developed countries. She thinks this could become a method of attack to make the 
government bend. However, as seen in the previous chapters of this thesis, Japan has a track record 
of refusing to sign relevant international legal documents and Japanese courts also refuse to interpret 
the treaties the way international society has been pushing for, which shows that in the Japanese case 
this compliance through international pressure has not been easy to accomplish.  
 
 183 
 Interviewees 4 and 5 from the WWN shared that they received a lot of guidance from external 
groups. Interviewee 4 talked about how she went to New York as early as 1992, wanting to share 
their plight with the UN. After having their story heard, they kept receiving a lot of support from the 
organization, even going to the CEDAW offices and constantly interacting with international and 
national groups, including the media. They have been keeping their movement extremely grassroots 
too, lobbying for their objectives and trying to educate people about the issue through many different 
ways instead of just fighting against the government. (Interviewee 4) 
In contrast, according to Interviewee 6 Union Bochi Bochi does not receive any kind of 
influence or help from international organizations. Their legal identity is of a labor union between 
people of the same industry (in Japanese, 上部団体), which does not have a relation with other kinds 
of big organizations such as the Rengo or the CEDAW. She was also not sure about the number of 
other organizations like Union Bochi Bochi, and she mentioned that many union members, herself 
included, are not well connected or informed in that sense, with the exception of some groups on the 
Kansai area. They do have some union members that are not Japanese, but the majority are indeed 
Japanese and their workings are clearly more domestic than international (Interviewee 6). The same 
is true for Interviewees 7, 8, 9 and 10 of Shinagawa Joshi Gakuin, who have as their biggest supporter 
and influence Gender=. 
 Lastly, according to Interviewee 11 the Zenroren has many connections to international 
organizations, such as with the France’s CGT and, in the context of the UN, with the ILO general 
assembly. However, they have only attended the meetings, while the Rengo has sent representatives 
to speak. Regardless of their difficulties to express their opinions, they can use the things they have 
learned there in their work back in Japan (Interviewee 11). She also mentioned doing lobbying 
activities, attending the CEDAW meetings where the Japanese reports are analyzed, and producing 
counter reports to contest the information provided by the Japanese government. In fact, she said that 
the union has been very relevant in the production of reports to international organizations that have 
influenced the recommendations given from such organs to the Japanese government, 
recommendations which on their turn influenced in the Japanese NGOs requests to the government. 
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This shows their interaction with transnational actors, especially in the movement from Japan’s 
denial to the ratification of treaties and the creation of domestic norms. Concerning the influence 
they receive from these external organizations, they want to keep following and striving to reach 
international guidelines and standards and indexes, particularly in points that Japan has been lagging 
behind, such as the limitation of working hours. In this context, she stated that the organization has 
been fighting to make Japan finally ratify the most relevant ILO conventions, debunking the excuses 
given by the government to refuse to do so, which specially focus on alleged conflicts between the 
conventions and domestic law. The same is true for the CEDAW optional protocol and the individual 
complaint system, which the government has not even tried to simply explain to the population or 
even post translated information on their website (Interviewee 11). 
  In addition to these questions about the general relationship of interview subjects with other 
actors, I asked some interviewees a follow-up question concerning the relevance of their organization 
and their activities particularly on the interaction process between the national and the international 
in the context of creating change in the protection of the women’s right to work. Overall, this was a 
difficult question for most interviewees, but their answers gave us much information of other aspects 
of Japanese society and how it deals with pressure from the international society.  
For Interviewee 3, she reiterated that Equality Action 21 was relevant domestically mainly to 
support women who decided to go to court, with one of the most disputed issues nowadays being 
pay inequality. As already mentioned in the item concerning the activities of Japanese courts, these 
are not easy cases, since they tend to not see the gender based discrimination included in discretionary 
evaluation made by the company. She also gave more insight on how external pressure has not been 
very successful concerning this judicial issue. Since the beginning of the 2000s, Japanese judicial 
disinterest has been shown to the CEDAW committee, which has continuously criticized Japan on 
that point, but no change has been made (Interviewee 3). In short, Japan and its passive, male-
dominated courts have been ignoring criticisms from international society, such as from the CEDAW 
and the ILO, and have remained unable to consider and measure equal pay for equal work. There is 
no measuring of the value of work based on international standards, because knowledge concerning 
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international treaties and human rights is not a priority in the first place. Interviewee 3 concluded 
that there was basically no progress in the area in the past 20 years, and cited the Chugoku Denryoku 
Case decision in 2016 as a clear example of the courts disregard for facts, lamenting that there was 
no clamor for changing these retrograde views of the court.  
 Confirming what had already been mentioned by Interviewee 11 and Interviewee 2 in 
relation to the way Japan closes itself off against external pressure and international models, 
Interviewee 3 pointed out the fact that in the work reform of 2018, the government ended up adopting 
a “Japan style” equal pay for equal work policy, which meant that people under different 
managements can receive different pay, even if they do exactly the same work. Based on the 
persistence of these setbacks to women’s rights, I asked what would be more productive for civil 
organizations to do if they wanted to aim for change: call for more international help or to focus on 
domestic action. Interviewee 3 replied that they are acting in both fronts, and that the most effective 
is to change the current government’s mindset, which has been the same since basically the 50s. They 
only validate the work of women who repeat the existing working process of men, and disregard 
other forms of work or any change that could be made to the current working situation in Japan 
(Interviewee 3). Even if there is no change in the leading party, in her opinion soon there must be at 
least some acknowledgement by these leaders that the way things are happening now is not good.  
 Interviewee 1 also had difficulty in placing Gender= in this transnational/domestic 
interaction, finally settling on the idea that since the organization’s main object is to try and change 
people’s mindset starting from the bottom to the top, they are found on the domestic, neighborhood 
scene. Thus, they do not have so much direct interaction with international actors, focusing on 
pressuring the government from the inside of the country. 
Lastly, Interviewee 2 answered that her participation in mainly through the activities of the 
JAIWR (Japanese Association of International Women's Rights) and other NGOs in the process of 
creating and applying law that protect the rights of Japanese women, based on the influence of 
international documents and treaties. She exemplified her participation through the CEDAW, which 
enjoyed the participation of NGOs not only during its ratification but also continues to do so during 
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the reporting and review process that happens every four years, in a process that allows the closed off 
Japanese society to face international society and open itself up. This is also true concerning the right 
to work, since this process helped identify the limitations that the EEOL has. In that sense, I can 
conclude that she has had a direct role in the process of norm diffusion according to the “spiral model” 
since the phase of repression, a role that continues to this day. 
 To summarize, these rich answers, with the help of the “spiral model” framework, allow me 
to see distinct, but interconnected and relevant roles played by members of the Japanese civil society 
in the process of realizing the women’s right to work. I can also understand how differently other 
actors influence each interviewee and draw some conclusions. First, the biggest and more traditional 
organizations such as the WWN were able to reach international actors more easily, especially 
because when they became active Japan was still very much closed off in terms of women’s rights 
and pressure from external organizations was necessary to make the government act. In other words, 
applying the “spiral model” framework here, I can identify characteristics of the phases of denial 
(phase two) and tactical concessions (phase three), with continuous interaction between the 
transitional network and domestic organizations aiming for the adoption of international standards 
concerning women’s rights. 
On the other hand, the most recently formed groups seem to not interact as much with 
international organizations, at least when it comes to direct interaction, instead focusing on working 
in the domestic realm. Also, even the interviewees that have had transnational interactions still carry 
them out in a limited manner, since most of the active members of Japanese NGOs fighting for 
women’s right to work are elderly women who usually cannot speak enough English to completely 
assert themselves in an international stage. They also tend to not use social network sites, relying a 
lot in printed out materials that might not be as appealing or accessible for younger generations. To 
make matters worse, young workers in Japan now are not as interested in fighting for their rights, 
because of reasons such as lack of education concerning these matters, lack of stable employment, 
lack of a cultural tradition of raising their voices in complaint. In addition to that, since Japan still 
has not ratified many international treaties (such as the CEDAW Optional Protocol), the domestic 
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NGO movement tends to focus their efforts on the legal area, which shifts their already limited 
manpower from compliance to commitment in the first place.  
Lastly, the “spiral model” assumed that there would be a dynamic, forward moving domestic 
NGO base which the international community could engage with, predicting demobilization of 
domestic and transnational actors only after reaching compliance in the phase of rule-consistent 
behavior (phase five). However, interestingly I see in the interviewees’ answers and in the present 
Japanese situation an unintentional demobilization of domestic actors after the phases of tactical 
concessions (phase three) and prescriptive status (phase four), before reaching full compliance. It 
must be considered that the model predicts a strong, continuous interaction between actors, and that 
it identifies extensive and coherent domestic NGO mobilization as a key variable explaining the 
success of norm diffusion. Yet, in the Japanese case there is a general lack of effective, profound and 
continuous engagement and a tendency within the domestic NGO base to be dissolving, mainly 
because the people involved in these organizations are elders and there is immense difficulty in 
recruiting younger members. Perhaps this is one of the reasons why Japan has been finding it so 
challenging to move on from a situation of barely committing to international women’s rights norms.  
7.2.3 What are the interviewee opinions concerning the spiral model framework? Do they 
consider the spiral model to be a helpful framework through which to understand Japan’s 
issues? 
 
  As can be seen from the conclusion of the previous part, the spiral model framework is 
identifiable in various aspects of the Japanese situation. In this part, I will clarify how the 
interviewees understood the model and applied it to their own realities, breaking it down into their 
take on where Japan is presently situated in the phases of the “spiral model” when it comes to 
women’s right to work, whether they saw the difference the concepts of socialization and persuasion 
can make in reality, and on the relation between Japan’s desire for a good image and position in 
international society and the way the government approaches norms protecting international 
women’s rights.  
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7.2.3.1 Japan’s attitude towards women’s rights situated in the spiral model phases 
 
I found that, once the “spiral model” was carefully explained so that it became accessible to 
people not so familiar with the topic, it successfully fit their lived experiences. Three of the 
interviewees were able to greatly relate the framework to their realities and had insightful answers 
concerning the model’s application to Japan’s case. Interviewee 1 associated the model and the 
commitment/compliance gap with her own experiences, in the sense that even though policies and 
laws have been created, their effectiveness does not reach the people they should and end up being 
useless. She exemplified that by her situation in her first company, which was a very traditional 
Japanese manufacturer and clearly had a career track for women and one for men, regardless of 
existing law forbidding discrimination between genders. According to her, this mirrored the 
persistent idea that women belong in the home and men belong in the workplace, maintained both 
by people in positions of political and economic power and the common citizens. The implementation 
gap was also very clear to her, which consequently put Japan on the lower levels of the phase of 
prescriptive status. (Interviewee 2)   
Interviewee 2, as a legal expert, was able to easily link the five phases of the “spiral model” 
to different times of Japan. Phase one of repression would be pre-Second World War; phase two of 
denial would be when the Japanese Constitution was created; phase three of tactical concessions 
would be during the 80s, when Japan finally created legislation to avoid extreme criticism from 
international society. Concerning the present situation of Japan, it would be situated between phase 
three and phase four, but closer to prescriptive status (phase four) (Interviewee 2). This analysis 
matches my suggestion that sometimes states commit to international treaties without any intention 
of complying to them, which creates an overlap between the end of phase three and the start of phase 
four. In other words, sometimes ratification of international treaties itself is a form of tactical 
concession, and thus even though this commitment can be understood as a goal in itself in the process 
of reaching compliance (in the form of phase four of prescriptive status), it can also be a commitment 
done in cynical way, which hinders the process of reaching full compliance. Accordingly, she 
believes Japan fits that description, and is still far from phase five (rule-consistent behavior) and full 
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implementation. Concerning the Optional Protocol to the CEDAW, she situated it on phase three of 
tactical concessions, as Japan refuses to ratify all protocols involving human rights in fear it would 
affect national judicial decisions. She brought up a lack of reflection concerning the issue from the 
government, and its fear of having issues like the comfort women cases brought up and decided on 
by international organizations, both which makes her believe that Japan will not ratify it in the near 
future to avoid the possibility of any kind of confrontation with the international society.  
Interviewee 11 is more pessimistic than the others, as she put Japan between phases two 
(denial) and three (tactical concessions) when it comes to the women’s right to work, considering 
that the government has continuously denied some of the existent issues and refused to abide by 
international law. She exemplifies this with the case of the discussion concerning the ILO convention 
on harassment, when Japan kept saying that recommendations were not needed and that other 
important points of the document should be suppressed, since making a more complete convention 
would cause complaints from domestic organizations, specially related to business circles. The part 
of the administration responsible for labor law has clearly been taking the side of big economic 
powerhouses, committing only to a minimum instead of focusing on workers’ rights as they should 
(Interviewee 11). Even worse, the same thing has been happening in other issues, such as with the 
women’s fight for the right to have separate surnames between spouses. 
As can be seen, the tendency of the answers was that Japan found itself unable to fully 
complete phase four (prescriptive status) when it comes to the women’s right to work. In addition to 
that, I could form educated conclusions similar to these, based on the responses from other 
interviewees even when they could not answer this question directly. This result is in line with my 
initial analysis of the Japanese situation according to “spiral model”, which put Japan in the phases 
of tactical concessions (phase three) and prescriptive status (phase four), depending on the rights 
taken into consideration. Furthermore, it shows how the model’s framework is useful to situate 
theoretically the Japanese issues with the lack of women’s rights’ implementation. 




In addition to the localization of Japan among the five “spiral model” phases, I also asked 
the interviewees if they could see the different results of the processes of socialization and persuasion 
in Japanese society. Here again I had valuable and insightful answers which showed that the model 
is relevant as a framework. Interviewee 1 answered that she believes that people’s mindset is 
gradually changing and more people from her generation onwards are beginning to be truly persuaded 
of the need for gender equality. However, she worries that old fashioned ideas of gender are still 
transmitted through picture books and animations, which perpetuates a retrograde view on society 
and culture and stops the persuasion process of changing people’s minds and ideas. 
Interviewee 2 saw the difference between both socialization/persuasion processes and 
emphasized the need to go deeper than just socialization in the case of Japan. According to her, the 
Japanese main political, legal and economic actors in the field of women’s rights protection do not 
feel the need to truly change themselves and the society we live in, using only palliative socialization 
means that are not effective in the long run. In the same sense, for Interviewee 11 it was clear that, 
at this point, Japan had only been subjected to socialization. She said this was obvious when looking 
at how the government has signed international treaties, but domestically it keeps taking actions that 
go against such commitments. The CEDAW officials are also aware of this contradictory attitude, 
which shows that Japan has only been committing to women’s rights protection to the extent that it 
is needed to keep its positive reputation within global leading nations (Interviewee 11). She agreed 
that if this situation persists, Japan will never reach phase five (rule-consistent behavior) of the spiral 
model, in other words, rule-consistent behavior will not be attained. To her, unless the Japanese 
mindset that believes “men work and women take care of the home and children” and has been in 
place since the Meiji Era is not fixed, no Japanese law or policy will ever be effective enough.  
In this context of lack of persuasion, I went back to ask some interviewees about their ideas 
concerning how high-context communication could influence in socialization processes and 
consequently in the perpetuation of women’s rights violations in Japan. All interviewees were certain 
the high-context communication (Hall, 1976) influenced in the difficulty Japanese women felt to 
complain about unfair situations. 
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Interviewee 3 focused on how this implicit obligation to follow the attitudes of older 
generations and of the rest of society, which still maintain this idea that women are supposed to be 
subordinated to and dependent on men, have been obviously detrimental to the situation of women. 
Interviewee 1 went further to explain how Japanese expressions such as “read the air” (空気を読む) 
and “follow your right” (右へならえ) are used to exemplify this kind of “Japanese-like” model of 
attitude that is subjected to the actions of other members of society. According to her, when there is 
high-context communication, there is difficulty to verbalize problems, which then become invisible. 
Consequently, it becomes impossible to turn a proposition like “gender discrimination is a social 
problem that should be solved by the whole society together” into knowledge shared by all. In that 
context, it is understandable how people – specially women – could not unite and form a movement 
to end disparity in Japanese society until now, and just perpetuated women’s lower position before 
men. (Interviewee 1) 
 However, regardless of these difficulties of high-context communication, Interviewee 1 
believes that whether there are men being discriminated against too changes the way society deals 
with and understands such discrimination. As an example, since the number of men working in 
irregular employment has started to rise in Japan, she cites that the disparity in the workplace has 
finally become an issue and was acknowledged as a social problem. On the other hand, the female 
low social and economic position in Japanese society is tolerated, if not treated as invisible. 
Particularly, she thinks that there is a high harmful internal (coming from women themselves) and 
external (coming from society/men) resistance towards women raising their voices in Japan 
(Interviewee 1).  
For Interviewee 2, the high-context communication culture has the effect of making positive 
or negative evaluations in a given society ambiguous, even though they are supposed to be fair 
standards. She exemplifies her point with the human resources evaluation standards in traditional 
companies. A lot of Japanese big corporations hire people from the same educational background and 
same age, but the majority of female employees are excluded from advancing in their careers and end 
up having to sue. However, at the courts, this situation is not easily identified as discrimination. This 
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is because the standards for promotion are ambiguous and their use is left to the discretion of the 
superiors in the company, mostly men. While there are some standards such as “Performance/Results” 
that cannot be manipulated, ambiguous and abstract standards like “Cooperativeness” or “Ambition” 
are easily affected by the superior’s gender bias. In the implicit workplace culture, if the person who 
defies a company principle is a man, this is valued as “someone that has the ambition to change the 
industry”. However, if it is a woman, it is valued as “someone who has no cooperativeness and cannot 
interact well with others”. In other words, ambiguity facilitates biases. (Interviewee 2) 
Lastly, Interviewee 11 brought up the difficulty women have in raising their voice as a worry 
of the union, and compared how Japan and South Korea are very similar when it comes to the lack 
of implementation of the women’s right to work, but the female reaction to this issue is very different, 
with South Korean women being more vocal for their rights. This can be explained by the fact that 
even though both countries are high-context countries, Japan is the highest one in the whole world, 
which makes South Korea seem low-context in comparison (Meyer, 2014, pp. 39-40, based on Hall, 
1976, pp. 85-125).  
The assertiveness of the interviewees when talking about this topic helps us conclude that 
this high-context communication cultural aspect is one of the biggest barriers for the implementation 
of women’s right to work. To address it, the “spiral model” may be used in combination with theories 
of norm localization, aiming not to force international women’s rights on the Japanese society, but 
to try to adapt the implementation of these rights (which are considered more western-based) to the 
lack of explicit communication between people and to ingrained traditional ideas concerning gender 
roles. This localization approach also influences the realization of persuasion within Japanese society. 
If a simple process of socialization, without any deep changes to the mindset of society and without 
any adaptation in international norms to facilitate an initial acceptance of them by the state, was 
enough to reach satisfactory compliance, there would not be such a huge gap in Japan concerning 
women’s rights to work. Considering that more than three decades have passed since Japan 
committed to an international treaty on the topic and internalized these rights through domestic law 
with no considerable progress, there is a need for the persuasion of the government and civil society 
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in order for the country to reach phase five (rule-consistent behavior) of the “spiral model”. This 
concept was easily grasped by the people dealing with this reality every day.  
7.2.3.3 The importance given by Japan to its position in international society and its approach to 
international law 
 
In this part, I will focus on the answers related to how much Japan values its leading position 
in international society, and how much it is willing to bend its “traditional values” in order to follow 
the international women’s rights trends and to not suffer reprisals from other nations. In other words, 
this answers give us insight on how much Japan has been “talking the talk” of women’s rights, 
inspiring its domestic policies in international norms, and to what extent is it actually “walking the 
walk”. 
Concerning Japan’s feelings about its position in international society, Interviewee 1 
answered that she believes Japan does not care about that nowadays, albeit that might be different in 
specific cases, such as concerning its economic situation. However, in a general sense (and specially 
when it comes to neighboring countries), Japanese people still think of themselves as culturally 
superior to other nations. It also puts a big distance between itself and others when it comes to law, 
using reasons based on geographical isolation and social/cultural differences. Not even globalization 
or the advent of the internet could completely change that argument yet, as it can be seen from the 
lack of impact international social movements like the “#metoo” had in Japan. This sense of 
uniqueness also results on the lack of legal inspiration from other countries. Thus, even though Japan 
has continuously been under external pressure to adapt itself to international norms, it keeps 
publicizing, nationally and internationally, the misleading idea that it is a gender equal country and 
ignoring important recommendations from transnational actors. This culminates in both the Japanese 
civil society and political leaders believing that there is no immediate need to implement effective 




 Interviewee 2, with her legal background, affirmed that the legislature studies what other 
nations are doing in the topic, specially looking at Europe and America, and most recently Korea. 
However, they end up arranging this information nicely to fit it to the “Japanese way”, taking just 
the points they want. The words “protecting the Japanese traditions” will definitely show up in the 
justifications for doing so, and things like the system of lifetime employment or the inexistence of 
wages based on job evaluation will definitely be maintained regardless of what other states are 
deciding. In other words, the practices of corporations keep being protected over international 
policies, giving benefits only to the government and the companies and ignoring the harm to the 
workers. She exemplified that with the fact that in 2006 indirect discrimination was included in the 
text of the EEOL (Equal Employment Opportunity Law), but was limited to three specific situations, 
which basically cancelled its applicability in Japanese companies. (Interviewee 2)  
 Interviewee 2 also touched on the same point as Interviewee 1 when she talked about the 
continuous Japanese refusal to sign the most relevant and basic ILO (International Labour 
Organization) conventions, maintaining this legal gap between itself and international society, 
answering only to a lot of external pressure or advice related to economy. This originated the Abe 
government plans of using women and foreigners in the workforce, just to try to improve the 
economic situation that has been worsening since 2009. However, the exclusively economic base for 
these policies is actually what makes them so ineffective and harmful to human rights (Interviewee 
2). This point of view is shared by Interviewee 3, who affirmed that even though some companies 
aiming to participate in the international stage must make themselves more gender equal in the eyes 
of other nations, they do not believe they have to do so because it is the right thing to do. It is a purely 
tactical decision, which shows again that Japan has only experienced socialization. Interviewee 5 
from the WWN followed this line of thought and added that constant change in governmental 
personnel keeps restarting any negotiation concerning the adoption of treaties or policies that might 
be beneficial to women. Interviewee 11 noted that she had never heard any kind of external influence 
in the Labor Policy Assembly (労働政策審議会), who discusses bill before adoption, corroborating 
the narrative that the Japanese government is still extremely closed off. 
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From these answers and an analysis of the Japanese government’s attitude towards external 
pressure, it becomes clear that Japan will not bend easily just to international recommendations. 
Unless there is a domestic, generalized mindset change, or the country’s economy reaches a point of 
crisis that makes it impossible to ignore or minimize the importance of gender equality for the 
economic, social and political health of a nation, there will be no significant bridging of the gap 
between commitment and compliance.  
7.2.4 How has the commitment/compliance gap been addressed by the Japanese government? 
What are the issues that have been persisting because of this gap? 
 
 In the previous chapters, I have introduced many issues that originate from and thus prove 
the existence of a commitment/compliance gap in the women’s right to work in Japan. In this part, 
through the answers of the interviewees, I will look at how this gap has been dealt with by the 
Japanese government and compile the societal problems that persist and worsen because of it. With 
that, I aim to shed some light into the main issues in need of undertaking, which might clarify ways 
of realistically improving the situation. 
7.2.4.1 Opinions concerning the Abe government’s policies aiming for gender equality 
 
 The numerous policies created by the Abe government and aiming to improve the situation 
of gender inequality in Japanese society are unanimously criticized by the interviewees. They all 
agree that the government does not believe in their rhetoric and does not want to comply to their own 
policies, as they refuse to create impactful solutions, such as a quota system to increase the number 
of women in positions of power within the government. Interviewee 1 shared that her previous 
company was known for being a good company for women to work at, even receiving governmental 
appraisal. However, actually it was completely discriminatory, inflating the number of women in 
management positions by creating a random department that had no importance at all and filling it 
with women. Regardless of the rising number of working women, the reality is that they are still 
marginalized either as full-time or irregular workers. (Interviewee 1) 
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Interviewee 3 gave many other examples of cases where the government’s discourse and its 
actions do not match. Claiming for a society “where women can shine” while maintaining different 
salaries for people that do the same work, refusing to raise minimum salaries and ignoring issues 
created by the growing discrimination and economic disparity shows that the government has only 
been doing lip service. This complaint is backed up by Interviewees 4 and 5 from the WWN, who 
added that deaths related to overwork and the calling for foreign workers without any previous social 
plan to include them in the Japanese society will only worsen the already bad situation. Interviewee 
6 illustrated these cumulative issues well when she said that the existing policies are extremely 
limited to creating a better workplace only for a limited number of Japanese women (and even then, 
they still fail), ignoring the situation of women from other countries, particularly South East Asia, 
that come to Japan and end up having to work as sex workers.   
Another criticism of the policies is the lack of promotion they have been getting, which was 
illustrated by the four interviewees from Shinagawa Joshi Gakuin. Even though they are actively 
researching gender equality in Japan, they were not aware of any details concerning policies created 
to try to improve the cooperation of companies or about the EEOL, for example. Even their female 
teachers, who were supervising the interview, did not know about them, which demonstrates how 
much the lack in publicity.  
Problems appear even in the language used in the official texts. As Interviewee 11 explained, 
the expression “女性を活用する”, which translates to “use women”, is commonly applied. In short, 
it is clear that they only wanted to use women to fill the gap in the labor force. Again, there is the 
fact that Japan has only been socialized to follow international women’s rights norms interfering 
negatively in its policies, since there is no internalization by the government of the idea that they 
must guarantee women’s right to work because this is the right thing to do as a society. The 
commitment to women’s rights is purely instrumental. In addition, the laws that have been adopted 
mostly consist of guidelines, with no duties or sanctions included in the provisions. For anyone who 
pays attention, the government’s intent to use women while keeping these inequalities in place is 
crystal clear.  
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On the other hand, Interviewee 2 is a little more positive about the topic. As a legal scholar, 
she doesn't think having laws and policies is a negative thing per se, but she does concede that the 
present laws all have clear limits. This is because the Abe administration has no idea of what to do 
to promote women’s participation and keeps getting stuck in empty frameworks. Particularly on the 
topic of violence both in the workplace and in the domestic environment, more focused efforts are 
clearly needed, but the government acts like it is enough to just make women work without any 
change to the workplace itself. In Interviewee 2’s words, “this is an administration that thinks women 
should take three years of maternity and childcare leave, hold their babies for that limited amount of 
time, and then just go back to work like nothing had happened”. She affirmed that if the government 
wanted to change things, they should start by changing the way Japanese men work too, but that has 
not been seriously considered. Another one of her suggestions is to look at an alternative policy from 
South Korea, where an average standard of gender equality is set according to the size of the company, 
and the ones that do not achieve it receive guidance until they do so. Instead of Japan just giving 
incentives to the big companies that comply to policies, she believes that the companies that do not 
comply are the ones that need more attention and instruction. Here, an interviewee is actively 
suggesting the use of emulation or lesson-drawing by Japan, using as a base another East-Asian, non-
western country that has been facing similar problems in women’s rights implementation.  
As the biggest flaw of these policies, I can cite Interviewee 11 and her irritation over the fact 
that Japan has continuously been advised by the CEDAW to create a comprehensive domestic law 
against discrimination, to no avail. If Japan will not even do something as basic as create a unified 
legal definition of discrimination, nothing much else can be expected of other approaches to the issue. 
This disregard is one of the pillars that has been sustaining the commitment/compliance gap in Japan. 
Considering the strong reaction against Abe’s policies, I questioned some interviewees on 
whether they believed there was an active attempt by the men in power to hinder female 
empowerment in Japan. Interviewee 3 was sure that the men in power do not want to change women’s 
position in society. Again, she raised the example of the lack of efficacy of Abe’s policies, which 
have been in place for far too long now without any real results. According to her, they are only a 
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façade that uses public money to show a good picture, and the reason for that lack of real action is 
that men are afraid of losing their position in society.  
Pessimistically, she thinks that their mindset will not be changed easily, since the kind of 
education all these generations have received focuses on separating girls and boys and differentiating 
the ways they should act. She does believe teenagers and young adults could theoretically be able to 
research for themselves and change the way they think, but considering the results of Mieko 
Takenobu’s recent work (2017), which has shown how these university students do not know 
anything about the labor market, labor law, and how they think workers’ unions are not positive 
organizations, the probabilities are not very high. (Interviewee 3) 
Interviewee 1 was less strong in her criticism, saying that, in her own experience, men tend to 
give women support and cheer them on as long as women remain in a lower position than theirs. 
Interviewee 2 added to this idea, when she said that men in power do not even think that women are 
their “equivalent enemies in society”, and instead are look down on them. For her, even if they are 
not actively trying to stop women from climbing up in society, they are still only seeing women as 
people who should focus on staying home, supporting men, and using only their remaining energy 
and time to contribute to society. Interviewee 1 complemented this line of thought, saying that as 
soon as women reach a point where they can threat this “male superiority”, most men would take an 
offensive stance that stops women’s growth. She thinks this attitude is clear in the way the Abe 
government has been actively promoting “a society in which women can shine”, but as soon as a 
woman gets to a high position, they are bombarded with an attitude that screams prejudice and 
presupposes that they only reached their position because they are a woman, meaning that they used 
their body or other “dirty” ways to get there. (Interviewee 1)  
For both interviewees, the point is that men just do not see women as equals. Even more 
worrying is that, according to them and to Interviewee 4, this attitude tends to also be present in 
women that reached high positions in Japan, because they believe they got to raise their status thanks 
to their hard work only and thus start looking down on other women, blaming them for their situation. 
Specifically, Interviewee 1 believes in the importance of changing this mindset through education, 
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from elementary school, by warning the students that in society everyone is not treated equally and 
they should be prepared to fight that discrimination. Instead of putting in women’s minds that they 
can succeed if they try hard enough (which ends up only making them blame themselves when met 
with unfair treatment), they need to be aware that this prejudice exists and to be given the weapons 
to fight against it (Interviewee 1). This lack of awareness of Japanese women concerning the unequal 
situations they face is an obstacle to the effective application of norm localization, since as already 
established the “spiral model” assumes a strong mobilized domestic base, but in the case of Japan 
there is not even a domestic reference point to use when adapting international law to the national 
level. In the same sense, the poor education women receive concerning their rights (and men 
concerning gender inequality) is perhaps connected in a vicious circle to Japan having experienced 
only socialization, and not full persuasion. Without basic and quality education on the topic, the 
chances of Japanese society’s mindset truly changing in the future, and of the state reaching a phase 
of compliance are extremely low.    
 As an addendum, Interviewee 11 mentioned that the present government has many people 
that are part of an extreme right-wing conservative group of assembly members called Nihon Kaigi 
(日本会議), who actively scorn women. She said that their intentions can be seen through their strong 
feelings of rejection concerning the possibility of the existence of a female empress, for example 
(and corroborating what Interviewee 1 had said on the importance of this topic before, concerning 
gender). According to these interviewees, while men in power keep saying Japan needs to change 
when it comes to the activities of women, in reality they do not want their beloved “traditional 
beautiful Japanese values” to change. 
 Conclusively, according to the interviewees, even if there is no proactive shunning of women 
from reaching positions of power by all men all the time, at least this idea of “male superiority” 
seems to have taken root in Japanese society, and it influences the creation and implementation of 
governmental policies. Together with the barriers that Japan creates by being a high-context 
communication society, which prides itself in its uniqueness and tradition, this way of thinking is 
extremely harmful and should be understood as another factor contributing to not only to the 
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commitment/compliance gap, but to the fact that Japan does not even commit to some international 
laws in the first place. 
7.2.4.2 The lack of strength of Japanese labor law in the context of the women’s right to work 
 
Above I mentioned in passing the problem of Japanese labor law consisting only of 
guidelines, with no sanctions or duties. I also established that the more partial the state’s commitment 
is, the more it inhibits full compliance. In this part, I will dive deeper into these issues that perpetuates 
the lack of women’s rights’ implementation. Interviewee 1 brought up the point that it is difficult to 
create legislation because of the power the economic sector has in the creation of these norms. She 
thinks it might be more effective to give Japanese companies a good example of growth brought by 
striving for a more gender equal workplace, or by using a quota system implemented by the 
government. As the Interviewee 9 mentioned, the ones responsible for following the law are the 
companies, so the spotlight should also be put on them for not complying. 
On the other hand, Interviewee 2 and Interviewee 11 believe that, even though the mentality 
of people making and applying labor law needs to change indeed, the penalties are still essential for 
norm implementation and to control abuses by companies. Interviewee 2 said that it is regretful that 
cases based on the Labor Standards Act, where fines are set for companies and criminal action is 
carried out, are both extremely rare. In Japan, the sole inclusion of penalties might not be enough, 
since cases end up depending on ineffective administrative guidance, but they are still extremely 
important as another possibility for women to fight for their rights. (Interviewee 2)  
Still concerning the topic of penalties, Interviewee 11 emphasized that small and medium 
size companies make up the biggest percentage of Japanese companies but are generally excluded 
from these policies, which is another big obstacle towards implementation. Furthermore, for the past 
30 to 20 years there has been a constant lack of public officers that can tackle supervision activities 
and answer to complaints and reports from workers, a situation that has plagued the Ministry of 
Health, Labor and Welfare and its organs in particular (Interviewee 11). It can be seen that the lack 
for workforce in Japan is not an issue just for the civil organizations. 
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Other aspects of the legislation can also be criticized. The Interviewees 4 and 5 from the 
WWN mentioned that the EEOL is often seen just as an administrative law without power, and 
Interviewee 6 complained about the limited number of legal protections she could actually use as an 
irregular worker, when negotiating her pay and other basic conditions. Plus, most people in her union 
do not have the education to understand such legal concepts, being excluded from their protection. 
Lastly, she cited the lack of strength of these legal guidelines to protect women even from the most 
basic forms of workplace violence, such as sexual and power harassment. As a weapon against the 
frail “protection” granted by the legal system, Interviewee 6 explained that the union tends to focus 
in using the fact that they can spread information about the bad behavior of the companies to the 
media and newspapers as leverage, appealing to the way society views these companies. 
In conclusion, it is the government’s duty to proceed with the necessary reforms aimed to 
fill the palpable lack of strength of Japanese labor law, which is an issue that illustrates the difficulties 
of creating meaningful domestic legislation in the first place. Not only women, but all Japanese 
workers deserve to have efficient ways to safeguard their rights before their employers, and to not 
fall victim of the implementation gap.    
7.2.4.3 Japan’s continuous low position in the WEF Gender Gap Index 
 
There is a consensus among the interviewees that Japan’s low position in the World 
Economic Forum Gender Gap Index represents reality accurately. With the exception of Interviewee 
6, who believes the discussion about a lack of women in positions of power is out of her and her 
union’s daily worries and thus does not dwell on the topic, the rest of the interviewees agreed that 
this kind of information concerning the statistically demonstrated substandard Japanese situation is 
not taken completely seriously by the government (which according to Interviewee 2 tends to brush 
it off as women not being interested in taking such high positions in society), nor being shared enough 
with society. And even if the information is shown in the media, people do not pay enough attention 
to it and do not take it as a problem (Interviewee 1). Some reasons were raised for this lack of interest, 
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with Interviewee 1 and Interviewee 3 saying the educational system is to blame, since it creates a 
situation of false equality for the kids, who then do not have any interest in these topic in the future.  
 However, positive points were also brought up. Interviewee 1 mentioned an increase in the 
media mentioning the results, especially because of many of cases of discrimination being shown in 
mass media. Interviewee 11 talked about how labor unions have been publicizing such results as 
much as they can, to cover for the lack of press coming from the government. Interviewee 2 cited the 
recent new legislation claiming for a larger number of women to be included as candidates for 
political positions, even though it has not been successfully applied to all parties. These constructive 
developments must be used as a first step towards making the Japanese government and businesses 
understand that this situation of gender inequality will not solve itself naturally, and that they must 
act on these issues if they want to bridge the commitment/compliance gap and create a society where 
all individuals “can shine”. 
7.2.4.4 The insincere Japanese approach to international treaties dealing with women’s rights 
 
Taking into considerations that the key point of the “spiral model” of norm diffusion in the 
interaction between domestic and international institutions and the catalyst to the creation of national 
law based on international norms, Japan’s attitude towards international treaties is specially worrying. 
Not only there is a glaring lack of information accessible to the public, as Interviewee 1 proved by 
answering that she had no idea what was the CEDAW Optional Protocol and that Japan had been 
refusing to ratify it, this lack of ratification itself, which persists regardless of the constant 
international requests for Japan to do so shows how little the government cares about the topic. The 
same has been happening with ILO conventions and recommendations, which Japan has refused to 
ratify even the most basic ones, according to Interviewees 4 and 5 of the WWN.  
Interviewee 11 clarified that this refusal is usually based on allegations of conflict with 
national law, or on a supposed “will of the population”, as happened with the decision concerning 
the case of allowing different surnames for married people. She went on to add that even the treaties 
that have already been ratified are not implemented, which is why NGOs all over Japan have been 
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focusing their efforts on lobbying for the ratification of the Optional Protocol, through the project 
group called ”Action to implement the CEDAW” (in Japanese, 女性差別撤廃条約実現アクショ
ン ). Although the participants are trying to not get their hopes up, not only because of the 
aforementioned resistance of the politicians but also because of practical reasons such as the constant 
changes in the personnel responsible for the ratification, they are moving forward towards their goal 
of giving Japanese women a route through which they can actively fight for their rights before 
institutions that care about women’s rights. 
7.2.4.5 The passive role of Japanese courts in women’s rights’ implementation 
 
It is already clear by now that Japan has not been putting enough effort into internalizing 
women’s rights norms into its domestic legal, economic and social environments. The same is true 
for the judiciary, which is extremely passive and tends to focus on applying national law only, as 
explained by Interviewee 1. This passiveness is relevant because decisions by courts may include 
references to norms and principles of international law and with that spark social change and 
improvements in norm implementation. Interviewee 2 complemented Interviewee 1’s criticism with 
the fact that Japan’s courts remain only in their strict judicial area and do not involve themselves 
with what the government does. She said the same happens for their relationship with international 
law, where courts could claim treaty violations but do not do so. If it is not a very clear and self-
executing treaty, the judiciary tends to not act at all. Unfortunately, the CEDAW is included in these 
cases of inactivity. This passiveness was blatant in the recent case requesting the right for different 
surnames for married couples, where the courts almost completely ignored the relationship between 
international law and domestic law despite the situation being clearly unfair towards women 
(Interviewee 2). Furthermore, she pointed out that the executive plays a bigger part than the judiciary 
in implementing law in Japan, since the former directly deals with the companies and can lobby for 
legal change. According to Interviewee 11, the courts tend to only give judgements that appease the 
government or follow its line of thought, prioritizing the spirit of policies than the spirit of 
constitution, domestic norms and international treaties. 
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 In the same sense, Interviewee 3 brought up the fact that these passive courts aim for 
settlements, which do not create strong precedents and usually do not include declarations of 
discrimination by the companies. Plus, on a more basic reasoning for discrimination, these 
unapproachable courts are formed mainly by men, who according to her are not informed about 
international instruments protecting women’s rights in courts, as they do not care for or consider 
these documents necessary. Interviewee 11 followed the same logic and went even further, by 
affirming that the role of the judiciary in implementation has been worsening and decreasing in the 
past twenty years. 
In fact, trying to win a case related to the women’s right to work in a Japanese court is a 
gamble. According to Interviewees 4 and 5 from the WWN, the Sumitomo Kagaku Case ended in a 
favorable settlement, which allowed workers from that company to reach managerial positions more 
easily (albeit this rising in ranks did not translate to their salaries, maintaining a gender pay gap). 
They explained that the judge was aware of their group’s activities with the UN and took that into 
consideration when writing his opinion, which was good for its social impact, as it was even included 
in a high school textbook. On the other hand, according to Interviewee 3, the Chuugoku Denryoku 
Case proved a clear situation of discrimination in payment, but the court dismissed it saying that it 
was unclear if there was gender discrimination or not. For them, unless there was an open division 
in men and women, explicit in the company policies, it was not discrimination. Plus, the judges 
prioritized the freedom of the company to create internal regulations more than the fact that these 
regulations cause inequality. (Interviewee 3). Basically, any sign of indirect discrimination was 
ignored and in this situation the Optional Protocol to the CEDAW would be able to give the plaintiff 
another chance of having their case analyzed. Even worse than this, other individuals do not even 
have the privilege to go to court, as Interviewee 6 explained. The Union Bochi Bochi tends to make 
use of offices that supervise the application of labor law (in Japanese, 労働基準監督署), which 
usually ends in a discussion and a settlement.  
 With the judiciary also contributing to the maintenance of the commitment/compliance gap 
within Japanese society, I can see that Japan indeed finds itself in a situation compatible with the 
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phase of tactical concessions, where state actors might say they accept the validity of international 
human rights, but do nothing to translate them to the domestic society. In that context, I reiterate the 
need not only for the ratification of the Optional Protocol to the CEDAW, but also for the education 
of Japanese judicial actors, including judges, prosecutors and lawyers, so that they can finally help 
society “walk the walk” of the women’s right to work. 
7.2.4.6 Observing other topics of relevance within the interviewees’ answers 
 
In the conversations held with each interviewee, there were comments that were not 
explicitly related to the framework of the spiral model. However, these points are important to 
enlighten us concerning some specificities of Japan and its views on gender stereotypes and gender 
equality. First, Interviewee 1 pays a lot of attention to gender stereotypes existent in daily life, and 
emphasizes the need to break down these ideas. She also specifically wanted to bring up the imperial 
system in Japan as something that is the worst evil in terms of maintaining a discriminatory mindset. 
She regretted that all the discussion about having a female successor was promptly dismissed as soon 
as a male successor was born as she believes that this image of only men in power within the Imperial 
Family is even more damaging than the inactivity of the Abe government, as it sends a direct message 
that only men can lead. Second, another interesting point was that Interviewee 6 was clear about 
feeling extremely alienated from the concept of international law, as it directly does not affect her 
daily life. After hearing that, I realized again the importance of making the topic of the women’s 
right to work in international law accessible to all kinds of people, as most probably share her view 
on this topic.  
 Lastly, the four interviewees from Shinagawa Joshi Gakuin gave us an interesting 
observation in relation to the use of social networks as a tool for spreading women’s rights related 
information in the Japanese context. They brought up the idea that it is easier for people to not even 
think about changing their mindset, just following the status quo. Thus, they believe the most 
important thing would be to make people actually think about social issues, regardless of the 
conclusion they reach. According to them, one good way of triggering young people into realizing 
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the importance of thinking about and questioning society is to have famous people speak up publicly 
about current topics. However, in Japan this kind of “influencer” are not very common, going against 
the international trend. They used the example of the “#metoo” movement, which was not very 
popular in Japan, staying concentrated only on social networks and barely being covered in 
traditional media (which tends to not cover these kinds of crimes against women effectively). 
However, they did mention that Rola, a famous female artist in Japan, tends to pick up on these topics 
and comment about them on her Instagram account, which encourages them, as her followers, to 
search more information. However, the four interviewees noted that she is not a “full Japanese”, 
since one of her parents is a foreigner, and thus it is easier for her to criticize these aspects and raise 
her voice. Their take on it being easier for a “half” Japanese to express herself can be linked to the 
aforementioned concept of high-context communication in Japanese culture and how it harms the 
process of norm implementation.  
7.2.5 What are the perspectives of interview subjects on the future, both concerning their 
organizational activities and the evolution of Japanese society? Do the interviewees have any 
suggestions to improve the present situation? 
 
 Until this point, the interviews helped clarify the issues that have been persistently happening 
in Japanese society in the present. In addition to that, consonant to my use of the spiral model to 
analyze the Japanese situation and possibly suggest ways of improving norm implementation, it is 
necessary to know more about the interviewees perspectives for the future of the country and their 
organizations, and their ideas on how to fix existent issues.  
For Interviewee 1, the biggest concern is finding efficient ways to change peoples’ minds, 
or at least to make them a little more open to learning about gender-related issues. For example, in 
the beginning of the organization some mothers would encourage them only behind the scenes, 
without raising their voices, which did not contribute to the cause. Most recently, Interviewee 1 has 
also been thinking that true change should not be treated as a denial of people’s traditions and 
customs, but as an evolution from these starting points to improve society together as people. This is 
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an approach very similar to the contents of norm localization theory, in the sense that it believes that 
some adaptation of international women’s rights norms to domestic customs might be more effective 
than forcing then upon states without any change. Interviewee 1 also reinforces the idea that what 
their organization wants is not for all women and men to necessarily divide all housework equally, 
or force all women to work, but just for everyone’s starting point to be equal, so that people in general 
and women in particular may make their own informed choices without being forced to act in a 
specific way.      
 Interviewee 2 will focus her efforts on the law, working on continuing to help on individual 
lawsuits until these can move the Diet to action and pressure the legislative to work on a 
comprehensive law against discrimination. With that, she hopes to centralize the various specific 
laws against discrimination that already exist and make it easier for these rights to be protected and 
understood by people. She also wants this legal change to make people think more deeply about what 
are human rights and what is discrimination. 
Interviewee 3, Interviewee 4, Interviewee 5 and Interviewee 11 have more realistic concerns 
about the future of their organizations. They all cited as their biggest worry the fact that the members 
are getting old and there are not enough younger people interested in following up on their work or 
creating their own movements. For example, the WWN at its peak had around 800 members, but 
now that has fallen to around 400. The organization members have been interviewing young workers 
and introducing the organization to them, but that has not given enough results, especially because 
of changes in the workplace, the lack of support from labor unions (who are constantly attacked by 
the government), and the rise in irregular, overworked employees. The same is true for Equality 
Action 21, which according to Interviewee 3 has seen a decrease in their activities and in people 
fighting for their labor rights. She complained that the deterioration of working conditions has been 
making it harder and harder to get people to worry and fight for these issues, and the small number 
of irregular workers’ organizations is not enough. That is why the members of Equality Action 21 
now are trying their best to leave written records of everything they accomplished, for future 
reference. Interviewee 3 also thinks university movements deserve more support, and that university 
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students need to be taught about the issues they might encounter when working in the future (an idea 
that is shared by Interviewee 11 and other leaders of the Zenroren). 
As a suggestion for improvement, Interviewee 11 said that the Zenrouren has been trying to 
return Japan to the point where it was a society made mainly of regular employees. Additionally, 
Interviewee 3 pointed out that more than a return to regular employment, the traditional Japanese 
long working hours need to be changed for Japan’s economy to grow. This is because the present 
situation has made it so women cannot physically follow these labor standards while taking care of 
the home, and men subjected to these working conditions cannot carry out their responsibility of 
sharing housework either (Interviewee 11). For her, it is a basic problem that affects everyone and 
holds society back. 
According to Interviewee 6, Union Bochi Bochi also suffers with the lack of manpower and 
overworked contributors, which is exacerbated by the fact that they have as members people that are 
even more marginalized than women, such as people with disabilities and working non-conventional 
jobs. This is related to Interviewee 6’s personal worries, as she mentions the difficulties in connecting 
and cooperating with other night workers through a tighter union. Plus, their organization has 
difficulty in retaining members, as people usually part ways after dealing with a specific case. 
(Interviewee 6)  
Interviewees 7, 8, 9 and 10 from Shinagawa Joshi Gakuin also faced the issue of lack of 
interest in the topic by their peers, but in a different context. Even though the school has around 1200 
female students, the four of them were the only ones discussing gender equality openly. They wish 
they could spread information and discuss with other people inside and outside the school. Lastly, 
they feel that it is still difficult to raise their voices in Japanese society, something that can be seen 
in a micro scale in their homes, where their mothers usually cannot go against their fathers’ words. 
The interviewees expressed the wish to change this and other unfair situations by climbing to top 
positions themselves in the future, in a top-down approach, at the same time they understand the need 




 Considering the common concern existent among these interviewees in relation to the lack 
of people interested enough in the topic of gender equality and women’s right to work to join their 
ranks, I questioned them on their thoughts concerning the reasons for such disinterest. In addition to 
confirming the factors already mentioned, such as the difficulty Japanese people have to externalize 
their ideas, the fact that irregular employment and prejudicial working practices have impeded people 
from thinking about their own precarious situation, and the lack of information openly shared with 
the bulk of society by the government, I asked whether the subjects had any concrete data on how 
women understand their present position in Japanese society.  
In that sense, both Interviewee 3 and Interviewee 11 showed me the results of the Gender 
Equality Bureau Cabinet Office 2018 White Paper on Gender Equality (in Japanese, 男女共同参画
白書), which has work-related data in its third chapter. For example, Image I-3-5 (represented here 
as Figure 10) shows the thoughts of women (left column) and men (right column) concerning the 
idea that “men work outside, women take care of the home”. From top to bottom, we have the 
progression of years, starting with 1979 (year 54 of the Showa Era) and passing through 1992, 2002, 
2012, 2014 and ending 2016. Concerning the table’s legend, from left to right we have: people who 
agree with the idea that “men work outside, women take care of the home”; people who agree with 
that idea if they have to choose an alternative; people who do not know how to answer; people who 
disagree with that idea if they have to choose an alternative; people who disagree with the idea that 
“men work outside, women take care of the home”. Although there is a predominantly downward 
trend on the number of people that agree with the idea completely (in the most recent data, 8.3% for 
women and 9.4% for men), considering these numbers together with the number of people that 
replied they would agree with that proposition if they had to choose an answer (in the most recent 
data, 28.7% for women and 35.3% for men), the situation becomes very alarming. Seeing how 
strongly the opinion of Japanese society is concerning these kind of values helps us understand why 





Figure 10. Thoughts of women and men on the traditional gender roles 
 
 In addition, Interviewee 11 provided data from a questionnaire carried out with more than 
ten thousand female workers and published in the Zenroren magazine. In Figure 11, we have the 
graph included in the original periodical. Concerning the legend, from left to right we have: the 
percentage of women who feel discrimination; the percentage of women who do not feel 
discrimination; the percentage of women who do not know; the percentage of women who did not 
answer. The vertical column represents the different kinds of industries they work at and the number 
of people who replied to the survey. From top to bottom, we have: the full number of participants; 
the subtotal of public servants; the number of public servants who are regular workers; the number 
of public servants who are irregular workers; the subtotal of private-sector workers; the number of 








Figure 11. Perception of women concerning discrimination in the workplace 
 
  When questioned if they felt that women were discriminated against when compared to men, 
the results were that only 5.3% of women feel discrimination in the workplace. Just from this result, 
some could conclude that there is no discrimination in the Japanese workplace, then. However, 
according to the Zenroren research (Zenroren Women’s Committee, 2016), the number of women 
realizing the discriminatory actions against them has been growing. In addition to that, Figure 8 of 
Chapter 6 showed a survey by the Japanese government which has shown most Japanese people 
believe men continue to receive preferential treatment over women in general. Considering that I 
have already established that it is incredibly difficult for women to raise their voices against 
discrimination, and that they do not receive any education on how to realize what is discriminatory 
or not, the low percentage of women vocalizing the unfairness against them makes more sense. 
Perhaps working women are just now becoming more aware and vocal of the discriminatory 
situations they have to face. As time goes by and these topics are more discussed, there will probably 
be an even higher increase in these numbers. 
 Lastly, Interviewee 1 gave the example that in kindergartens, even though both parents are 
working and thus they need to leave their kids there during the day, the teachers always send letters 
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addressed only to the mother, as if it is their sole responsibility to care for the child. Interviewee 1 
mentioned that the teacher at her child’s kindergarten only realized the issue after she pointed out the 
discriminatory undertone of this situation. Based on that, according to Interviewee 1 the main issue 
should not be the lack of women’s rights per se, as commitment has reached a somewhat comfortable 
level, but instead the lack of knowledge concerning these rights, the low number of people who make 
use of them (mainly because of high-context societal pressure to conform), and the low awareness of 
what kind of situations are discriminatory. Women especially do not realize their rights are being 
infringed, and when these women beat all the odds and rise to a position of power, they end up 
creating an infinite spiral of disregard, blame and non-compliance. (Interviewee 1) 
 Although this lack of awareness of Japanese women (and men) concerning gender equality 
paints a bleak picture of the future, not all is lost. As already mentioned, due education could work 
very well to raise awareness concerning gender issues. In addition, Interviewee 1 raised the point 
that, with the advent of the internet, she is optimistic that people will find people going through the 
same discriminatory situations and support organizations, and thus will become more prone to raising 
their voices against unfairness. 
7.3 Conclusion 
 
 In this chapter, I presented the results of the interviews carried out with a variety of Japanese 
women who are involved, in different levels and from diverse perspectives, in actions to reach better 
women’s rights protection. After introducing the methodology used to prepare the interview setting, 
the interviewees list and the question list, I looked at the answers given by the interviewees through 
the “spiral model” of norm diffusion, applying together with this theoretical concept aspects of norm 
localization, of different types of socialization and of feminist theory, in order to better understand 
the Japanese domestic views on the commitment compliance gap and the general lack of 
implementation of women’s right to work.  
 First, I presented the interviewees backgrounds and their relationship with feminist 
movements. A relevant find was the distance between Japanese women, even the ones actively 
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involved in the fight for the protection of women’s rights, and feminist theories. Interestingly most 
subjects, and specially the older ones, did not participate in or identify with Japanese feminist 
movements, usually strictly separating both their activities. By introducing a feminist approach of 
norm contestation to the “spiral model”, it might be possible to bring activism aiming to realize 
women’s right to work closer to feminist theories criticizing the male-centric international society 
and how this male-dominance spills over into legal, political, economic and social institutions, which 
obviously include work-related customs. In addition, since feminist activists are more prone to 
actively try to change people’s views on gender roles and discrimination through theoretical and 
hands-on approaches, they are consequently more involved in promoting persuasion domestically, 
and thus their association with the people striving to guarantee the protection and the realization of 
the women’s right to work would be an important way of helping Japan move on to a status of better 
compliance. In conclusion, this exercise would broaden the horizons of and strengthen the protection 
of the women’s right to work, creating intersections with other relevant issues (as the ones raised by 
Interviewee 6, in relations to marginalized workers) and bring fruitful results both to research and to 
society. 
Secondly, I found that the “spiral model” framework is very useful to analyze Japanese 
society. Concerning the model’s characteristic relationship between domestic and international actors, 
I saw that the interviewees had distinct experiences. While some more traditional national 
organizations had had productive interactions with international ones, particularly when Japan was 
dealing with its first steps towards committing to international women’s rights (phase two/phase 
three of the “spiral model), newer groups do not have the same level of direct exchange with 
transnational actors. I also concluded that even the interviewees that interacted with international 
organizations had limitations in such communication, because of lack of language skills, advanced 
age, technological proficiency, lack of manpower. Another essential factor was Japan’s refusal to 
ratify many international treaties, which makes the organizations focus on commitment instead of 
compliance. I suggest all this might influence in the demobilization of Japanese domestic 
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organizations before reaching compliance, and thus in the state getting stuck in phases 3 and 4 of the 
“spiral model”, having difficulty in committing to international women’s rights norms.      
  Third, the “spiral model” framework, when explained concisely, allowed people that had no 
previous contact with this theory to place Japan into its phase structure and identify in their 
experiences many theoretical points, such as the differentiation between socialization and persuasion 
and the effects this might have for implementation. The interviewees mostly placed Japan in between 
phases three (tactical concessions) and four (prescriptive status) of the model, matching my original 
analysis, with some particular cases of refusal to ratify international treaties putting it down on phase 
two (denial). Also, there was a consensus among the interviewees that Japan has not gone through 
persuasion, which could one explanation for why the country finds itself with such a huge 
commitment/compliance gap. 
 Fourth, important insight was earned on how the Japanese governmental, economic and 
social institutions, despite the ratification of international documents protecting women’s rights, 
remain unable to prevent the perpetuation of some social practices that weaken international pressure 
and continue to enable discrimination against women, harming specifically female empowerment 
and gender equality, and generally the growth of society itself. Plus, since the aspect of high-context 
communication predominates in Japan, it is usually difficult for women to raise their voices against 
such discrimination and inequality. These women should be able to enjoy a legal and judicial 
protection network, but because of insufficient legal strength, the Japanese laws and policies created 
to implement the women’s right to work are continuously and unanimously criticized. In the same 
sense, the judiciary is also not helpful in its approaches to topics related to gender equality, thus 
contributing to this maintenance of the commitment/compliance gap within Japanese society. 
Lastly, I can combine with these factors data that shows how much women and men still have 
gender roles internalized and the lack of people interested in partaking in the fight for gender equality. 
All this contributes to impeding Japan from reaching, or at least getting closer to a phase of rule-
consistent behavior in the women’s right to work. In this context, I can understand how important 
using persuasion as a type of socialization and taking into consideration the Japanese individualities 
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and applying notions of norm localization is to change the way Japan interacts with and internalizes 
international treaties as domestic laws and policies. Compiling the aforementioned conclusions, some 
main points can be identified, as follows: 
 There is a strong presence of traditional gender roles within Japanese society, which needs 
to be considered when trying to make Japan comply with international women’s rights law. 
 There is a distance between the interviewees and feminist movements, which limits the 
NGOs protection of the women’s right to work and affects the effectiveness of their being 
able to change society’s views on gender and discrimination.  
 There is a lack of awareness of Japanese women concerning their being discriminated 
against and a lack of education concerning women’s rights, which may be connected to 
Japan not experiencing persuasion. 
 There is a generational gap within the NGOs, with a majority of elderly members and an 
insufficiency of newer, younger members, which is contributing to the inadvertent early 
dissolution of domestic mobilization. 
 In conclusion, the worsening situation of Japanese economy, the increase in poverty and 
social stratification, the shrinking population and other factors all have been contributing to lowering 
the Japanese standing amongst other leading members of international society and creating domestic 
friction too. This makes us consider until when can Japan keep stayed attached to past “traditions” 
and keep up with the changes in the world. If the present laws, policies, attitudes towards gender 
inequality and the importance of women for a healthy society are not reconsidered soon, Japan will 




Chapter 8. Conclusion 
 
 In this thesis, I aimed to identify the causes for Japan’s commitment/compliance gap when 
it comes to the women’s right to work. To reach that goal, I used the “spiral model” of norm diffusion 
as my guiding theoretical approach, adding to it some complementary characteristics taken from 
other theories of norm diffusion. Emphasis should be given to the fact that the model is an ideal-
typical conceptualization of what happens when the processes of norm diffusion work well, which 
helps researchers identify and make sense of the “messy” points that might exist in the way towards 
norm implementation. It is also undeniably a product of its time, but with the necessary awareness 
and reflexivity over this characteristic the “spiral model” can still be highly valuable today. That 
considered, I adapted the “spiral model” to the Japanese case in question, by linking it to Checkel’s 
theory of different types of socialization, Acharya’s norm localization theory, and to feminism, 
particularly to a feminist view of norm creation, diffusion and implementation, through theories of 
norm contestation. Throughout such approach, as an underlining guide, I took into consideration 
positionality theory and the cultural/traditional argument, made occasionally by political and 
economic key players, which suggests that Japanese “culture” or “tradition” would be incompatible 
with some aspects of women’s right to work, being consistently aware of how biases and assumptions 
held by me and my interviewees, formed as a result of the context of our life experiences, intersecting 
identities and power relations, could affect the research. To the extent that it is true that it is 
impossible (and maybe even prejudicial) to completely avoid such predispositions, I focused on the 
understanding that there are women’s rights that warrant universal protection. It is important to notice 
that such understanding was clearly shown and shared by all the interviewees, and that Japan’s 
positions and actions as a state, both in the international and domestic legal stages, corroborate the 
idea that it also accepts this universal protection paradigm. That considered, I concentrated my efforts 
on using the hybrid “spiral model” as a way of anticipating and mitigating the possible effects of 
positionality and of resistance to norm diffusion arguments, based on recourse to culture and tradition.      
 After introducing the theoretical basis of this model, I proceeded to present the historical, 
legal and social background that culminated in the present lack of women’s rights implementation in 
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Japanese society. First, I introduced the legal protection given to women’s rights, focusing on the 
treaties that guarantee the right to work, such as the International Bill of Human Rights, the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) and 
International Labour Organization (ILO) documents related to the topic. Then, I considered how 
Japan tried to domestically apply such international women’s rights provisions, looking at mainly at 
the work of the executive and the legislature, but also touching upon the way the judiciary applied 
laws and principles related to the topic in their decisions. It was possible to conclude then that the 
rights based UN process approach has not been so successful in Japan, especially in comparison to 
other regions of the world, such as Latin America.  
 Following the document analysis, referring to both primary and secondary sources, I could 
identify the major commitment and compliance issues existing in Japanese society, and start to 
analyze this data through the “spiral model”. However, I needed to go deeper into these problems to 
be able to form more reliable answers to my original research question and to confirm if the model 
was truly a valid framework to use in the case of Japan. Thus, I interviewed a selected group of 
Japanese NGO representatives and other actors that worked with, researched and/or experienced 
gender discrimination at the workplace daily. After compiling their answers to a variety of questions, 
focusing on their thoughts on the “spiral model” as applied to the Japanese situation, and including 
questions about their personal experiences as Japanese working women and their views on Japanese 
culture, I finally had enough information to define a strong, but not limited, list of reasons for the 
lack of implementation of women’s right to work in Japan. In this conclusion, in addition to 
summarizing these findings, I will also identify other topics of interest, and finally suggest tentative 
ways for the government to bridge the commitment/compliance gap.   
Initially, I had three main propositions for why the commitment/compliance gap has 
persisted so strongly in Japan, even with continuous government rhetoric on making society a more 
gender equal place. The first one was the influence that cultural and social conditions have in the 
lack of implementation, particularly when it comes to women and the workplace. Japan, in an attempt 
to protect traditional values, has maintained the idea that “men work and women take care of the 
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home” alive in the minds of its citizens and of people in powerful positions. Because of this mentality 
(internalized and externalized by both women and men, albeit in different proportions), workplace 
issues damaging to women’s careers and lives, such as the gender-pay gap, sexual and power 
harassment and the fact that women tend to be forced into part-time or clerical positions, also persist 
strongly in Japan. The second proposition is related to how Japan has been criticized by domestic 
and international actors for downplaying the importance of international law over domestic law. The 
state has continuously avoided implementing repeated recommendations from international 
organizations and publicizing such information nationally, which affects the level of knowledge of 
the general population concerning such norms and rights. The third proposition deals with the fact 
that even Japanese domestic labor laws and policies that were supposed to implement international 
treaties lack strength, mostly consisting of guidelines without any duty or sanction. This allows 
companies and courts, both dominated by men, respectively to avoid complying and to prioritize the 
discretionary power of business over the rights of female workers.   
 All these three tentative propositions were clearly confirmed in my deeper document and 
interview-based analysis. However, I also found more layers to these problems, particularly after 
applying the “spiral model” to the Japanese situation. First, I could unmistakably situate Japan within 
the five phases of the “spiral model”. My original conclusion was that, considering the characteristics 
of each phase and the present situation of Japan in relation to women’s right to work, the situation in 
Japan with regard to the women’s right to work could be located in between the end of the phase of 
tactical concessions (phase three of the “spiral model”) and the beginning of the phase of prescriptive 
status (phase four of the “spiral model”). This is because even though the Japanese legislature and 
the executive have signed some international treaties on the topic and created domestic laws and 
policies aiming to revert the situation of gender inequality, these have continuously not reached their 
original goals. Also, when it comes to some other important international treaties and conventions, 
such as the Optional Protocol to the CEDAW and ILO Conventions no.111 and no.183 (which are 
key to guarantee equality in the workplace), Japan has refused to even ratify them, ignoring advice 
from international actors. This puts the country, in relation to these specific situations, even lower in 
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the phase of denial (phase two of the “spiral model”). These classifications were confirmed by the 
interviewees, who were adamant that Japan was nowhere clear the level of rule-consistent behavior 
(phase five of the “spiral model”). This can be seen in Figure 12, and can be related to the theory of 
organized hypocrisy in the sense that reaching phase four is actually a form of tactical concession for 
Japan. The state is recognizing that there is an international women’s rights script it should follow 
and thus it is adjusting its logic of appropriateness to an extent by creating legislation even when it 
has no intention of implementing it satisfactorily. The interviewees were highly aware that this lack 
of compliance feels almost tactical, which shows that they are aware of Japan masking its logic of 
consequences under a logic of appropriateness, and that the “spiral model” framework was useful to 
identify and name processes of non-compliance in this case.  
 I was also able to place Japan within Checkel’s theory of different types of socialization. 
Based on his division between role playing (Type I socialization) and persuasion (Type II 
socialization or normative suasion) and on the logics of action behind these kinds of socialization, I 
could place Japan in a situation of strategic calculation and/or following the lead of other 
international players just to avoid making such calculations. In other words, Japan has not been truly 
persuaded about the need and the importance of guaranteeing the women’s right to work. It might be 
“talking the talk” to some extent, but it is not “walking the walk”. Analogously to the point 
concerning Japan’s place in the “spiral model’s” phases, the interviewees also corroborated this 
classification, affirming that the Japanese government and business have been recognizing that there 
is an international script they should follow (under a logic of appropriateness), but they still make 
instrumental decisions (under a logic of consequences) to try to quickly solve issues such as the 
worsening economy and the lack of workers. This contributes to the general lack of understanding 
concerning gender equality in the workplace, and consequently stops Japan from going beyond a low 






Figure 12. The suggested position of Japan (reproduction from page 34) 
 
 Other relevant points related to the “spiral model” and complementing theories were also 
brought up by some interviewees. Interviewee 1 pointed out that true change should not be come 
from a denial of people’s traditions and customs, but as an evolution of these ideas aiming to improve 
society. This approach can be linked to Acharya’s norm localization theory, in the sense that adapting 
some of international women’s rights norms to domestic customs might initially be more effective 
than just forcing then upon states. Although I had already considered this possibility when adding 
the concept of norm localization to the model, since it would help us avoid complaints of 
neocolonialism, in particular by non-Western states like Japan, it was interesting to see this 
mentioned and confirmed by one of the interviewees without any prompting. 
 The answers related to the relation between the Japanese feminist movement and the work 
of the interviewee were surprising. Considering most people fighting for the women’s right to work 
are women themselves, my initial thought was that the women’s liberation movement of the 70s or 
even more modern views on feminism would have been intrinsically connected to their activities. 
However, most interviewees had no connection to the movement and feminist theory, usually seeing 
it as more of a sociological approach that could not be of use for their activities. This finding allows 
us to suggest that introducing a feminist approach to the “spiral model” was useful not only to 
theoretically criticize the male-centric international society that spills over into legal, political, 
economic and social institutions, but also to enhance the relationship between feminism and Japanese 
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women, particularly female activists. This could be used to materialize such feminist theories into 
activism aiming to realize women’s right to work, thus broadening the limits of the protection of the 
women’s right to work and creating intersections such as the one suggested by Interviewee 6, related 
to marginalized workers.  
 The insight from the interviewees also contributed to my analysis of Japanese society and 
how it evolved concerning the mobilization for the realization of the women’s right to work. The 
model assumes that there will be a constant interaction between domestic and international actors 
until the phase of complete implementation. However, the interviewees did not have uniform 
experiences of such interaction. Some more traditional national organizations had enjoyed fruitful 
interactions with international actors, particularly when Japan was starting to commit to international 
women’s rights (phase two/phase three of the “spiral model”), while more recently formed groups 
and older groups in their recent activities do not have the same level of connection. From the 
interviewees answers and from my observations when participating in women’s rights events, I could 
also notice limitations in transnational communication deriving from the activists’ lack of language 
skills, advanced age, lack of technological proficiency, lack of manpower, too much focus on 
commitment instead of compliance (caused by Japan’s aforementioned refusal to ratify many 
international treaties). I concluded that all these obstacles influence in the inadvertent demobilization 
of Japanese domestic organizations before reaching compliance, and this adds to the explanation of 
why the state has such difficulty to commit and comply to international women’s rights norms. This 
demobilization is represented in Figure 13, with focus on how the “spiral model” assumed that 
domestic society structure and the pressure coming from it would continuously broaden during 
phases three (tactical concessions) and four (prescriptive status), decreasing only after phase five 
(rule-consistent behavior) was completed.  
I must point out that the fact that this standard process could not be identified in Japan does 
not diminish the relevance of the “spiral model” in any sense. As previously mentioned, the “spiral 
model” works as a framework illustrating what happens if the process works well, and deviation 
from this model only demonstrates how useful the theory is when it comes to identifying which cases 
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diverge from the model, and how and when they do so. Thus, in turn, this knowledge allowed me to 
make better sense of the Japanese situation, and consequently to suggest more accurate ways to 
improve implementation and to move Japan towards phase five. 
Figure 13. Linear representation of the processes of the “spiral model” framework with 
focus on the last phases of the “spiral model” and on the broadening of domestic structure 
 
 Social and cultural aspects of Japan were consistently brought up by the interviewees. They 
incisively relayed their experiences and knowledge of how traditional values are used by the Japanese 
governmental, economic and social institutions as excuses to resist international pressure, thus 
perpetuating (possibly intentionally, or at least without realizing) a strict view on gender roles and 
harming the empowerment of women in particular, and the growth of society in general. This is 
aggravated by the high-context communication cultural characteristic of Japan, which focuses on the 
importance of following implicit social and customary clues and ends up making it more difficult for 
women to raise their voices against discrimination and inequality that is intrinsic in society. Data has 
proven this tendency, showing that both Japanese women and men still have gender roles internalized, 
possibly because of a lack of education on the matter, or because of this cultural tendency of 
following in the footsteps of past generations without questioning (as mentioned by Interviewee 1).  
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 To make matters worse, from the analysis of court cases and the insight from interviewees 
that had participated in these legal battles directly, I learned that in Japan women can enjoy neither 
a legal protection network, nor a judicial one. As already mentioned, Japanese laws and policies 
aiming to implement the women’s right to work were continuously and unanimously criticized for 
their insufficient awareness of societal issues and lack of legal strength. Similarly, the judiciary has 
been failing women who come to it to guarantee an application of the law based on principles of 
gender equality, since the courts’ approach to cases dealing with the women’s right to work has been 
prioritizing the discretionary power of the employees, unless there is a clear manifestation of 
discrimination that is explicitly mentioned in the workplace. This is another reason that contributes 
to burying women’s voices and to the maintenance of the commitment/compliance gap within 
Japanese society. 
 Lastly, a common worry of all the interviewees was the low number of people interested in 
fighting for gender equality. A group of previously mentioned factors, such as the job instability 
faced by newer generations, the lack of information offered to them on labor rights, the cultural fear 
of standing out with their complaints and breaking the implicit communication social rules has been 
contributing to people not being interested on joining activism groups or even their own labor union. 
Consequently, Japan remains far away from reaching satisfactory levels of compliance, remaining at 
phases three (tactical concessions) and four (prescriptive status) of the “spiral model” concerning 
the women’s right to work.  
 In conclusion, after looking at all these possible reasons for Japan’s lack of compliance, I 
can suggest some ways of improving the situation. First, following the “spiral model” framework 
and its diffusion techniques, I can look at which mechanisms of action would be able to push Japanese 
society forward more effectively. Considering that Japan has been focusing only on a reward model 
to get companies to comply to labor laws, without any real success, I suggest that conditionality 
should be used instead in the form of domestic legal sanctions for such companies. It is past time 
Japanese law becomes stronger. Capacity building is another welcome mechanism, since from this 
research it has become clear that there is not enough information being shared or education being 
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given on the topic, even to the most relevant governmental actors. From the idea offered by 
Interviewee 2, I may suggest that looking at the laws and policies created by other nations, 
particularly East-Asian nations that rank better than Japan in international gender indexes, through 
the mechanisms of lesson-drawing and mimicry could also be useful.  
However, the most important suggestion is for international and national civil society actors 
to strive to persuade Japan of the importance of guaranteeing the women’s right to work. Japan has 
been stuck in an instrumentalist view of such rights, trying to get women in the workforce just to 
fulfill economic goals and without adapting its traditional and harming work-related views to this 
new configuration of society. While it is important to take into consideration the Japanese 
individualities and apply notions of norm localization to norm suasion, norm diffusion actors need, 
through discourse and persuasion, to change to some extent the way Japan interacts with and 
internalizes international treaties as domestic laws and policies. If this change does not arrive soon, 
the shrinking population of Japan, the intensifying social stratification, the worsening of the economy 
and the increase in poverty will lead to new domestic problems and the lowering of Japan’s standing 
within international society. Considering these dangers, senior Japanese decision-makers must 
reconsider their attachment to traditions that are clearly only harming society. I hope this research 
can be a starting point for future studies not only in the matter of norm diffusion for women’s right 
to work, but also used to help Japan adapt its unique social aspects and traditional views to the 
demands of a new societal structure that will not wait for it to catch up. Japan has been stuck in time 
and hindered by so-called cultural differences for too long. If it does not keep up with the changes in 
both international and its own domestic society, Japan will never be able to overcome this persistent 
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